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CHAPTER I 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
On the other hand, if the money is being spent as it needs to be spent—to rebuild our 
roads and our bridges and our schools, and making sure that we are putting in place the 
kinds of infrastructure foundations that are necessary for economic growth over the long 
term—then I think all of us will benefit and our voters and our constituents, the people we 
work for, are going to be extraordinarily grateful. – Barack Obama, 12 March 2009. 
 
Many administrations have sought to maximize their control of the machinery of 
government for political gain, dispatching Cabinet secretaries bearing government 
largess to battleground states in the days before elections. But [Karl] Rove…pursued the 
goal far more systematically than his predecessors…enlisting political appointees at 
every level of government in a permanent campaign. –Washington Post, August 19, 2007. 
 
In late 2008 and early 2009, the United States rapidly entered a profound 
economic recession. In concert with Congress, the Bush and Obama Administrations 
crafted legislation intended to stem economic losses and restart the economy on a path 
toward growth, employment, and stability. What became the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009
1
 was signed into law on February 19, 2009. The White House 
stated that the legislation was “a nationwide effort to create jobs, jumpstart growth and 
transform our economy to compete in the 21
st
 century”2 and would “provide immediate 
tax relief to families and businesses, while investing in priorities like health care, 
education, energy, and infrastructure…”3 
                                                 
1
 P.L. 111-5 
2
 Obama, Barack. “White House Releases State by State Numbers; American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act to Save or Create 3.5 Million Jobs.” The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 17 February 
2009. Web. 20 October 2011. 
3
 Obama, Barack. “Statement on Recovery and Reinvestment Agreement.” The White House, Office of the 
Press Secretary, 11 February 2009. Web. 20 October 2011. 
2 
 
 The Recovery Act or ARRA ultimately provided $282 billion in tax relief, $274 
billion in discretionary funding programs like grants and contracts, and $284 billion in 
entitlement program funding.
4
 Although the legislation attempted to serve a universal 
goal—rehabilitating the flailing economy—the means by which the Obama 
Administration and Democrats in Congress sought to achieve that goal was controversial. 
During the negotiation and even after passage of the bill, criticism percolated across the 
two parties and branches as well as in the media. This concern over the structure and 
content of the bill involved issues such as the role of politics in the economic recovery 
and the exercise and expansion of power in policy making. 
 While the bill was intended to resolve an enormous economic crisis, critics 
suggested that the Recovery Act and the many drafts before final form contained 
porkbarrel spending that advanced individual electoral interests over the economic 
interests of the nation. Much of the discussion of porkbarrel spending came to fruition in 
a debate over the use of earmarks in the legislation. The president voiced this concern 
most actively. Although this criticism emerged in response to the Recovery Act, such 
concerns are not context specific. Instead, these earmarks are frequent points of 
contention in the discussion of the annual federal appropriations process.  
 The debate over porkbarrel politics and legislative earmarking did not begin with 
the Recovery Act. Earmarks as anathema has been part of the political lexicon and mood 
for decades. The issue prompted President Bush to issue an aggressive Executive Order 
(No. 13457) in January 2008 in an effort “to be judicious in the expenditure of taxpayer 
                                                 
4
 http://www.recovery.gov/About/Pages/The_Act.aspx 
3 
 
dollars.”5 Specifically, this Executive Order directs federal agencies to ignore earmark 
requests that are not written into appropriations or authorization legislation.
6
 While many 
of the talking points of the time suggested an effort to eliminate earmarks, Presidents 
Bush and Obama instead wanted “the number and cost of earmarks [to] be reduced…”7 
because “done right, earmarks have given legislators the opportunity to direct federal 
money to worthy projects that benefit people in their districts.”8 
 One concern over pork and the use of earmarks was their “corrupting element” 
that can “be traded for political favors.”9 However, some frame this worry in terms of 
fiscal responsibility. In early 2009, as the American economy contracted and government 
spending rose dramatically, earmarks became a target of those voicing concerns over 
unchecked disbursements. While Obama sought to strip earmarks from the Recovery Act, 
between it and the FY 2009 Appropriations bills, there were nearly 12,000 earmarks 
(Riedl 2009). The reality of the earmarks debate had little to do with fiscal responsibility, 
and the Obama critique while publicly framed as deficit control had a different 
motivation entirely. 
 The removal of earmarks from spending bills does little to reduce spending. In 
fact, “earmarks don’t add money to the annual federal budget, they simply direct money 
from the pot that is already being spent” (Needham 2010). In this way, the removal of 
earmarks does not aid in the pursuit of fiscal discipline. Instead, it simply transfers the 
                                                 
5
 Bush, George W. “Protecting American Taxpayers From Government Spending on Wasteful Earmarks.” 
Executive Order 13457 of 29 January 2008. Web. 20 October 2011. 
6
 Commonly, legislators include earmark requests in conference reports with the expectation that federal 
agencies will honor such a provision. E.O. 13457 requires federal agencies to treat such requests as 
advisory and non-binding. 
7
 Ibid at 5. 
8
 Obama, Barack. “Remarks by the President on Earmark Reform.” The White House, Office of the Press 
Secretary. 11 March 2009. Web. 20 October 2011. 
9
 Ibid.  
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power to make distributive decisions from Congress to the president. Traditionally, 
Congress has exercised the power to decide where federal spending would be directed. 
The legislative branch exercises this power in a multitude of ways including creating 
block and categorical grants, designing distributive formulas, detailing criteria, and 
earmarking funds. However, executive branch discretion guides the allocation of large 
sums of federal dollars under both divided and unified government. Presidential efforts to 
curb earmarking are born not from an altruistic desire to rid policy of politics. Rather, 
such endeavors serve to protect the presidential power of the purse by maintaining and 
preserving discretion.  
 Congress and members of the media have noted that the foundations of a 
presidential critique on porkbarrel politics is both motivated by a desire to expand and 
preserve executive power and a disingenuous attack on the role of politics in policy 
making. Early into his tenure and in response to the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 
2009,
10
 President Obama wrote in a signing statement that “spending decisions shall not 
be treated as dependent on the approval of congressional committees” and that his 
administration would resist any effort to “condition the authority of officers to spend or 
reallocate funds on the approval of congressional committees,” calling these 
Congressional actions “impermissible forms of legislative aggrandizement in the 
execution of laws.”11 
 Congress became acutely aware of presidential efforts to expand spending power 
and resisted such pressure. Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) summed 
up the president’s maneuver as an “issue about discretion, about an argument between the 
                                                 
10
 P.L. 111-8 
11
 Obama, Barack. “Statement on Signing the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009.” The White House. 11 
March 2009.  
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executive branch and the legislative branch over how funds should be spent” (as quoted 
in Bolton 2010). Understanding this fight between the branches and the political, 
electoral, and institutional power that spending authority and allocation decision making 
carries, Congress resisted “put(ting) the money into the hands of President Obama [and] 
allowing his administration to spend the money as it saw fit.”12  
 This conflict between the branches over the distributive powers of government is 
not new. In fact, wrangling over proper spheres of power date to the beginning of the 
Republic, and as the government has grown in size and scope, so too have battles over the 
demarcation of legislative and executive power. Louis Fisher wrote in 1975, “a 
customary congressional control has been to delegate broad discretionary authority, 
confining that discretion by a combination of statutory guidelines and a trust in the 
integrity and good faith of executive officials” (259). He went on to explain that “unless 
Congress strengthens its control over budget execution, it cannot legislate back to reality 
its vaunted ‘power of the purse’” (1975, 260). 
 Congress has long enjoyed the political benefits and unique character of its 
constitutional role.
13
 As the government’s appropriators, legislators use this power to 
influence policy and demonstrate for their constituencies their hard work by returning to 
their state or district a share of the federal largesse. Through what David Mayhew calls 
“credit claiming,” legislators use spending power to seek political and electoral rewards 
(reelection or electoral stability) from their employers (voters) (1974). Any threat to a 
                                                 
12
 Senator Inhofe (OK). “Earmarks.” Congressional Record  Vol. 156 (November 29, 2010) p. S8254. 
13
 In fact,  Senator Lamar Alexander (R-TN) explains that efforts to ride Congress of the ability to earmark 
“would undermine the Constitution because instead of placing a check on the President, it turns the 
checkbook over to him” (Alexander, Lamar [TN]. “Alexander Statement on Earmark Moratorium.” Office 
of US Senator Lamar Alexander. 15 November 2010). 
6 
 
fundamental behavior and the primary goal of Congressional actors is met with profound 
resistance.  
In the battle over porkbarrel spending, earmarks and the Recovery Act, 
Republicans were quick to criticize the behaviors of President Barack Obama. However, 
Democratic co-partisans were also wary of presidential efforts to expand spending 
authority (Needham 2010; Ward 2009).
14
 The separation-of-powers controversy over the 
power to spend government revenue rests not over whether earmarks exist, but rather, 
who performs the earmarking. A 2006 Wall Street Journal article declares, “Presidents 
like pork, too” (Calmes). The piece proceeds to explain that “the president’s earmarks are 
harder—if not impossible—to tally” and “once federal agencies get funding from 
Congress, [the president’s] appointees are fairly free to steer sums to places, programs 
and vendors as the administration decides” (Calmes 2006).  
Presidential earmarks, a phrase less common than its Congressional counterpart, 
demonstrate not only the president’s discretionary authority over large tracts of the 
federal budget, but also his desire to use such spending in politically or electorally 
expedient ways. While it is often regarded as a truism that Members of Congress use 
porkbarrel spending to claim credit before their electoral constituency, presidents behave 
in similar ways. Seniority, seats on key legislative committees, and electoral vulnerability 
are among the characteristics that benefit legislators in seeking to garner extra funding 
from the appropriations process for political gain. However, discretionary spending 
authority in the executive branch similarly empowers the president. There is also little 
doubt that the White House seeks such influence and pursues such goals. In discussing 
                                                 
14
 Needham’s article from The Hill includes quotations from David Obey (D-WI) and Ward’s article from 
The Washington Times includes quotations from Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV). Both criticize 
the transfer of spending power to the executive branch.  
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the Recovery Act, Vice President Joe Biden remarked that whenever “we’ve sent money 
out to renovate a school in a particular city, in a particular states—it will be up there [the 
recovery.gov web site]. All the press will see it on the web site. The neighbors and the 
community will see it.”15 The Vice President makes clear that the funds allocated by the 
executive branch serve as credit claiming opportunities for the President.  
To this end, presidents emulate the behaviors of Members of Congress in the 
arena of distributive policy. Chiefs executive seek to wield spending authority such that 
allocation decisions run through the White House or the offices of appointees within 
respective agencies. Such authority carries with it an inter-institutional strength that 
increases presidential policy power. Yet beyond the accumulation of power, presidents 
also reap the benefits of spending authority. Like legislators, allocation decision making 
allows presidents to claim credit for federal projects and demonstrate to voters that the 
White House views their local interests as important.  
The same basic political motives driving the behaviors of Members of Congress 
also drive the behaviors of presidents. Presidents allocate federal dollars strategically to 
facilitate an electoral connection to the people they represent. The debate over the 
propriety of porkbarrel spending (or more aptly the source of such spending) reveals a 
president who seeks to “…‘decide to put it in some key district or state’ for political 
gain” (Calmes 2006).16 In fact, Office of Management and Budget official Barry 
                                                 
15
 Biden, Joseph. “Remarks by the Vice President at the First Recovery Plan Implementation Meeting.” The 
White House, Office of the Vice President. 25 February 2009. Web. 18 October 2011. 
16
 In the quotation provided, Calmes is quoting Tom Schatz, President of Citizens Against Government 
Waste. 
8 
 
Anderson claims “presidents use earmarks much as members of Congress do” (as quoted 
in Calmes 2006).
17
  
 The view of the president as a political being may come as a surprise to many. 
The public view and the perspective of many political scientists often differ regarding the 
motives, behaviors, and role of the president in the American system. Throughout the 
history of the Republic and the study of the presidency in political science, presidents 
have been described in many ways ranging from a constrained executive to a powerful 
leader to a unique institutional actor facing distinctive political forces.  These views 
prescribed precise expectations regarding presidential incentives. This dissertation seeks 
to (re)conceptualize the way in which we view presidents, their goals and their behaviors. 
In the context of federal spending, I explore how presidents are motivated by their own 
electoral goals and advance these goals through the formal and informal powers of their 
office. The expansive powers and complex institutional structure of the executive branch 
allow the presidency to be micro-level in nature, provoking the chief executive to be 
campaigner-in-chief engaged in particularistic policy rather than a national figure 
committed to universalistic policy. 
 
Evolving View of the President 
 
 Over the history of the Republic views of presidential power, motives, roles, and 
duties have changed dramatically. Since the Founding, disagreements existed over the 
nature of the office of President of the United States and its role in the policy making 
                                                 
17
 Clames goes on to quote Anderson as saying that spending decisions are used “To reward political 
supporters, campaign contributors and sometimes members of Congress.” 
9 
 
process. Such conflict raged between parties, among the branches, in academic circles 
and among presidents themselves. Changes in presidential experience and practice, as 
well as important transitions in the size, scope, authority, and responsibility of the office 
have led to evolution in perspectives. Conflicts about and changes in the office of the 
president produced dramatically different scholarly views of motives and incentives. 
Because the nature of an institution shapes the incentives of those within it, these varied 
views of the presidency result in quite different presidential behaviors. Disagreements 
over the power and role of the president have begun to give way to a consensus view of 
broad presidential power and policy influence. Contemporary scholars argue that modern 
presidents share similar incentives and powers derived from their institutional role. 
 
Disagreements over Defining the Presidency  
 
 The construction of Article II of the US Constitution and ratification of the 
document did little to settle what was a contentious debate at the Constitutional 
Convention. The design of the office of President of the United States, like many issues 
during the Convention, produced disagreement and ultimately compromise. Whereas 
term length, electoral procedures, and other executive branch concepts were plainly 
defined, the limits of power and scope of the office were far less clear. 
The vague nature of Article II produced conflict as early as the Washington 
administration, reflected famously in the Pacificus-Helvidius debates that played out in 
the nation’s newspapers. In response to Washington’s Proclamation of Neutrality, 
10 
 
Alexander Hamilton and James Madison debated the scope of the president’s power. 
Hamilton (Pacificus) argued for an expansive view of the Executive, noting  
because the difficulty of a complete and perfect specification of all the 
cases of Executive authority would naturally dictate the use of general 
terms—and would render it improbable that a specification of certain 
particulars was designed as a substitute for those terms, when antecedently 
used. (Pacificus No. 1) 
 
More generally, this view reflected Hamilton’s perception that the key to a powerful and 
successful nation was the creation of a potent executive. Meanwhile, Madison 
(Helvidius) largely echoed his arguments from the Federalist papers, explaining that 
Pacificus’ view of the Executive would threaten the stability of the Republic. The conflict 
was rooted in philosophical differences over executive power. The text of the 
Constitution—and particularly the (dis)use of the phrase “herein granted” generated 
much of this lively debate. Whereas the Vesting Clause in Article I refers to “legislative 
powers herein granted,” Article II excludes that phrase in outlining presidential power. 
Hamilton argues that such an omission signals broader, less bounded executive power, 
while Madison claimed the text denotes limited presidential authority (Nelson 2008). In 
fact, the view of the constrained president characterized Madison’s writings of the period. 
In his defense of the new constitution, Madison juxtaposes Congressional power with that 
of the president in Federalist No. 48, describing “the executive power [as] being 
restrained with a narrower compass, and being more simple in its nature…” The public 
exchange between the Treasury Secretary and the future president framed not only a 
disagreement between nascent political parties but a continuous debate that ignited 
passions for generations. 
11 
 
 Conflict over the role of the president in the affairs of government was not merely 
philosophical in nature. It also affected the manner in which presidents exercised the 
powers of their office. Before the 20
th
 century, presidents varied dramatically in terms of 
the assertion of power and involvement in affairs, foreign and domestic. Disagreement 
over the proper role and scope of the presidency include famous and contentious disputes 
between Congress and the president, including Jackson’s efforts to close the National 
Bank and Andrew Johnson’s removal of his Secretary of War. In this context, an 
expansive view of presidential power motivated the chief executive to engage Congress 
in a power conflict. 
 However, expansive presidential power and a defense of the strength of the 
executive were not uniform throughout history. Several presidents spoke out against 
presidential power and warned of its risks. In his Inaugural Address, William Henry 
Harrison warned of a president’s constitutional ability to seek additional terms in office, 
claiming  
that republics can commit no greater error than to adopt or continue any 
feature in their systems of government which may be calculated to create 
or increase the lover of power in the bosoms of those to whom necessity 
obliges them to commit the management of their affairs.
18
 
 
For President Harrison, his view of limited presidential power drove him to swear off 
seeking a second term (had fate allowed the decision to be within his discretion). He also 
went on to note the limited policy role of the president arguing 
I can not conceive that by a fair construction any or either of its (the 
Constitution’s) provisions would be found to constitute the President a 
part of the legislative power…In the language of the Constitution, “all 
legislative powers” which it grants “are vested in the Congress of the 
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United States.” It would be solecism in language to say that any portion of 
these is not included in the whole.
19
 
 
This view places presidents as bystanders in the legislative process, empowered solely  
 
through the use of the veto. 
 
 Indeed, Harrison was not alone among presidents. In a book penned after the 
conclusion of his term as commander-in-chief, William Howard Taft famously argued for 
the “literalist” theory of presidential power.20 Literalist theory reflects the Madisonian 
view that presidential power was limited to that which is expressly granted 
constitutionally. Taft wrote in contrast to Theodore Roosevelt who promoted the 
“stewardship theory” of presidential power.21 Under this theory, Roosevelt envisioned the 
president to be charged to do anything in response to national needs not explicitly 
forbidden constitutionally. The views reflect dramatically different perspectives on 
presidential power, even from those who personally exercised it. 
 Scholars of the presidency also carried the debate over presidential power into 
academic circles. Disagreement over the power of the president motivated some of the 
early research and writings in the embryonic field of American political science, and no 
scholar exemplified both topical debate and evolution more than Professor Woodrow 
Wilson. In his preface to his 1885 text Congressional Government, Wilson writes that his 
essays, “take[e] Congress as the central and predominant power of the system” and that 
the purpose of the book “is to illustrate everything Congressional” (i). Early in his career, 
Wilson wrote powerfully of the authority of Congress in American political affairs and 
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policy making. Even when acknowledging the role of the president, Congress was viewed 
as the superior force of power and the “foreman set over the forces of government” 
(Wilson 1885, 302). The implication of this view is that of a president largely divorced 
from policy making, at least in the domestic context.
 22
 
 Wilson’s view of the role of the president as secondary in the American system 
did not persevere. In fact, in the preface to the second edition of Congressional 
Government just 16 years later, Wilson notes “The President of the United States is now, 
of course, at the front of affairs, as no president except Lincoln, has been since the first 
quarter of the nineteenth century” (1901, xii). However, Wilson remained wary of the 
permanence of this power dynamic, skeptically writing, “the new leadership of the 
Executive, inasmuch as it is likely to last…” (1901, xii). By 1908, Wilson’s view of the 
president had transformed dramatically. In Constitutional Government in the United 
States, he writes, “there can be no mistaking that we have grown more and more 
inclined…to look to the President as the unifying force in our complex system, the leader 
of both his party and of the nation” (1908, 60). During a 23 year period, Professor Wilson 
endures a transformative view that many scholars, observers and citizens shared. 
Formerly, scholars believed the exercise of presidential power often depended 
substantially on the personality and “initiative” of the officeholder and that successful 
and forceful use of presidential power was exceptional.
23
 What became clear early in the 
20
th
 century was that the presidential role was changing, and it was unclear whether 
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 In Constitutional Government in the United States (1908), Wilson distinguished the president’s role in 
foreign policy writing, “One of the greatest of the President’s powers…[is] his control, which is very 
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Congress would reclaim its position of prominence. Wilson argued that as the 
presidential role transformed, the president became incentivized to take more active, 
central and public investment in politics and policy. 
 The transitions in views over presidential power and scope of influence that began 
in Wilson’s writings continued into his tenure as president and beyond. In many ways, 
these views of the presidency transformed because of events and changes in American 
politics and society. Crises of economics and foreign policy during the first half of the 
20
th
 century drove changes in the view of presidential power and put greater demands on 
government, generating new citizen expectations. The first half of the 20
th
 century 
included crises that threatened both democracy and capitalism, and the presidential 
response involved a profound exercise of executive power in an effort to meet both 
challenges and public need.
24
 In fact, the New Deal/Roosevelt era expanded presidential 
power in multiple ways. Beyond simply the exercise of power during crisis, Congress and 
eventually the Supreme Court ultimately delegated and codified increased presidential 
power in concert with the expansion of the federal government role in domestic affairs. 
The president came to be viewed as a unitary actor who acquired wide-reaching power to 
affect outcomes in the national interest. Congress formalized this new role by expanding 
presidential staff in creating the Executive Office of the President (EOP). The EOP 
quickly grew and over time included the Office of Management and Budget (formerly the 
Bureau of the Budget), the White House Office, the National Security Council, the 
Council of Economic Advisors, and several other policy-relevant institutions. Rather than 
a return to the old, after World War II, a new equilibrium was set and the president 
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remained a powerful and dominant force in American political life. This permanent 
institutional transformation led to dramatic change in the way citizens view their 
president, how scholars study the office, and presidents are driven to behave. 
 
The Modern View of the Institutional Presidency 
 
Modern scholars of the presidency particularly focus on how the 
institutionalization of the office and increased citizen demands on government shape the 
behavior of all modern presidents. Modern presidents, as the only nationally elected 
political official (save the vice president) must be intimately involved in policy making 
and motivated by broad-based, national goals. The profound socioeconomic and political 
changes that occurred during the New Deal and World War II era dramatically 
transformed the office and fundamentally shaped the incentives and behaviors of all 
presidents from that point forward. No longer would presidents have a restrained role or 
one secondary to Congress. Instead, the president would become the singular leader of 
the American government. In fact, Neustadt (1960) notes,  
A striking feature of our recent past has been the transformation into 
routine practice of the actions we once treated as exceptional. A President 
may retain liberty, in Woodrow Wilson’s phrase, “to be as big a man as he 
can.” But nowadays he cannot be as small as he might like. (5) 
 
 Part of what defines the modern presidency is agreement about some aspects of 
the power of the president and his role in government, laying to rest much of the previous 
debate on the subject. One element of this consensus is an institutional view of the 
16 
 
presidency.
25
 With the institutional presidency scholars focus less on individual 
presidents and more on how the office and the unique position shapes presidents. The 
phrase “White House” serves not as a convenient synonym for “president,” but as a 
moniker more representative of the reality of the position and conceptualization of the 
office.  
 The institutionalization of the presidency emerged in response to greater demands 
on the office. Beginning with President Wilson’s active legislative role and solidified 
with the efforts of President Roosevelt’s New Deal, presidents actively engaged in 
domestic policy in addition to foreign policy.
26
 The public, responding to expectations set 
clear by FDR at the start of his presidency, increasingly viewed presidents as the official 
held to account for national problems. Presidents responded by playing a greater role in 
issues like transportation, social welfare, education, scientific research, race and equality 
issues, and tax and economic policy. In fact, Moe and Howell note that as the presidency 
transformed, 
the public began to demand positive governmental responses to pressing 
social problems and to hold the president, as the symbol and focus of 
national leadership, responsible for the successes and failures of 
government. (1999, 136) 
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 Huntington (1965) eloquently explained the institutional features of the presidency in an effort to shift 
from personal assessments of presidents (but see Greenstein 2000, 2009), and this work spurred much of 
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Cromartie 1982) and careerists (Pfiffner 1999; Wilson 1989). 
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 The expanded executive branch role in budgetary politics encouraged and aided the president’s foray 
into, and eventual takeover of domestic policy (Pfiffner 1996; Schick 2000). 
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Through time, presidents became more successful at implementing a broad and 
coordinated legislative agenda and affecting policy outcomes in substantial ways.
27
 In 
fact, presidency scholars took hold of this conceptualization of the presidential effort, 
leading Stephen Wayne to title his 1978 book, “The Legislative Presidency.” The 
burgeoning institutional presidency allowed the White House to develop and advance 
legislation that was broad-based and programmatic (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). 
 
Institutionalizing Incentives: The National President 
 
 A widely held view has developed in which modern presidents have a unique 
vantage point in the policy process and as the only nationally elected representative in 
government must focus on matters of broad public significance and import to be 
effective. This national constituency shapes views of governance and the choices of 
public policy issues. Scholars of the modern presidency argue presidents are distinctive 
as “they are the only governmental officials elected by a national constituency in votes on 
general, rather than local, policy issues” (Kagan 2001, 2334). Because of the nature of 
this constituency, presidential elections are “focused on broad public policy questions” 
(Kagan 2001, 2334). At the service of this constituency, presidents are charged with and 
held responsible for the creation and execution of public policy that is more universalistic 
in nature. Thus, constituency incentivizes the exercise of power. 
 Even presidents note their distinct role. For “a question of transcendent 
importance,” Andrew Jackson defended presidential decision making as “in justice to the 
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responsibility which he owes to the country.”28 Herbert Hoover explained that “the 
President must represent the nation’s ideals,”29 while Harry Truman explained presidents 
try to “accomplish something that will be for the benefit of all the people of the 
Nation.”30 Thinking on the presidency always contained a strain that the president is a 
unique actor in the American system and is alone in having an electoral connection to a 
national constituency. This institutional position means presidential policymaking “is 
occupied with numerous and important national problems,”31 while parochialism must be 
left to the humors of legislators. In describing presidential interests, Moe notes of 
presidents,  
the heterogeneous national constituency leads them to think in grander 
terms about social problems and the public interest…Reelection, 
moreover, does not loom so large in their calculations (and in the second 
term, of course, it is not a factor at all). They are more fundamentally 
concerned with governance. (1993, 363) 
 
In fact, Moe proceeds to explain, “[i]f there is a single driving force that motivates all 
presidents, it is not popularity…it is leadership” (1993, 364). Peterson and Greene 
explain,  
Because the executive has a national constituency, it is primarily 
concerned with matters of national policy. Members of Congress, who 
have smaller, more homogeneous constituencies, are more concerned with 
the geographically distributive effects of these policies…Similarly, when 
issues have important distributional impacts but do not seriously affect the 
country as a whole, members of Congress will have more at stake than 
executive officials. To preserve scarce resources, presidents and their 
advisers will often defer to congressional wishes on these issues. (1994, 
34) 
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The different motivations of presidents and legislators are regarded almost as a truism 
and as an obvious implication or consequence of constitutional design and policy design. 
While “legislators are driven by an almost paranoid concern for reelection,”32 “reelection 
obviously cannot explain the behavior of (modern) presidents during their second terms, 
since they cannot run again. And even in their first terms, presidential behavior seems to 
be driven more centrally by other things.”33  
 In fact, compared to the local and varied nature of the legislature, the unitary 
nature of the American executive suggests that presidents are resource restricted from 
dealing with policy minutiae.
34
 In a sense, the responsibility of one individual to oversee 
the scope of executive and administrative duties in the United States is a profound 
expectation, often viewed as beyond reach. As such, the legislative branch and the vast 
bureaucracy ensure that the details of policy are sustained, while the president focuses on 
the bigger picture of government function and public policy making. 
 Under close scrutiny, the view of the “national” president depends on four 
common assumptions about presidential elections, behavior, and motives. First, with few 
exceptions, presidents are implicitly assumed to be responsive to a national constituency. 
Unlike legislators who represent small portions of the American electorate, presidents are 
seen to be elected by the whole, represent the whole, and thus, must be responsive to the 
whole, often in the form of satisfying the national median voter. Second, the presidential 
concern over elections is often viewed as a secondary consideration that is outranked by 
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concerns such as historical legacy, policy making, and institutional power. Third, if 
presidents have electoral interests, they evaporate during the second term. Light notes, 
“we expect the (reelection) goal to dissipate in the second four years. Theoretically, the 
search for electoral success declines” (1999, 66).35 Fourth, and connected to the national 
constituency thesis, presidents are resource constrained from engaging micro-level policy 
and constituency-centered electoral politics. Legislators with individual, local staffs and 
smaller constituencies have greater freedom and drive to deal with localized politics, a 
luxury presidents do not share.  
 These four assumptions drive much of the theory about presidential goals and 
behaviors. However, when each assumption is unpacked it is questionable and is at odds 
with much of what we know about presidential preferences. These assumptions generate 
a view of presidents not as politicians but of strictly policy-driven actors with little 
interest in or powerless in engaging in electoral politics and disengaged from the election 
of their successor.  
 
Reconceptualizing the American Presidency: The Election Driven President 
 
 The president's unique electoral environment and unitary place atop a coequal 
branch can certainly create incentives for presidents to focus on broad public policy. 
However, the common view of presidents as policy-driven actors dramatically 
underestimates the effect that electoral politics has on presidential incentives and 
behaviors. Scholarship that employs this view rests upon a misconception of the 
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institution and misses other critical forces acting on presidents. Indeed, presidents 
consistently influence and direct micro-level policy and do so to advance their electoral 
interests. The institutional structure of presidential elections and the position of presidents 
within the executive branch uniquely position them as such. Presidents are politicians just 
like legislators and are driven by the same electoral motivations to influence policy. 
Although constituency size can surely affect the manner in which an individual 
campaigns, the meme that the president faces a broad, national constituency fails to 
reflect the institutional design of presidential elections and the reality of such 
campaigns.
36
 The national constituency thesis implicitly assumes that presidents consider 
the interests of the median voter of the entire nation, much like legislators try to please 
the median constituent in their districts. If true, a focus on the national median voter 
provides clear incentives for presidents to purse broad policy initiatives or risk electoral 
defeat. Such an electoral constraint may be true for a president chosen by national 
plebiscite; however, the American president is not.  
The institutional structure of the Electoral College dictates what is required for 
electoral success. Presidential candidates must compete not in a national plebiscite, but in 
50 individual elections for each state’s electoral votes. The “national” presidential 
constituency is truly a series of individual state constituencies. During the campaign, 
candidates choose which states they will target, often not appearing or expending 
campaign funds in many (Shaw 2006). Instead, candidates spend time and compete in 
competitive or swing states—a small subset of all states. Shaw notes in describing the 
focus of presidents in the electoral context that candidates “identify those states most at 
risk and most critical to amassing 270 electoral votes” (2006, 52). In this way, presidents 
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face a much smaller electoral constituency that generally excludes both states they are 
nearly certain to win as well as states they will surely lose. Because constituency size 
affects the electoral behaviors of officials, this view of a substantially narrowed 
presidential constituency affects the understanding of presidential behavior. 
The structure of the Electoral College incentivizes the constituency focus of 
presidents. Whereas an executive selected through a national vote must focus on the 
median voter of the nation, the American president cannot. For example, if the median 
voter in the United States resides in San Diego, California, it would be useless for 
presidents to work for her vote. Instead, presidents are often committed to motivating 
substantial base turnout in swing states. Presidents do seek to appeal to independent and 
moderate voters and need to win median voters in swing states in order to be successful. 
However, the strategy must be more complex. Depending on turnout, the characteristics 
of a swing state’s median voter can vary dramatically. Moreover, the political views of 
the median voter in Pennsylvania or New Hampshire or Colorado may differ dramatically 
from the nation’s median voter. As a result, appealing to a voter similar to the nation’s 
median may actually be a defeating strategy that presidents must avoid.  
 The design of electoral institutions has serious implications for the behaviors and 
pursuits of elected officials. The failure of previous research to account for the structure 
of the Electoral College—resorting instead to a stylized view of a plebiscitary 
president—has serious theoretical and empirical consequences. It is only through the 
incorporation of the Electoral College system into analysis of presidential behavior can 
research fully explore presidential goals, incentives, and preferences. 
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 For decades, scholars have argued that electoral interests, broadly defined, 
influence presidential behavior. As a politician and an elected official, it would be 
surprising if presidents do not allow electoral considerations to enter their political 
calculus. However, the engagement of these electoral motives is seen as unique as the 
office itself. While legislators fervently engage in more base particularistic politics, 
presidents participate in position taking (Canes-Wrone and Shotts 2004; Canes-Wrone, 
Herron, and Shotts 2001) or the pursuit of broad public policy in an effort to connect with 
voters.  
 It is certain that electoral interests are among a host of forces that induce 
behaviors among chiefs executive. In fact, this claim finds support in the literature that 
outlines Congressional behavior, as well. Mayhew writes, “a complete explanation (if one 
were possible) of a congressman’s or any one else’s behavior would require attention to 
more than just one goal” (1974, 14). Members of Congress may value good public policy 
or institutional power, but are primarily motivated by their electoral interests. Presidents 
operate in the same way. Before presidents can achieve any other goals, they first need 
electoral success. Presidents seek election, reelection, and ultimately the election of a 
successor from their own party. Essentially, electoral success “has to be the proximate 
goal of everyone, the goal that must be achieved over and over if other ends are to be 
entertained” (Mayhew 1974, 16). Once again, Mayhew’s reference to legislators’ goals 
must, too, extend to presidents.
37
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their second term, as it is a necessary condition for the continuation of other goals.  
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Moreover, the primacy of presidential electoral interests is observable in practice. 
Presidents are highly political and constantly campaigning, leading Sidney Blumenthal to 
describe the process as The Permanent Campaign.
38
 Sitting presidents become consumed 
with electoral considerations as “reelection remains a critical goal through much of the 
first term. Both the President and his staff have considerable energy invested in returning 
for a second term” (Light 1999, 64).  In fact, media coverage and campaign staff note the 
profound amount of time, energy, and resources that presidents expend on campaigning 
(see Shaw 2006 for a comprehensive description of such campaign activity). This drive 
for electoral success and support is not simply reserved for the campaign trail but also 
dominates behaviors inside the White House (Tenpas 2000).  
The 22
nd
 Amendment often provides an argument against a president’s interest in 
electoral politics and micro-level policy. A president’s personal electoral interests are 
limited to a single reelection, after which he is barred from seeking the office. Scholars 
and observers often note the focus of second term presidents on a policy agenda, the 
access to and exercise of institutional power, and even the solidification of an historical 
legacy. For example, President Clinton devoted a fair portion of his second term to 
Mideast peace, hoping resolution of the conflict would bolster the historical account of 
his presidency. However, this did not prevent Clinton from working to aid his vice 
president’s efforts to win the office.  
For presidents, the term limits instituted by the 22
nd
 Amendment certainly create a 
unique institutional dynamic that must be accounted in the assessment of the electoral 
motive. Although scholars argue that it recudes electoral incentives presidential electoral 
interests should persevere (Rottinghaus 2006). This is true particularly when operating 
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from the perspective that electoral success facilitates the achievement of other goals. 
Presidents are motivated to see their party’s standard bearer succeed to the White House 
for both personal and partisan reasons. The same-party successor ensures policy making 
by a president with similar preferences. While presidents of the same party may not be 
ideological clones, they are certainly ideologically proximate. Presidents will seek to 
create an electoral environment in which voters will credit the incumbent party of the 
president and its standard bearer with success. To this end, retiring presidents who 
facilitate a same party successor benefit from a continuation of similar policy initiatives 
as well as possible benefits to historical legacy.
 39
 Thus, the assumption that presidential 
electoral interests fade when term limits are salient is unfounded. The transition from 
personal to party-centered interests may make the electoral incentive moderate but not 
dissipate. Instead, the motivation remains.
40
 
Finally, presidents not only have the desire and the institutional motive to 
participate in electoral politics, but often he has the resources to engage in porkbarrel 
politics—targeting federal funds to key constituencies.41 The president, though singular 
in nature, governs the largest, most diverse branch with the highest levels of expertise. 
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The structure and size of the executive branch not only facilitates the ability of the 
president to affect micro-level policy initiatives, but may make him better-positioned than 
Congress to be effective in such areas. 
Congress empowers the president and the executive branch to make decisions 
over broad areas of federal policymaking. Presidents are not only delegated power to deal 
with macro-issues, but are directed by Congress to deal with the minor policy details that 
are necessary in the daily administration of government.
42
 To this end, the president and 
his subordinates are required by law to deal with the type of personal-level policies and 
politics for which credit is often given to Congress. Lost in that narrative is the 
expansive, micro-level role of the executive branch in the daily lives of all Americans. 
Among the reasons Congress delegates decision making authority to the executive 
branch are time and expertise (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999). The sheer size of the 
executive branch means that it is better equipped and more effective than Congress at 
dealing with the large number of policy decisions that must be made daily. Although 
congressmen and senators seek to claim credit for distributive policy, such outcomes are 
often determined off Capitol Hill. To this end, presidents have a host of micro-level 
projects and policies to reference before key and targeted constituencies. For example, a 
president seeking voter support in Ohio can hold a press conference beneath a bridge in 
Cleveland that his Department of Transportation constructed. Like Members of Congress, 
presidents can ensure that funds are targeted, local needs are addressed, and credit is 
claimed. 
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Policy areas that include federal spending empower presidents in two distinct 
ways. First, presidents are not passive recipients of discretion. Instead, presidents can 
negotiate greater discretionary authority over the allocation of federal funds in exchange 
for their support of legislation. Second, once legislation is enacted, presidents are able to 
shape, in profound ways, the manner in which it is implemented. This multi-faceted role 
allows presidents to influence policy at several stages. 
 Although the executive branch administers most federal policy, many such 
actions are performed by career-level bureaucrats far removed from the walls of the 
White House. The president surely cannot engage in every administrative decision that 
the executive branch makes. However, this limitation should not be conflated with a lack 
of influence. Presidents are well-positioned to affect even micro-level policy decisions 
because of the president’s appointment power and the structure and hierarchy of the 
executive branch. Presidents are constitutionally and legally empowered to select 
thousands of political appointees to head executive branch institutions. These institutions, 
ranging from policy offices in small agencies to Cabinet departments, are responsible for 
policy decision making. Presidents are able to convey their preferences and those 
preferences are directed down chains of command from officials selected by the White 
House to other appointees and bureaucrats. Moreover, many policy decisions, once 
recommended, often require final approval from a political appointee and often additional 
checks by the Office of Management and Budget. This executive branch decision making 
apparatus creates an institutional environment that facilitates presidential influence even 
over micro-level policy. 
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 In sum, presidents are much like other politicians. Their electoral interest serves 
as a key motivation for presidential behavior. In order for presidents to achieve any goals, 
they must first be successful campaigners. The institutional design of the executive 
branch as well as the electoral structures that select its leader encourage presidents to 
focus on their electoral goals. To accomplish this task, the nation’s chief executive needs 
not exclusively focus on broad issues, but can seek to influence micro-level particularistic 
policies. This fundamental drive combined with the nature of executive branch decision 
making motivates presidents to engage in the same behaviors as legislators but with a 
unique set of powers. 
 
Presidents and Distributive Politics 
 
 Spending authority is an important public policy power and it provides an 
excellent place to test theories of the election driven president. Presidents extract 
discretionary authority from Congress, and they and their surrogates make decisions over 
the allocation of hundreds of billions of federal dollars each year. This discretionary 
power provides presidents the opportunity to engage in porkbarrel politics, strategically 
allocating funds to key constituencies at critical times. By doing so, they influence 
policies ranging from agriculture to transportation to defense to housing. 
 In this way, President Obama’s approach to crafting and influencing the Recovery 
Act was not unusual or unprecedented behavior. Instead, such actions are part of a larger 
pattern of presidential attitudes toward policy making. Rather than policy simply being an 
end in its own right, it can also be used as a tool of electoral politics. Essentially, 
29 
 
presidents frequently use federal spending as a campaign tool, much like Members of 
Congress do.  
 
Dissertation Outline 
 
  The remainder of this dissertation is composed of five chapters. Chapter II will 
introduce the detailed theoretical contribution of this dissertation. I explain how the 
powers of the presidency allow for the targeting of federal funds to key constituencies—
swing states—in advance of elections. In so doing, I describe both the executive branch 
institutional opportunities that facilitate presidential porkbarrel politics and how the 
institutional structure of the Electoral College will affect the precise distributive strategy.  
 The chapter introduces the core data used in this dissertation. I have constructed a 
comprehensive data set that includes all federal discretionary grant allocations from 
1996-2008. The data on allocations are drawn from the Census Bureau’s Federal 
Assistance Award Data System (FAADS) and are complemented with a host of 
institutional, electoral, political and demographic data to assist in this empirical endeavor. 
In introducing these data, I also present descriptive statistics to acquaint the reader with 
precisely what is represented and how it informs our understanding both of the 
institutional presidency and distributive policy in the United States. These data allow me 
to answer the overarching research question for this project: Do presidents influence the 
distribution of funds to advance their electoral interests? I evaluate presidential electoral 
influence on annual state-level federal grant allocations while controlling for other factors 
such as the influence of Congress and other electoral and institutional considerations. 
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 Chapter II demonstrates that swing states receive a significantly higher number of 
grants and grant dollar allocations. This swing state benefit increases in the two years 
leading up to a presidential election, suggesting that presidential strategy influences 
policy outcomes both geographically and temporally. The findings support the notion that 
presidents and their surrogates use their spending authority to advance presidential 
electoral interests at key times. In the end, Chapter II offers preliminary evidence of the 
presidential porkbarrel. 
 Chapter III considers the same question at the agency level. Critical to 
understanding the precise means of presidential control requires knowledge of agency 
characteristics. The bureaucracy is not a homogeneous institution in which presidential 
power and influence is uniform. Instead, the executive branch of government is a diverse 
array of administrative units that, in many cases, is designed to facilitate or hinder 
presidential influence. I explain how institutional characteristics of the bureaucracy—
namely agency location, politicization, and agency ideology—affect presidential 
distribution.  
 Chapter III demonstrates that agency characteristics condition presidential power 
and the pursuit of electoral goals. In cabinet agencies—as one would expect—
presidential power is more pervasive, and these institutions are highly responsive to the 
president’s electoral interests. Broadly, cabinet agencies direct federal grants to swing 
states at the expense of non-swing states. This electoral-goal responsiveness occurs 
regardless of the saturation of political appointees within an agency and the ideology of 
an agency. However, in independent institutions, presidential power is conditioned. 
Chapter III shows that in independent agencies, presidents rely heavily on the saturation 
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of political appointees—politicization—within the institution to advance their electoral 
efforts and direct funds to swing states. However, consistent with expectations, more 
insulated independent commissions are less responsive to presidential preferences, and 
presidents struggle to reap the electoral benefits from commissions’ spending power.  
In addition, Chapter III adds nuance to the understanding of the legislative role. 
While the literature suggests that Congressional authority in the area of spending policy 
is unmatched, the results show how legislative constituencies benefit in the distribution of 
federal grants. Specifically, executive branch agencies tend to allocate more funds to 
states represented by legislators serving on Congressional appropriations subcommittees 
with oversight over those agencies. In fact, this finding serves as the only means by 
which legislative interests are satisfied through discretionary fund distributions. The 
chapter suggests that presidents seek to satisfy key legislative constituencies in an effort 
to maintain discretionary authority and keep alive the policy power to allocate pork. 
 Chapter IV examines the role of presidential power over the distribution of federal 
funds, but approaches the general research question from a different perspective. I 
evaluate the internal agency processes and staffing decisions that empower presidents to 
control outcomes and induce responsiveness from bureaucratic actors. I seek to drill 
down beneath the aggregate level and ask several questions about the specific 
institutional mechanisms of presidential power and influence. How do presidents get 
control of distributors? Who are the distributors—those charged with allocating federal 
funds? What type of political, institutional, and administrative environments do 
distributors face? To approach these questions, I employ a different data set: the Survey 
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on the Future of Government Service.
43
 Conducted from 2007-8, this extensive survey of 
queries career and appointed federal government executives. The Survey provides data on 
numerous issues facing executive branch employees and decision makers, including 
internal agency environment, policy making power, contact with political institutions, 
and the structure of decision making. Additionally, the Survey gathers data on 
respondents’ background characteristics, work and political experience, and other 
demographic data.  
 One challenge to the assertion that presidents influence federal grant distribution 
emerges from the charge that presidents are too busy to deal with such individual-level 
policy decisions. Chapter IV addresses this concern and shows how presidents influence 
personnel and processes to affect outcomes and wield political control. Moreover, the 
chapter is centered on the claim that presidents will seek political responsiveness from 
agencies that provide him with key political and electoral benefits and a reduced risk of 
policy failure. I argue that distributive institutions are ideal in offering presidents the 
benefits of porkbarrel politicking at a low cost. Federal executives with distributive 
authority not only exhibit characteristics likely to generate greater responsiveness to the 
president, but they are also subjected to more politicized environments than those without 
distributive authority.  
 This chapter engages theories of presidential control to examine how strategic 
staffing, administrative organization, and the creation of a politicized decision making 
environment induces policy responsiveness from even apolitical technocrats. Specifically, 
this chapter shows that presidents politicize the leadership of the executive branch with 
individuals who are more politically experienced and ideologically aligned with the 
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White House. Moreover, this effort is enhanced for positions with distributive authority. 
In order to empower politically responsive individuals, administrative processes are 
structured so that political actors in the White House and OMB and political appointees 
have key policy influence, particularly over federal spending. This finding illustrates not 
only the strategy behind the administrative efforts of presidents, but the unique attention 
presidents pay to distributive policy. Finally, Chapter IV shows that presidents seek to 
apply political pressure throughout the bureaucracy and significantly stronger pressure to 
those with spending authority.  
 This chapter illuminates precise mechanisms and processes that presidents use to 
influence and direct micro-level decision making in the executive branch. Moreover, the 
specific presidential attention that is paid to distributive policy suggests both that 
presidents can influence the distribution of federal funds in key and strategic ways and 
that presidents recognize the political and electoral importance of such policy. Chapter IV 
complements the previous two analyses with a more detailed, process-centered evaluation 
of presidential power, offering additional evidence of the salience of presidential electoral 
interests in the administration of policy. 
 Chapter V continues to drill down toward the individual level to assess 
presidential influence over policy in advancing his electoral interests. This chapter 
evaluates the specific processes that presidents use to inject electoral politics into the 
administration of policy. In testing theories of the election driven president, I seek to 
describe and demonstrate how a politicized decision making context and environment in 
grantmaking institutions dramatically affects the experience of bureaucrats and the 
geographic distribution of federal funds. To approach this question, I rely on extensive 
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original interviews with federal bureaucrats and appointees in agencies that distribute 
federal discretionary grants. I further complement this work by conducting interviews 
with state bureaucrats who apply for federal funds and interest group lobbyists who 
specialize in federal grants policy. 
 The data from interviews and the subsequent conclusions add texture and 
understanding to the federal grants process and allow both a confirmation of the findings 
from the systematic analysis and the extension of a causal argument. By observing, 
through interviews, the precise manner in which presidential influence manifests and the 
effects of that influence for public policy outcomes, I provide a critical bridge between 
systematic regularity and causal effect. This chapter serves as a key means of 
demonstrating presidential power, motives, and behavior in the context of the broader 
research question of this project. 
 In clear terms, I illustrate how presidential preferences influence the federal grants 
process and how the White House, OMB and political appointees serve as presidential 
surrogates who have a profound role in deciding where federal grant dollars are sent. This 
chapter details how presidential surrogates, in many cases, position themselves into key 
decision making roles with regard to fund allocations. Moreover, appointees and OMB 
also create an information environment in which presidential and administration 
preferences are clear and career-level decision makers are expected to incorporate those 
wishes into policy outcomes. I also describe how political actors design grant programs 
and, more importantly, program eligibility criteria in strategic ways. Criteria design 
allows political influence ex ante through the inclusion of targeted eligibility 
requirements or ex post by allowing appointees to use discretionary or administrative 
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points to affect the evaluation and scoring of proposals. Additionally, political actors 
often reserve for themselves final allocation authority as another means of ensuring 
political control. In the end, this chapter shows the precise and comprehensive processes 
and mechanisms that presidents use to affect micro-level policy outcomes and advance 
their own electoral interests. 
 Finally, Chapter VI concludes. I include a detailed discussion of the necessity to 
consider presidential electoral interests as a primary, motivating factor when assessing 
the behavior of the chief executive. I explain how the findings in this dissertation 
describe a system of presidential influence that is unique in our understanding of the 
behavior of the chief executive. First, presidents are not simply able to influence policy in 
broad national terms, but the structure of the executive branch actually allows an impact 
on micro-level policies. Second, I note that presidents use this power to participate in 
porkbarrel politics to advance their own electoral interests—a behavior rarely associated 
with presidents. Finally, Chapter VI discusses the policy implications of the empirical 
findings of this project and the reconceptualization of presidential behavior and policy 
influence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 
 
PRESIDENTIAL SWING STATE STRATEGY: FEDERAL GRANTS AS A 
CAMPAIGN TOOL 
 
 
 
Between October 8, and October 14, 2004, presidential appointees in the US 
Department of Energy, including Secretary Spencer Abraham, scheduled and attended 
ceremonies announcing nearly $300 million in alternative energy grants. While such a 
disbursement of grants may seem like a routine part of the bureaucratic process, these 
grants were not evenly distributed across the states. Instead, hundreds of millions of 
dollars in grants were announced in five of the most competitive states in recent electoral 
history: Michigan, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Florida.
44
 Moreover, these 
grants were announced only weeks prior to a highly competitive presidential election. 
These announcement ceremonies occurred as President Bush campaigned heavily 
throughout these states.  
How does the president’s drive for electoral success influence the distribution of 
federal grants? Each year, the agencies of the federal bureaucracy, headed by presidential 
appointees, distribute billions of tax dollars to the states through grants. Despite the 
prominent role of the executive branch in this process, research often ignores the 
influence of the president and other executive branch officials, instead focusing on the 
role of Congress. In order to understand how federal money is distributed, it is vital to 
know how presidents influence the grants process and what preferences drive this 
influence.   
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This chapter develops the idea that presidents, like members of Congress, are 
primarily driven by electoral concerns. The presidential electoral motive informs 
theoretically much of this work. However, presidential elections offer a different set of 
rules than do Congressional elections. I address those differences in building my 
argument. In particular, I develop hypotheses that arise from the structure of the Electoral 
College, contending, for example that swing states are more likely to be benefactors of 
federal money than states that the president (or his party) has no chance (or is certain) of 
winning. The results of this analysis clearly demonstrate that through the strategic use of 
discretion, presidents influence the distribution of federal funds, essentially using them as 
a campaign resource.  
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I review the literature on porkbarrel 
politics and federal spending policy, drawing specific attention to how American political 
elites direct federal funding in electorally strategic ways. Second, I present a theory of the 
presidential porkbarrel. I explain how electoral interests serve as a primary motivating 
force in presidential behavior. The electoral motive, thus, induces presidents to engage in 
particularistic politics, capitalizing on their spending authority. From this theory, I derive 
a series of hypotheses about the relationship between presidential preferences and the 
distribution of federal discretionary grants. Next, I provide a comprehensive overview of 
the core data used in the dissertation, broadly and this chapter, specifically. The data 
include all federal discretionary grant allocations to the states from 1996-2008, and this 
section introduces the reader to the manner in which many of the concepts and variables 
are measured. In the following section, I introduce the methodological approach used in 
this chapter and present the results of the analysis. The results show that presidential 
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electoral interests influence grant allocations both with regard to the geographic 
distribution of funds and the timing of disbursements. Finally, before concluding I 
discuss the implications of these findings for public policy and the theoretical 
understanding of presidential power, motives, and behaviors. 
 
Federal Money as a Campaign Tool 
 
In the pursuit of electoral success, political elites use myriad means to gain and 
secure constituent support. Among these means is the targeted distribution of government 
funds (Bickers and Stein 2000; Cox and McCubbins 1986; Dixit and Londregan 1998). 
Mayhew (1974) describes the process by which Members of Congress claim credit for 
the distribution of particularized benefits, often including federal spending. Political elites 
are motivated to secure their constituents’ fair share (or more) of federal spending, as it is 
an easily demonstrable example of elected officials’ work (Arnold 1979; Fenno 1978; 
Ferejohn 1974; Fiorina 1977; Lowi 1969). Money that helps expand a hospital, equip a 
fire department or sustain a military installation all aid a locality while padding a 
politician’s resume.  
Research into porkbarrel politics typically focuses on Congress, arguing 
legislators’ “almost paranoid concern for reelection” and control of the government 
pursestrings encourage such behavior (Moe and Wilson 1994, 8). Scholars have noted 
that Congress strategically allocates funds to districts and states for several reasons. They 
include electoral competitiveness (Bickers and Stein 2000; Stein and Bickers 1994, 
1995), partisanship (Balla, et al 2002; Hurwitz, Moiles and Rohde 2001; Levitt and 
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Snyder 1995), members’ institutional power (Carsey and Rundquist 1999; Lee and 
Oppenheimer 1999; Rundquist and Carsey 2002; Rundquist, Rhee, and Lee 1996), and as 
a means of legislative coalition building (Stein and Bickers 1994; Lee 2000, 2003; Lee 
and Oppenheimer 1999). This behavior is considered a pervasive and accepted (even 
expected) practice among members of the legislative branch.  
However, other research examines the role of the executive branch in this process. 
Specifically, scholarship of late essentially asks whether and to what extent the 
presidential porkbarrel exists. Examining aggregate federal spending programs, research 
demonstrates that congressional and gubernatorial partisan alignment with the president 
translates into greater distributive benefits (Berry, Burden, and Howell 2010; Gasper and 
Reeves 2011; Larcinese, Rizzo, and Testa 2006). In fact, Berry, et al (2010) suggests that 
this effect of partisan alignment serves as a dominant influence in distribution, trumping 
even traditional Congressional effects. Similarly, Bertelli and Grose (2009), in an 
examination of contracts from the Departments of Defense and Labor, finds that the 
ideological position of select cabinet secretaries influences federal grant distribution.  
These works demonstrate that the president’s political interests drive the 
allocation of funds. More clearly, presidents actively seek to create a friendlier policy 
making space by supporting copartisans in Congress and in governors’ mansions with a 
stream of federal dollars. Underlying these claims is an understanding that presidents 
seek to use federal funds in an effort to influence copartisans’ electoral fates.  
In a related way, other research considers how presidents use pork to advance 
their own electoral interests. Shor (2006) tests whether electoral considerations such as 
number of Electoral College votes and state competitiveness influence which states 
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receive more grants. More recent work engages the constituent connection more 
precisely. Chen (2009) in an examination of FEMA disaster grants finds that local Florida 
neighborhoods that supported President Bush’s 2004 reelection fared better than similarly 
affected Democratic localities. Here, Chen suggests that disaster aid was associated with 
political support, and the distribution served, in part, to reward core voters for their 
electoral support. Mebane and Wawro (2002) explores how different types of funds 
during Reagan’s second term were effectively targeted to constituencies in order for the 
president to claim credit for such spending. 
Additional work argues presidents introduce an electoral strategy not in 
geographic terms, but through timing. Presidents strategically time grant allocation 
announcements in order to reap the maximum benefits in terms of credit claiming 
(Anagnoson 1982; Hamman 1993). This research speaks to an important aspect of 
presidential electoral strategy that is often overlooked in scholarship on the presidential 
porkbarrel. While it is important to examine the geographic nature of electoral strategy, 
strategic timing is also critical.  
Although several scholars examine the role of the president in porkbarrel politics, 
many of these studies are limited in a variety of ways. First, much research focuses on a 
small number of grant programs and agencies or examine a narrow time period. Second, 
systematic studies of presidential influence often fail to consider the effect of a 
presidential electoral strategy in the distribution of federal funds. Finally, those studies 
that do consider presidential electoral strategy consider either the geographic or temporal 
nature of such strategy.  
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In order to evaluate thoroughly how presidents influence the distribution of 
federal funds, it is vital to examine both the location and timing of allocations. 
Particularly in the context of electoral influence, both concepts are essential aspects of 
campaign strategy and success. However, before considering why and in what way 
presidents affect federal fund distribution, it is first necessary to understand how 
presidents have the opportunity for such influence. To examine this question, I explore 
presidential spending power.  
 
Presidential Spending Power Examined 
 
Federal spending comes in several forms. Some types of spending are strictly 
controlled by legislation and offer Congress substantial control over distribution. For 
example, formula grants are allocated according to an often complex statutory equation. 
These formulas factor population, capacity and need into their allocation schemes. 
However, political considerations such as legislative seniority and coalition building 
considerations also influence these formulas (Lee and Oppenheimer 1999). Other areas of 
spending offer presidents the discretion to control outcomes. Executive agencies allocate 
discretionary federal grants totaling about 100 billion dollars yearly.  
Congress often delegates power to the executive branch because it increases the 
time members can spend on other issues. Moreover, presidents are not passive recipients 
of delegated power, but they and their copartisans in Congress often have a preference for 
greater discretion. Through the president’s role in the legislative process, he can gain 
discretionary concessions in exchange for his signature (Cameron 2000; Krehbiel 1999; 
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McCarty 2000; Volden 2002). When presidents are given discretion, they have a direct 
impact on policy areas (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999; Huber and Shipan 2002). 
Beyond simply having the discretionary authority to influence distributive 
politics, the president may be best positioned and equipped to deal with these micro-level 
allocation decisions. In fact, presidents have both active and indirect means of 
influencing distributive outcomes in a manner consistent with his electoral preferences. 
First, the president oversees a bureaucracy that is large and filled with experts on every 
policy issue. The expertise and ability of the bureaucracy to handle micro-level policy 
decisions is one reason Congress delegates certain powers to the executive branch. These 
individuals serving beneath a web of political appointees who serve at the pleasure of the 
president and in many institutions wield final decision making authority over fund 
distribution. These actors are more responsive to presidential preferences and help ensure 
policy outcomes are, as well.  
What is further required of presidents to influence the distribution of government 
revenues is for distributive decision makers within the bureaucracy to have knowledge of 
presidential preferences. Specifically, those appointees and bureaucrats who have final 
spending authority must be keenly aware of the how presidents want money spent. In the 
context of presidential porkbarrel politics, it is necessary for distributors to be aware of 
presidential geographic and electoral preferences. Presidential geographic preferences are 
not only easily conveyed, but are widely known. In general terms, it is little mystery 
which states are considered competitive in presidential elections. Such information is 
nearly universally reported in the media, broadly understood within the electorate, and 
most importantly, is common knowledge among politically savvy individuals. Political 
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appointees and decision makers who hold positions in the Washington establishment 
surely know presidential electoral preferences and the geographic means of employing 
discretionary spending authority to target constituencies. 
In addition to reliance on political appointees, presidents have a host of tools to 
control the bureaucracy, including presidential directives, executive orders, and signing 
statements. Further, presidential preferences are easily communicated and carried out 
through pressure from the White House, the Office of Management and Budget and 
political appointees (see Gordon 2010; Lewis 2008; Wood and Waterman 1991). In fact, 
Gordon demonstrates that White House staff can effectively convey the preferences of 
the president to political appointees regarding the allocation of federal funds and that 
such pressure can have an impact on distributive outcomes.
45
 Moreover, OMB or its 
subsidiary branches within federal agencies approve many discretionary grant criteria and 
the language used in requests for proposals, adding an additional layer of influence the 
grants process.  
Indirect mechanisms in the process can also facilitate presidential control. 
Agencies understand the value of presidential support in terms of maintenance of funding 
levels, protection from reorganization or closure, and attention to priorities. 
Responsiveness to presidential electoral interests could function as means of continuing, 
gaining or rehabilitating presidential support. Further, shared ideological or policy goals 
between a president and agency can also motivate enhanced agency responsiveness. This 
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ideological alignment means a conservative agency such as the International Trade 
Administration (ITA) would prefer to work with a Republican president rather than a 
Democratic one. As such, ITA decision makers may be more willing to use the levers of 
policy making to support a friendly president’s electoral goals. 
For these reasons, presidents are well positioned to engage in the micro-level 
policy decisions involved in the distribution of federal funds. Moreover, legislative 
discretion offers presidents the power to influence distributive outcomes in order to 
pursue their goals. Finally, the electoral pressures that presidents face provide the 
incentive to rely on the powers of their office and access to resources in order to enhance 
their electoral prospects. 
 
Federal Grants and the Presidential Campaign 
 
Presidents pursue a series of goals during and after their tenure in office including 
good public policy, expanded institutional power, and enhanced presidential legacy 
(Cooper 2002; Moe and Howell 1999; Neustadt 1960). However, before any of those 
goals can be secured or even pursued, presidents need electoral success. Like all political 
elites, presidents are electorally-driven individuals who seek election, reelection, and 
ultimately, the election of their same party successor (Brams 1978; Rottinghaus 2006; 
Shaw 2006).  
Beyond the obvious benefits of an individual’s initial election to the office of 
president, reelection allows the president the most immediate and continued influence 
over public policy. His will and preferences continue to be a pivotal part of the policy 
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process. Moreover, sitting presidents are the only individuals able to exercise unilateral, 
institutional power and are best positioned to expand those powers. Finally, while a 
second presidential term does not guarantee an enhanced legacy, one term presidents are 
almost always guaranteed a reduced legacy. The reelection goal is a primary force in 
presidential behavior, and this claim is evidenced, in a very basic way, by observing that 
presidents almost always seek reelection.  
Although the electoral motive of presidents is strong and personal during the first 
term, it remains active in the second term as well. Presidents are motivated to see their 
party’s standard bearer succeed to the White House for both personal and partisan 
reasons (Rottinghaus 2006). The same-party successor ensures policy making by a 
president with similar preferences. While presidents of the same party may not be 
ideological clones, they are certainly ideologically proximate. For example, Ronald 
Reagan and George H.W. Bush did not have identical policy preferences, but Bush’s 
policy impact was more consistent with Reagan’s preferences than Michael Dukakis’ 
would have been. Moreover, even during the 2000 presidential election when Vice 
President Gore sought to distance himself from President Clinton, the sitting president 
went as far as giving the Gore campaign final approval of his travel schedule in an 
attempt to enhance Gore’s chances.46 Thus, while self-interest may motivate a stronger 
electoral motivation during a president’s first term, institutional and ideological forces 
ensure that this incentive endures throughout a president’s tenure and does not dissipate 
in the second term.  
Presidents employ active strategies to seek electoral support. Shaw and Roberts 
(2000) offers an examination of presidents harnessing the power of local media in order 
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to conduct a messaging campaign and to cover campaign events. Their work shows that 
candidates’ active use of campaign press coverage and debates in the months leading up 
to an election influences a measure of the likelihood of candidate electoral success. 
Moreover, Shaw and Roberts detail the way in which campaign events, rallies, and public 
announcements influenced a campaign’s electoral prospects (2000). Further, Shaw (2006) 
demonstrates how campaign resources in the form of advertising, campaign stops, and 
events are predominantly funneled to key constituencies at the expense of others. 
Specifically, Shaw explains that the academic- and media-driven idea that campaigns are 
rational allocators of resources “leads one to (correctly) presume that candidates seek to 
identify those states most at risk and most critical to amassing 270 electoral votes when 
they decide where to campaign” (2006, 52).  
Federal grants serve presidents in a similar way. Given the large sum of grants 
appropriated each year and the level of discretion granted to the executive branch, they 
are an ideal electoral tool. Like campaign funds, federal grants can be allocated in 
strategic ways to appeal to key constituencies for their support. While the goal of much 
campaign spending is to get a candidate’s message, qualifications, and accomplishments 
into the consciousness of voters, the benefits of grants are two-fold. First, grants provide 
advertising as their announcement and disbursement are covered by local media, 
providing free publicity for a presidential candidate. Second, grants serve as a direct 
transfer from the federal largesse to a state’s economy. Grants can provide a host of 
improvements, services, or aid. They offer short term support to a community in a way 
that provides little additional cost to a local constituency. Chubb (1985) describes grants 
as ideal for localities because they provide a good (or service or both) without raising 
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local taxes. This low cost-high benefit spending is particularly true for grants that have 
few conditions or expectations for local government matching (Chubb 1985). Presidents 
are able to claim credit for these grants among the state’s voters, while relieving 
constituents of the prospect of local tax increases.
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Typically, the scope of a president’s national constituency makes porkbarrel 
politics appear to be an ineffective electoral strategy. However, because of the 
institutional design of the Electoral College, presidents do not face a national electorate, 
but instead a series of sub-national, state-level electorates. Moreover, only a handful of 
states is competitive in presidential elections, reducing a huge national electoral to a 
much smaller set of competitive races (Shaw 2006). The small size of the truly 
competitive presidential electorate makes an electoral strategy that utilizes the 
distribution of government funds a feasible and appealing tactic. 
Thus, presidents will use their power and discretion within the federal grants 
process to enhance their electoral chances. In practice, this means targeting the 
distribution of federal grants to key constituencies at key times in order to gain and 
secure support. Because there is a fixed sum of grant funds to be distributed each year, 
the president must target funds in an electorally strategic manner. In this way, he has the 
strongest incentive to deliver grants to states where victory is not certain for either 
political party. These states are often referred to as swing states, toss-up states, or 
battleground states. In a swing state, the population is typically politically divided and the 
infusion of resources, including federal grants, into these states may affect electoral 
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 Unlike formula and block grants, discretionary grants often come with few conditions or contingencies. 
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outcomes.
48
 Research on the presidency demonstrates that presidents and presidential 
candidates spend disproportionate levels of their campaign resources in swing states 
(Shaw 2006).  
For the purpose of this chapter, I divide states into three categories: swing states, 
core states, and lost cause states. Core states are those almost certain to support the 
incumbent presidential candidate. Lost cause states are those almost certain to support the 
non-incumbent party’s candidate. Shaw explains that “states in the battleground (swing) 
category received the most resources” (2006, 46).49 In modern presidential politics, 
Vermont is a core state and Mississippi is a lost cause state for Democrats. Presidents will 
direct the most funds to swing states, where the ultimate electoral payoff will be its 
highest.  
H1: Swing states will receive more in grants than core states or lost cause 
states. 
Swing states are key because their electoral fate is not just unknown, but may be 
malleable. Presidents will concentrate resources in order to influence the outcome. 
Engaging in advertising, making campaign stops, and directing federal grants may have 
an impact on a sufficient number of voters to allow the president to win a given state. 
Additionally, grants allow presidents to connect with and gain support from local 
officials who will publicly support, endorse, and work for him. In this way, presidents 
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 This research strictly engages presidential strategy without commenting on the success of that strategy. 
The distribution of government funds as a means of advertising and credit claiming serves as a strategy 
utilized by many elected officials. An additional and interesting question, that cannot be addressed in the 
confines of this chapter would consider the impact of grant allocations on presidential electoral outcomes in 
the states. 
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 Shaw explains that “base states”(core states) receive less. Discussion of the opposing party’s “base 
states” (lost cause states) suggests that they are largely reserved for the lowest level of  resource allocation. 
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recognize that elections are won or lost in these key states and seek to utilize resources in 
a way to maximize their chance of winning. 
Beyond a geographic understanding of the electoral nature of grant allocation, it is 
important to evaluate presidential strategy in terms of time. An electorally strategic 
distribution of federal grants should not be uniform throughout presidential tenure. 
Instead, time should affect grant distribution in two important ways. First, grants are 
more appealing as an electoral tool as an election nears. Because voters tend to use more 
recent events in their judgment of elected officials (Zaller 1992), effective credit claiming 
and advertising should occur in the period preceding an election (Fiorina 1981; Shaw 
2006; Shaw and Roberts 2000).  
Moreover, Alesina and Rosenthal (1989) in a discussion of macroeconomic policy 
distinguish between policies that have long and short term impacts. They argue that long 
term policy should be utilized in the first two years of a presidential administration as 
their effectiveness should coincide with the presidential election. Meanwhile, other 
policies that have short term impact should be used in the final two years of the 
administration as the immediacy of their impact will enhance electoral chances.  
Although Alesina and Rosenthal rely on a formal model in which completely 
informed voters reward presidents for observed economic growth and success, 
Hetherington (1996) demonstrates that the mere perception of economic conditions may 
motivate voters to punish or reward presidential candidates. Because the grants being 
analyzed in this project are typically short term in nature, they are more likely to be used 
as a presidential election draws near. These grants either provide immediate impact or at 
least provide the perception of positive impact in voters’ recent memory.  
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H2: Swing states will receive more grants in the two years prior to a presidential 
election than in the two years after. 
Second, while presidents are motivated not only by their own reelection, but the 
electoral success of their same party successor, self-interest should trump partisan 
interest. Rottinghaus argues that presidential electoral interests can extend to the second 
term, as a president seeks a partisan hold on the Oval Office (2006). In this way, the two 
term limit does not deconstruct the electoral drive, as presidents still maintain electoral 
preferences regarding the next occupant of the White House.  
Despite a continued electoral interest for presidents, other research suggests the 
salience of personal electoral considerations can influence behavior. Broadly, research 
finds that the salience of personal electoral motivation will influence the behavior of US 
Senators (Kuklinksi 1978). Moreover, Canes-Wrone and Shotts (2004) finds that while 
presidents are responsive to the public across presidential terms, the effect is enhanced 
during the first term when personal electoral preferences inform behavior.  This argument 
emerges from a view in which a president’s personal electoral interest serves as a salient 
force in guiding behavior. Although interest in the success of their party’s standard bearer 
will influence presidential behavior across terms, this concern may not influence behavior 
as strongly as would one’s own electoral interest. As a result, a president’s commitment 
to the electorally-motivated distribution of grants should be stronger in his first term than 
in his second. 
H3: Swing states will receive a larger benefit in grant allocations in a president’s 
first term than in his second. 
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These hypotheses help explore more clearly presidential influence in the 
aggregate distribution of federal grants. By examining both the geographic and temporal 
influences on the distribution of these federal funds, this project paints a clearer picture of 
the motives behind their allocation. An allocation strategy that significantly increases 
funding to swing states, particularly as a presidential election approaches and in a 
president’s first term, suggests that a president’s electoral preferences are a consideration 
in the distribution of these funds. Like Members of Congress, election-driven presidents 
use their spending power to advance their goals. 
 
Measuring Presidential Power over Federal Grants: An Introduction 
 
To approach the question of presidential influence over the federal fund 
allocations, I focus on a subset of federal spending: federal discretionary grants. 
Discretionary grants are an appealing segment of the federal largesse for several reasons. 
First, discretionary grants are allocated based on decision making in the executive branch. 
The “discretion” that distinguishes these grants is power delegated from Congress to 
federal agencies to determine not only the distribution of these funds, but often the nature 
of the programs that will govern them. These grants provide the executive with a clear 
avenue to influence allocations and provide the president a clear context in which to 
advance his electoral goals.
50
 Second, like many fund allocations, the federal government 
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 Discretionary grants by no means offer the “hard case” in demonstrating presidential influence. However, 
given that political influence over the distribution of federal funds is already biased toward legislative 
effects and because Congress influences distributive politics in so many areas, it is important to focus on a 
setting that can facilitate executive influence. Discretionary grants provide that ideal setting.  
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keeps quite meticulous records on the allocation of discretionary grants that have at 
different times been publicly available for various years.
51
 
 
Dependent Variables 
 Federal discretionary grants serve as the basis for the dependent variables used in 
the next two chapters (and the central focus in the qualitative analysis in Chapter V). Data 
on federal discretionary grants are drawn from the Federal Assistance Award Data 
System (FAADS) which is compiled by the Office of Management and Budget and 
subsequently maintained by the United States Census Bureau. The data found in FAADS 
are extensive, including information not only on discretionary grants but a series of other 
types of federal funding including formula and block grants, government insurance, 
cooperative agreements and more. The data set allows for a straightforward isolation of 
funding by numerous categories, including funding type, and to this end, I isolate by 
discretionary grants.
52
 The data on grant allocations include every discretionary federal 
grant distributed to the 50 states from 1996-2008. During this period of time, the 
bureaucracy doled out more than $962,000,000,000 in grants. This money was allocated 
through 3,692,084 grant disbursements. 
 The data available through FAADS offers a wealth of information about each 
grant allocation including location, amount, program, agency, date of distribution, among 
other details. Each of these can offer insight into the structure of an allocation or serve as 
part of a critical set of explanatory variables (and in many cases I capitalize on this 
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 For some of the data, they are available for a fee and may require a Freedom of Information Act request. 
However, the data, in whatever context they are available, are maintained in clear, consistent, and reliable 
data sets. 
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 For purposes of clarification, FAADS labels discretionary grants “project grants.” 
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additional information in just that way). The data allow for a substantively important 
distinction in the conceptualization of grant allocations. In a basic way, grants are easily 
understood in terms of dollars. Dollars serve as a unit that is comparable across space and 
over time, and as such is an appealing quantitative measure of the basic variable of 
interest. However, grants can also be understood as a number of allocations, independent 
of dollars.  
 For example, the state of Rhode Island may receive a single grant to construct 
several new fire stations in Providence. That grant may be worth $3 million. This 
allocation will help the city of Providence and the surrounding communities and provide 
an economic stimulus to the area. The elected official responsible for this grant may 
receive media attention and the appreciation of Rhode Island voters for bringing this 
money to the state for much needed improvements. Grants may take a different form, as 
well. The state of Arizona may receive a series of 12 grants each valued at $250,000 to 
purchase fire equipment for Maricopa County. The area will receive a similar $3 million 
dollar economic stimulus, but the residents of the area may perceive the funds differently. 
Rather than media coverage of a single $3 million dollar grant, The Arizona Republic 
may publish a steady stream of monthly grant allocations, constantly keeping voters 
aware of the flow of federal funds to the area.  
 These examples capture the idea that it is critical to measure grants in two 
different ways, as their use in terms of credit claiming can differ depending on the 
number or value of grants. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 illustrate real federal grant dollar and 
population-controlled number of grant allocations annually from 1996-2008. The figures 
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demonstrate there is substantial variation in both grant and grant dollar allocations over 
time. 
To capture accurately each concept, I measure both grant and grant dollar 
allocations in specific ways. First, for the purpose of this project I measure grant dollars 
as the logged real grant dollars per 100,000 people per state-year. This measure is  
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methodologically appealing for several reasons. First, it naturally controls for population, 
which is key given dramatic population differences across states and their expected effect 
on the distribution of federal funds. Next, I control for inflation by indexing allocations 
for prices, using 1996 dollars. Because grants can have an economic impact and that the 
perception of the value of grants can have an impact on the perceived effects of 
allocations, it is critical to make sure that funds are comparable, not simply across space 
(as population controls allow) but also over time. Finally, while the population and 
inflation controls help reduce the impact of outliers (smooth the data), these efforts fail to 
control sufficiently for such a concern. To overcome this challenge, I use the logarithmic 
value of the population-adjusted real grant dollars per state year, as a means of 
standardizing the measure and limiting the effect of outliers.  
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To measure the number of grants, I employ a similar approach to overcome some 
characteristics in the data that can present analytical challenges. I measure this dependent 
variable as the logged number of grants per 100,000 people per state-year.
53
 Essentially, 
and for the same reasons, this variable is measured identically to the grant dollars 
variable with the omission of the unneeded inflation adjustment.  
 
Characteristics of the Data and Key Independent Variables
54
  
 The key means of conceptualizing presidential electoral influence emerges from 
the competitiveness of states in presidential elections. As mentioned previously, 
presidents who seek to advance their electoral interests are best served to target resources 
to swing states. Swing states are the most competitive in presidential elections, and of 
greatest import, they have an electoral fate that is uncertain. Although debate exists in the 
literature on porkbarrel politics regarding which type of constituency an elected official 
should target,
55
 both empirical regularities (see Shaw 2006) as well as a theoretical 
foundation demonstrates clearly that the institutional nature of the Electoral College 
motivates presidents to focus on swing constituencies (states).
56
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 As a note of clarification, for both dependent variables in Chapter III, the unit of analysis is the agency-
state-year, the grant allocations by an agency to a state in a given year. In this analysis, the measure of the 
number of grants no longer controls for population because the values become so small that interpretation 
is difficult. Instead, I include an independent variable that measures population as a means of controlling 
for such effects. 
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 The discussion of these data is by no means exhausting for the purpose of the systematic analysis in the 
dissertation. This discussion serves, instead, as an introduction to the core data used in this project. 
Additional independent variables used as controls and to assess alternative hypotheses are used throughout 
the dissertation and will be discussed in the context of the relevant analysis in the proceeding chapters. An 
overview of the measurement of the variables relevant for this chapter can be found in Appendix 2.A1. 
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 See Dixit and Londregan (1996) for a discussion of the debate between swing and core hypotheses. 
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 It should also be noted that the presidential campaign focus on swing constituencies is true at the state 
level, but may not be true at the sub-state level. Because of the winner-take-all and first-past-the-post 
nature of state electoral vote allocations, presidential candidates focus on winning states and concentrate 
resources (campaign or pork) on swing states. However, the means of winning swing states or the strategy 
by which presidential candidate achieve success within swing states must not necessarily reflect the swing 
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 To measure state electoral competitiveness, I use a common data source: the 
incumbent share of the two-party vote in the previous presidential election. This measure 
is quite appealing for understanding the presidential motivation in porkbarrel politics. 
While scholars have sought to use other measures of competitiveness in evaluating 
campaign behavior, these measures are temporally limited for the purpose of this project 
(even if they are useful for the research in which they are employed). For example, Shaw 
(2006) uses lists compiled by campaigns in the months leading up to a presidential 
election to understand competitiveness and electoral strategy. These lists are incredibly 
useful and are often updated rapidly in advance of elections based on timely information. 
For Shaw, such a measure was key in understanding salient campaign behavior in the 
months prior to Election Day. 
 For this project, such a measure is insufficient. Because I hypothesize that 
presidents will engage in grant-centered porkbarrel politicking throughout their tenure, 
the campaign lists are unavailable to inform a president as to the competitiveness of states 
during much of that time. Instead, the vote results from the previous election are 
immediately available to an incumbent president and can serve as a useful guide in the 
effort to influence the allocation of funds to key states. This measure also serves as a 
stable reflection of competitiveness, not subject to revision based on polling results or 
media information.  
 Specifically, I operationalize state competitiveness as two and three category 
measures. The two category—dichotomous—measure indicates whether a state is a 
swing state. I denote a state as swing if it was decided by 10 percentage points or fewer in 
                                                                                                                                                 
hypothesis. In fact, one can imagine that within a swing state, a presidential campaign may target core 
voters in an effort to win that state (see Chen (2009) for an example of a core constituency strategy being 
implemented within a swing state, [Florida]).   
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the previous presidential election and as non-swing otherwise. The 10 percentage point 
measure is a standard in the literature on elections and maintains a level of face validity, 
as well. Table 2.1 lists the swing states for each approaching presidential election year 
analyzed in this project. Although the measure can be blunt, including a few states that 
are not typically competitive and excluding a few that are, the table below demonstrates 
that this measure generally reflects competitiveness in an accurate way. Like any 
measure, it is imperfect, but generally captures well the concept of state electoral 
competitiveness in presidential elections. Furthermore, while ten percentage points can 
reflect a large number of votes, political fortunes can be reversed by simply changing the 
minds of just over five percent of a state’s population. Moreover, a state decided by a 
margin of 55-45 or less is commonly viewed as a competitive state.
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 Although as noted above and in Chapter 1, the swing hypothesis is theoretically 
and empirically consistent with the institutional nature of the Electoral College, the 
dichotomous measure of state electoral competitiveness does not allow for a 
straightforward evaluation of the core state hypothesis (a key alternative explanation in 
the study of distributive politics). To overcome this limitation, I also include a three 
category measure of state electoral competitiveness. The categories for this variable are 
swing state, core state, and lost cause state. A core state serves as one that the party of the 
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 For much of the analysis, I use a measure of an eight percentage point or fewer difference as an 
alternative. Some literature considers this measure more conservative as it includes fewer states. However, 
the conservatism of this measure is up for debate given that it offers greater weight to the most competitive 
states at the expense of moderately competitive states. Additionally, in terms of face validity, the reduction 
of the competitiveness margin to eight percentage points excludes in several cases states that are widely 
considered (publicly and by campaigns) to be swing states. The expansion of the margin to ten percentage 
points often captures these states. Another alternative, the use of a continuous (folded) measure of state 
electoral competitiveness may be appealing, but it fails to capture the manner in which presidential 
campaigns conceptualize states. While states are seen as more or less competitive, Shaw (2006) clearly 
demonstrates that presidential campaigns think of states in terms of being swing or non-swing and less in 
terms of a continuous measure. 
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incumbent president can be nearly certain of winning; a lost cause state is one that the 
party of the incumbent president can be nearly assured of losing. In modern and 
contemporary presidential politics, Massachusetts is a core state for a Democrat, while 
Oklahoma is a lost cause state. Table 2.2 demonstrates the manner in which each 
competitiveness category is measured.  
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Table 2.3a shows the average number of grants and grant dollars allocated to each 
type of state. The results appear inconsistent with the theoretical predictions of the 
project. Lost cause and core states receive far more in grants than do swing states. 
However, a deeper look at the data shows that a few data points are driving these results. 
First, California and New York are extreme outliers and in every year in the data set are 
coded as either a core state or a lost cause state. These states’ grant allocations far exceed 
all other states. In fact, in some years, their grant allocations are more than six standard 
deviations above the mean of all allocations. Additionally, during the period under 
analysis two exogenous shocks affected certain states that should be expected to drive up 
grant receipts to those areas. The first is New York in the few years after the September 
11
th
 terrorist attacks. The second comes with Louisiana and Mississippi in the years 
following Hurricane Katrina. Examining the data show that grant receipts increase 
dramatically in these years. In fact, California, New York and these disaster years drive 
almost a fifth of the variation in the grant allocation means, despite making up less than 
five percent of the data points.
58
 While these data are not irrelevant, their exclusion 
provides a different view of the remaining 95.1% of the data. 
Table 2.3b shows the means when the California, New York and disaster state-
year data are excluded. These data show greater consistency with the theoretical 
expectations of this project. Both in terms of the number of grants and grant dollars, 
swing states receive more than other states and substantially more than average. In fact, 
on average, swing states receive $240 million more in grants per year than core states and 
nearly 900 more grants annually. This examination of means suggests that a more 
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 In this description of the data, New York is coded as a disaster for 2002, 2003 and 2004. In these years, 
the states are even greater outliers than New York is typically. However, the non-disaster years for New 
York are outliers in their own right. 
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comprehensive examination of the relationship between state competitiveness and grant 
allocations is warranted. On its face, this bivariate relationship offers the first systematic 
evidence of grants being allocated according to presidential electoral calculations. 
 In addition to the geographic nature of federal fund allocations, I also include 
variables that measure the strategic timing involved in the distribution of grants. To 
measure this concept I rely on two measures. The first denotes the salience of elections. 
This measure of electoral proximity is a dichotomy indicating the two years leading up to 
a presidential election (and after a midterm Congressional election). The second 
dichotomous measure indicates a president’s first term, reflecting expectations that term 
effects may exist in the data.  
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 Table 2.4 also captures various characteristics in the data that are important in the 
evaluation of political behavior and inter-branch relations. The data cover two 
presidencies, and at least one year in each term of those two presidencies. The two 
presidents under analysis—Bill Clinton and George W. Bush—hail from different parties 
and governed during varying partisan relations with Congress including unified 
government, semi-divided government, and divided government. Additionally, the data 
include divided government for both presidents. This variation allows for the evaluation 
of presidential behavior in the midst of their own reelection efforts and as lame ducks 
supporting their eventual party’s standard bearer. Thus, although the data include only 13 
years, this time period allows for remarkable variation in terms of national leadership.  
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State-Level Congressional Controls 
In light of a substantial literature that argues that Congress is the solo player in 
distributive politics, it is of great import that Congressional effects be controlled. 
Although the aggregate state-year-level dataset can complicate the isolation of precise 
Congressional effects, I include a series of measures that seek to capture the influence of 
Congress in the distribution of grants. First, I use a dichotomous measure of state 
membership on the Senate Appropriations Committee. Because all funding bills pass 
through this committee, this measure will serve as an effective proxy for Congressional 
influence. It is likely that membership on this committee will allow a direct influence in 
the area of grant allocations.
59
  
Moreover, I control for whether it is an election year for a member of the 
Appropriations Committee, whether it is an election year for an incumbent Senator, 
whether there is a competitive Senate election in a state, whether the state is represented 
by a member of the Senate leadership, the number of majority party Senators representing 
a state, US House delegation partisan alignment with the president, and the 
Appropriations subcommittee power of states. To control further for the role of Congress, 
all models in this chapter are estimated using fixed effects for state. These fixed effects 
will control for the influence that individual Senators may have on fund allocations.
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Because previous literature demonstrates Congressional influence, these variables will 
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 Different measures of Congressional influence were considered. This measure seemed theoretically and 
empirically sound. Membership on both Appropriations committees, offered almost no variation, as almost 
every state has a congressman or senator on the committeee. Even membership on the House 
Appropriations Committee offers little variation, as most states maintain membership. Failure to seat a 
member on that committee in the House is biased against small population states. In the next chapter, the 
unit of analysis is agency-level allocations and I am able to introduce more textured Congressional controls 
in an effort to examine the influence of legislative factors in fund distribution. 
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 For example, Senators Ted Stevens (AK) and Robert Byrd (WV) were notorious for benefitting from the 
appropriation of government funds, using their unique individual influence to secure substantial money for 
their states. 
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subject the presidential influence hypothesis to rigorous testing. In the end, this chapter 
seeks not to argue that Congress is powerless to influence the distribution of federal 
grants, but instead to argue that presidents act as powerful players in a complex allocation 
system. 
 
Intergovernmental Controls 
Other research suggests that federalism is an alternative explanation for the 
distribution of federal funds (Berry, Burden and Howell 2010; Larcinese, Rizzo, and 
Testa 2006). This work often argues that the political environment that governors face 
influences how grants are distributed. As such, I include controls for whether it is an 
election year for a state’s governor, whether there is partisan alignment between the 
president and a state’s governor, and an interaction of gubernatorial election year and 
partisan alignment with the president. These measures will control for gubernatorial 
electoral concerns and their effects. 
 
State Capacity/Demand 
Measures of state capacity or demand likely also influence grant distribution. As 
such, I control for yearly real gross state product and the miles of roads within a state. 
These data offer stable and comparable measures of the economic capacity for each state. 
Next, because many federal grants fund research and development particularly in areas of 
education and health care, it is important to control for the amount of research conducted 
in each state. I control for the number of colleges, universities and hospitals. I further 
consider a measure of the elderly population as a proxy for demographic demands on 
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government. Additionally, there is a theoretical reason to believe a priori that a few cases 
will be profound outliers due to disaster circumstance and are controlled as a result. This 
variable, labeled “disaster,” accounts for New York in the three years following the 
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and Louisiana and Mississippi after Hurricane 
Katrina. 
 
Evaluating Influence 
 
I estimate a series of models using ordinary least squares with fixed effects for 
state and year. The fixed effects serve as part of the larger effort to ensure that the results 
are robust even when controlling for a multitude of alternative hypotheses. The use of 
fixed effects offers a more conservative estimation by adding additional layers of controls 
beyond those used for Congressional influence, intergovernmental effects, and measures 
of state-level need and demand. Further all estimates are reported with robust standard 
errors. 
The results of this study generally lend support to the hypotheses presented above. 
Presidents use their discretion over federal grants to institute an electorally-strategic 
process of distribution. This presidential strategy reflects both the geographic 
significance of constituencies as well as the salience of elections with respect to time. 
Table 2.5 shows the estimates of the number of grants regressed on state 
competitiveness and timing and a set of controls. In this table, both models are estimated 
in identical fashion except that Model 1 uses a three-part measure of state 
competitiveness, while Model 2 employs a dichotomy. The analysis indicates that swing 
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states receive between 7.3% and 7.6% more grants than do other states. Additionally, 
using this measure of competitiveness, core and lost cause states are statistically 
indistinguishable, suggesting the executive branch focus in the distribution of grants is on 
electorally competitive states. This swing state benefit translates to substantial gains for a 
state. For example, Tennessee in 2007 was a core state and received 4110 federal grants. 
These results suggest that if Tennessee were a swing state it would see more than 300 
additional grants in that year alone.   
The proximity of an election is associated with an increase in grant allocations, as 
well. The estimates suggest that states will receive 10% more grants in the two years 
prior to an election than the two years following one. This finding offers additional 
evidence that the electoral interests of the executive branch influence the federal grant 
allocation strategy. An approaching presidential election initiates a change in the way the 
executive branch allocates federal grants. This finding lends support to a theory of 
presidential influence in another way. If the grant distribution process were 
Congressionally-dominated, one would expect the inability to reject the null hypothesis 
because of the frequency of Congressional elections. Instead, the two years approaching a 
presidential election see higher grant allocations than the two year approaching a 
midterm.  
Beyond the analysis of the number of federal grants, I also examine the allocation 
of federal dollars. Table 2.6 presents the results of this analysis. In this table, the models 
are identical to those found in Table 2.5, except that they are estimated using the logged 
real grant dollars per 100,000 people as the dependent variable. The results of the grant 
dollars models echo the findings of the grants models. Swing states see a benefit of 5.7% 
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more grant dollars than other states. These findings provide further evidence that federal 
grant allocations reflect presidential electoral preferences over geographic distribution.  
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Once again, Tennessee in 2007 received about $1.06 billion in grants. However, the 
results suggest that as a swing state, Tennessee would have reaped an additional $60 
million in grants in that year. 
More to the point and similar to the grants models, states receive about 6.6% more 
grant dollars when a presidential election is approaching compared to when one is distant. 
In the dollars models, states receive more in a president’s first. This is consistent with 
hypothesis 3 and offers a distinct finding from the grants model. In both the grants and 
grant dollars models, the estimates for term are imprecise and preclude rejection of the 
null hypothesis. 
Figure 2.3 charts the substantive effects of these estimates for grant and grant 
dollar allocations. The strategic allocation of grants with regard to geography and time is 
immediately clear. State competitiveness and electoral proximity have not only 
statistically significant consequences for allocations, but those effects translate into 
substantively important effects for a state of average size. From the perspective of the 
average citizen or citizen group, living in a swing state, particularly in advance of an 
election translates into a huge influx of additional federal funds to your state.  
In the grant dollars model, the results show that a senator’s membership on the 
Appropriations Committee is associated with about a 7.6% increase in grant dollars. This 
finding is generally consistent with previous research that indicates a legislative influence 
in the distribution of federal dollars (Carsey and Rundquist 1999; Rundquist and Carsey 
2002; Rundquist, Rhee and Lee 1996). The results, taken as a whole, suggest that there 
exist both executive and legislative pressures on the allocation of federal grants.  
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However, these results cannot detail whether this effect is driven by Congress itself or 
presidents seeking to placate Senate appropriators. 
 The models presented in Tables 2.5 and 2.6 offer evidence that there exists a 
presidential electoral influence in the geographic distribution of federal grants. Swing 
states receive more grants and grant dollars than do core states and non-swing states. 
Further, the proximity of a presidential election changes the way in which grants are 
allocated, increasing both the number of grants and grant dollars allocated to the states.  
However, the timing variables as specified in both models only describe the effect 
of time on allocations to all states. While the evidence suggests that federal grant 
allocations are strategically timed, it does not provide a comprehensive understanding of 
that strategy. To understand allocation strategy more completely, it is important to 
examine the intersection of timing and geographic distribution. To do this, I re-estimate 
the grants and grant dollars models using variables that interact the timing and swing 
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state variables. Table 2.7 presents the results of the estimation. In all four models, state 
electoral competitiveness is a dichotomous measure of whether a state is a swing state. 
The first and third models are specified with variables that interact swing state with first 
term. The second and fourth models interact swing state with election proximity. These 
interaction variables provide insight into how timing affects swing and non-swing states 
differently. Their introduction into the models offers a more nuanced evaluation of 
strategic timing and geographic allocation.  
In these models, the proximity of a presidential election continues to play an 
important role in the distribution of funds. Although the interaction terms fail to reach 
statistical significance, the parameter estimates suggest that swing states receive more 
grants and grant dollars when an election is proximate compared to when it is distant.
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The results from the interaction of proximity and competitiveness and the implications of 
the variable for the fit of the model offer additional support for the expectations from 
Hypothesis 2. They suggest that presidents are strategic with regard both to where and 
when grants are allocated.  
Moreover, the estimates suggest that swing states receive more grants and grant 
dollars in a president’s second term compared to the first. Hypothesis three suggests that 
presidential self-interest should lead to increased grant allocations in the first term. A 
contrary finding could be attributable to executive branch and presidential learning 
curves. Because new presidents and appointees rapidly find themselves in new decision 
making settings for which they were not necessarily prepared, it may take time before 
they can fully realize and execute a grant allocation strategy. As such, the influence  
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 Further, F tests on the impact of the interaction variables for each model shows that the interaction 
variables have a significant impact on model fit for both models analyzing  grant dollars. For the election 
proximity interaction, F = 79.95, p< .0001; for the term interaction, F = 54.99, p < .0001. 
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during the first term may be artificially low as new members of the executive branch face 
a type of on-the-job training.
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As an additional test of Hypotheses 2 and 3, I divide the data according to state 
competitiveness and reestimate them.
63
 The results of this analysis reported in Table 2.8 
add context to the interactions reported in Table 2.7. The failure of the interaction of 
competitiveness and election proximity is driven by the robustness of the election 
proximity effect. More clearly, when an election is proximate, presidents generally 
allocate more grants and grant dollars than when an election is distant. This finding likely 
occurs because presidents play a strategic role in the legislative process. As mentioned in 
Chapter 1, presidents are able to extract greater discretionary authority from Congress as 
a condition for supporting legislation. The results reported here suggest that the 
presidential pursuit of discretionary authority increases in advance of presidential 
elections. Although there is suggestive evidence that presidents allocate more funds to 
swing states when an election is proximate, the general flood of money to the states in 
advance of presidential elections influences the statistical significance of this distinction. 
Table 2.8 offers support for the robust electoral effects in the distribution of funds, both 
with regard to targeting allocations to key states and enhancing discretionary authority 
during key times. 
Table 2.8 also reports mixed results for presidential term effects. Hypothesis 3 
predicts that while presidential electoral preferences should be salient across one’s tenure, 
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 The ideal test of this proposition would require a modern three term presidency, in which the first term 
there exits acclimation effects, the second term provides the president with electoral self-interest, and a 
president is term limited after his third term. However, the requirements of the 22
nd
 Amendment to the US 
Constitution bar this test. 
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 Additionally, in Appendix 2.A2, I divide the data by election proximity and reestimate. 
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the personal nature of the electoral interest in the first term should increase that salience.
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This analysis challenges this claim, showing little empirical ability to tease out robust 
term effects, particularly with regard to state electoral competitiveness. The estimates 
reported in the preceding tables offer evidence of a more continuous electoral interest—
one unaffected by the institutional and electoral implications of the 22
nd
 Amendment. 
These findings demonstrate that the proximity of a presidential election motivates 
a change in executive branch allocations of federal grants. During the two years prior to a 
presidential election, the executive branch allocates a significantly higher percentage of 
grants and grant dollars are concentrated in swing states. The evidence indicates not only 
that presidents think about states in terms of electoral competitiveness, but that the 
urgency of electoral demands motivates increasingly strategic grant allocations.
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Analyzing Influence 
 
Research into executive branch politics has sought to understand how the 
presidency has changed over time. Among these changes, researchers consider how the 
president has become more responsive to political or electoral considerations. The 
dawning of the politicization (or perhaps hyper-politicization) of the American 
presidency has been pegged at numerous points in time. They include Nixon’s second 
term, the fallout of Carter-era bureaucratic reforms, the Reagan presidency, and the 
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 As a final test on the robustness of the findings regarding the interaction terms, Appendix 2.A6 and 2.A7 
report the results of re-estimation of the data by splitting the sample, according to the elements of the 
interactions. Appendix 2.A6 separately examines Swing and Non-Swing state data, testing the effect of 
timing variables on both dependent variables. Similarly, Appendix 2.A7 separately examines proximate and 
distant elections data, testing the effect of the swing state variable on both dependent variables. These 
analyses offer additional support for the theoretical claims in the central analysis in this project.  
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Clinton years. What is clear is that the office of president is now a more politically- and 
electorally-motivated than in previous periods. 
Because of this institutional transformation, the findings presented here may not 
extend to earlier eras of the presidency, and it is unclear from previous research what 
would be an acceptable historical starting point. However, it is quite likely that the 
findings of this project will inform our understanding of the presidency into the future. 
Politicization of the presidency and the strategic use of appointees that was observable in 
the Reagan era and that accelerated during the Clinton and George W. Bush 
administrations will, at the very least, ensure the presidency remains a highly political 
institution. Accepting the institutionalization of political and electoral concerns, it is 
important to evaluate how politics influences presidential behavior. This chapter has 
taken such a consideration of an evolving presidency and tested its effects on distributive 
policy. 
Several implications emerge from the results of this study. In a very 
straightforward way, presidents care about their own electoral interests and use their 
influence over the federal largesse to further these goals. These findings add to a growing 
voice in the literature that argues that presidents, like members of Congress, are 
motivated by elections and behave in a manner that reflects electoral concerns (Shaw 
2006; Shaw and Roberts 2000; Canes-Wrone and Shotts 2004). Specifically, presidents 
engage in a targeted and electorally-strategic allocation of government funds to crucial 
constituencies (states). This finding echoes recent work that suggests electoral 
considerations motivate and inform presidential influence over the distribution of funds 
(Berry, Burden and Howell 2010; Berry and Gersen 2010). However, rather than showing 
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that presidents use funds to aid copartisans in reelection, this chapter shows that concerns 
over presidential elections drive influence. 
 In short, this research demonstrates that presidents’ electoral motives influence 
the distribution of federal funds. The literature in this area often (and accurately) argues 
that Congress plays an important role in distributive politics, and this chapter offers 
support for this claim, as well. However, the findings presented here effectively 
demonstrate that presidents also wield substantial influence. Rather than a system of fund 
distribution that a single branch of government dominates, the allocation of federal 
dollars is a shared power in which the oft-overlooked executive branch plays an 
important and influential role.  
 In evaluating presidential power, an important distinction in this research emerges 
from the type of spending being analyzed. The project uses federal discretionary grants 
for an important reason; the executive branch has authority over the distribution of those 
funds. Unlike some other types of funds (or federal outlays generally), these federal 
grants offer presidents a clear path to participate in porkbarrel politics. In any study of the 
strategic distribution of government funds by elites, it is important to consider both the 
motive and opportunity to influence allocations. Discretionary authority offers presidents 
the opportunity to influence the process, and as a result, the findings presented here have 
broader implications. In addition to federal grants, the executive branch maintains 
authority over the allocation of spending in other areas such as contracts and 
procurement. Thus, this research question can be extended into any of the areas of 
spending in which presidents and the executive branch have the opportunity to influence 
outcomes directly.  
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This chapter details the manner in which presidential electoral concerns, 
presidential power and the characteristics of presidential elections inform federal fund 
distribution. Given the institutional design of the Electoral College and the nature of 
competition in presidential elections, swing states serve as the key constituencies in the 
race for the White House. Presidents use their discretionary control over huge sums of 
federal grant dollars to target funds to swing states. By delivering funds to these states, 
presidents seek to perform a basic and strategic task in distributive politics to target 
constituencies with a “relatively high willingness to abandon their ideological preferences 
in exchange for particularistic benefits” (Dixit and Londregan 1996, 1133). In this way, 
federal grants function as an incumbent-controlled pool of campaign funds that presidents 
are able to allocate strategically. 
 This research also engages the distributive politics literature that focuses on the 
recipient constituency. Scholars debate whether core constituencies (e.g., Levitt and 
Snyder 1995) or swing constituencies (e.g., Dixit and Londregan 1996) benefit most in 
the allocation of funds. The core hypothesis is often posed in the context of legislative 
elections and reflects a strategy that is particularly effective in popular elections. This 
chapter lends support to the theory that swing constituencies receive a positive bias in the 
presidentially-influenced allocation of federal government funds.  
However, I also suggest that presidents may make more nuanced calculations 
regarding the distribution of grants within states. While this research suggests an 
interstate swing state bias in distribution, it does not preclude a differently-motivated 
distribution bias at the intra-state level. For example, Chen (2009) argues that within the 
swing state of Florida, FEMA grants are delivered to core constituencies in the state’s 
79 
 
Eastern counties. Such a finding can be entirely consistent with the results of this chapter. 
This research simply suggests which states will receive more grants. Research that 
examines intrastate grant funding may well find that presidents target core constituencies 
within swing states in an attempt to enhance their electoral prospects. Conversely, 
research may demonstrate that the swing state bias is true at both the inter- and intrastate 
levels. This chapter cannot comment on the latter. Instead, the research presented in this 
chapter offers support for the swing hypothesis in presidential elections specifically at the 
interstate level, as is consistent with the institutional design of the Electoral College. 
 Finally, this chapter speaks strictly to presidential influence and behavior, and 
offers evidence that the distribution of federal grants reflects a strategy consistent with 
presidential electoral preferences. This chapter does not necessarily speak to the 
effectiveness of this strategy on voting behavior. Instead, I argue that a presidential 
administration has an annual duty to distribute federal grants. The executive branch’s 
allocation of grants is relatively low cost, as the bureaucracy is charged by Congress to 
perform the action with distributive discretion. Because grants offer a yearly porkbarrel 
opportunity for presidents, serve as an opportunity for media advertising and can be 
targeted in strategic ways, grants will be allocated to states that are electorally important 
to a president. Presidential elections can be decided by a few hundred popular votes in a 
single state or set of states. As such, the allocation of grants is a nearly costless action 
that may have the ultimate payoff. 
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Conclusion 
 
The National Park Service (NPS) administers hundreds of nationally protected 
areas. Chief among these areas, of course, are America’s national parks. Eight of the 
nation’s 58 national parks are found in the most populous state California—a protected 
area roughly the size of Massachusetts. In fact 30 sites protected by NPS can be found in 
California. By comparison, Pennsylvania is the home to no national parks and only 18 
federally protected areas. Between 1996 and 2008, NPS allocated more than 200% more 
grants to Pennsylvania than to California. Despite California’s population advantage 
(300%), geographic size advantage (400%), and advantage in the number of areas 
protected by NPS (67%), Pennsylvania, one of the most politically important states in 
presidential elections, saw dramatically more federal funds. 
Like Members of Congress who indulge in the attachment of earmarks and fiddle 
with funding formulas, presidents use executive branch discretion over federal grants to 
advance their own electoral interests. Federal grants provide presidents credit claiming 
opportunities in key constituencies. This chapter demonstrates that presidents are 
concerned with their own electoral interests and direct federal grants to swing states, 
particularly in advance of a presidential election. The findings suggest a commitment to 
presidential credit claiming in the arena of distributive politics. It appears that all else 
equal, applying for a grant from a swing states, rather than a non-swing state may be a 
more fruitful endeavor. Moreover, the bureaucracy’s generosity is greatest in advance of 
a presidential election. 
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This research also engages a debate in distributive politics about the beneficiaries 
of government funds. While this chapter offers support for the research that posits that 
swing constituencies receive more government funds, it offers a more nuanced 
understanding of this research. First, it is crucial to understand and consider the 
institutional structure of elections when evaluating the beneficiaries of government fund 
distribution. Such consideration can produce unique and dynamic theories of fund 
distribution. For example, this study suggests that interstate fund distribution is consistent 
with the swing hypothesis, but intrastate distribution may not be. The institutional 
structure of the Electoral College can allow (and may encourage) different distribution 
strategies at inter- and intrastate levels.  
Moreover, this study suggests the importance of incorporating presidential power 
and executive branch influence into studies of distributive politics. As a major player in 
all stages of the public policy process, the president must be incorporated into studies of 
distributive politics. However, what this chapter suggests is that the extent of presidential 
influence in the realm of federal spending depends in large part on the type of spending. 
As the literature on delegation suggests, presidential power is most effective in areas with 
the greatest executive discretion. However, several distributive politics studies fail to 
consider the role of discretion in federal spending allocations. Future research must shift 
away from an examination of aggregate federal outlays and focus more clearly on the 
independent effects associated with specific types of spending. 
Finally, this research calls for students of the American presidency to consider 
that executive behavior may be less unique than is often argued in the literature. 
Although presidential powers and duties are certainly distinct in the American system, 
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presidential behavior is likely driven by the same basic forces that motivate Members of 
Congress and other elected officials. In a fundamental way, presidents are election-
minded individuals who depend on electoral success to influence outcomes, accomplish 
secondary goals, and advance their political agenda.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
 
AIDING AND ABETTING THE PRESIDENT: AGENCY RESPONSIVENESS TO 
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL INTERESTS 
 
 
 
Article I Section 9 says, clearly, we are the ones who are supposed to make these 
spending determinations in Congress. Now there are a lot of spending determinations 
that are made that I bitterly oppose. But if you say that you end all—they call them 
‘earmarks’…then that means all that is going to be done by Barack Obama in the White 
House. It will go to the Executive. 
Senator James Inhofe (R-OK), March 14, 2010
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In this statement, Senator Inhofe explicitly discusses a battle constantly waged 
between the branches of government regarding who controls public policy. Inhofe 
defends the power of Congress to direct federal agencies in the allocation of funds. 
Failure to provide this direction amounts to what Indiana Senator Richard Lugar calls a, 
“surrendering of Constitutional authority to Washington bureaucrats and the Obama 
Administration” (Lugar 2010). Two issues drive this debate and underlie the Senators’ 
concerns. To whom are agencies responsive? And what preferences do agency outcomes 
reflect? 
Agency responsiveness to political elites has long been a topic of interest to 
scholars. Research usually characterizes agency responsiveness as a uniform relationship 
between the bureaucracy and particular political actors. However, not all agencies 
function in a way such that Congress (or the President or the agencies themselves) is 
singularly empowered to affect all policy outputs. Instead, the system of separated 
powers drives compromises regarding the creation, reauthorization, and existence of 
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agencies, such that a diversity of interests influences policymaking. The responsiveness 
of agencies to these interests is a function of interbranch relations and agency design, 
which itself is a product of interbranch relations.      
This chapter considers how agency responsiveness to presidential electoral 
preferences varies across agencies. I systematically analyze how key agency 
characteristics affect the way federal grants are allocated in the context of presidential 
electoral goals, while accounting for the effects of Congress, state copartisanship, and 
state need. The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I review the literature outlining the 
presidential electoral motive and how it influences the distribution of federal funds. 
Second, I describe the theoretical and empirical weaknesses facing work in this area. 
Third, I explain why agencies should be more or less responsive to presidential electoral 
preferences. Next, I employ data on all agency-level federal discretionary grant 
allocations from 1996-2008 to estimate the conditional relationship between agency 
attributes and responsiveness to presidential preferences.  
I find that presidents are motivated by their own electoral preferences and seek 
policy outcomes that enhance those preferences. At the same time, I show how insulation 
and politicization condition agency responsiveness. I conclude that presidential influence 
over policymaking extends to most areas of the bureaucracy, but that specific institutional 
designs can limit or enhance this influence. Additionally, research into the administrative 
presidency must consider electoral interests as a forceful motivation in understanding 
presidential behavior and policy influence. 
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The Election Driven President 
 
The president is typically viewed as a major player in universalistic public policy 
ventures involving issues such as security, foreign policy, and the macroeconomy 
(Alesina and Rosenthal 1989; Neustadt 1960; Tufte 1980). Much of the work in this area 
argues that partisan or ideological preferences drive these broad policy pursuits. 
Presidents signal their preferences in these policy areas through public support for 
legislative proposals (Canes-Wrone 2001; Canes-Wrone and Shotts 2004; Cohen 1997; 
Kernell 1993), budgeting and funding priorities (Bertelli and Grose 2009; Krause 1996), 
and guidance in administrative rulemaking (Cooper and West 1988; Wiseman 2009).  
While traditional work on presidential motivation centers on partisanship, 
ideology, and legacy, (Moe and Howell 1999; Neustadt 1960) the electoral motivation is 
often ignored. While existing research essentially regards as a truism that Members of 
Congress are election-driven actors who seek to provide particularized benefits to their 
constituencies, presidents are often seen as part of a different and unique category of 
elected officials (See Mayhew 1974, Lowi 1969, and their progeny). This research 
considers the president to be driven solely by national-level issues and “think in grander 
terms…about social problems and the public interest” (Lewis and Moe 2012, 371). To 
that end, the “national” president is not motivated by the provision of particularistic 
policy outcomes in the same way legislators are. However, I argue in this dissertation that 
in order to achieve any goal, presidents require electoral success in order to maintain 
influence and achieve preferred outcomes. In this way, the electoral motive is not only 
primary, but a necessary condition for the realization of other goals.  
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The electoral motivation manifests in a variety of ways. For example, presidents 
modify behavior in response to the political and electoral environment and their own 
popularity (Canes-Wrone 2006; Canes-Wrone, Herron and Shotts 2001; Canes-Wrone 
and Shotts 2004). Such behavioral changes can have real effects on policy outcomes, 
including distributive policy. Indeed, recent work and the previous chapters argue that the 
electoral competitiveness of states in presidential elections, the proximity of those 
elections, and constituency partisanship influence where the administration directs federal 
funds (Chen 2009; Mebane and Wawro 2002; Shor 2006). Others argue that co-partisan 
electoral considerations drive presidents to allocate federal funds to congressional 
districts or to states with governors of the same party (Berry, Burden and Howell 2010; 
Berry and Gersen 2010; Larcinese, Rizzo, and Testa 2006). What these studies suggest is 
that presidents are not only driven by electoral interests, but that presidents harness their 
policy making power and translate it into a tool to aid in their electoral success.
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This work also brings to light an oft-overlooked aspect of executive branch 
behavior: the presidential porkbarrel. Of course, the literature on legislative elections is 
saturated with studies that demonstrate that Members of Congress seek to funnel federal 
money to their constituencies. However, because of the size of the national constituency 
and the wide ranging responsibilities facing presidents, they are often assumed to be 
immune from such basic political behaviors, “prefer(ring) public policy ventures of more 
diffuse impact” (Mayhew 1974, 128). However, this dissertation relies on both the 
presidential electoral motive and executive branch discretionary authority over the 
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Krause (2005). 
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allocation of certain federal funds to show that presidents behave in much the same way 
as members of Congress. In the context of presidential elections, research theoretically 
and empirically demonstrates that presidents are predominantly concerned with their 
appeal in swing states (constituencies) and that advertising dollars, campaign visits and 
parts of the federal largesse are directed to these states (Dixit and Londregan 1996; 
Lindbeck and Weibull 1987; Shaw 2006; Shor 2006). Thus, in the context of porkbarrel 
politics, the election driven president wants federal agencies to direct funds to swing 
states.  
 
The Myth of Agency Homogeneity 
 
 The executive branch is a large, diverse, and unique macro institution with 
component parts that operate in dramatically different ways. Bureaucratic institutions are 
often not the product of efficient design, but of political compromise and their structural 
features have important implications for their function. In fact, agencies are often 
designed for the express purpose of facilitating or hindering political and policy influence 
from specific elected officials.   
 As a result of the varied nature of bureaucratic organization, any theory of 
presidential policy making must incorporate the effect of institutional context on political 
influence and policy outcomes. However, work on distributive policy influence assumes 
homogeneous responsiveness across agencies. In this literature, one approach examines 
federal spending at the aggregate level. Often annual fund allocations to states or 
congressional districts serves as the unit of analysis (Berry Burden and Howell 2011; 
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Hoover and Pecorino 2005; Larcinese, Rizzo, and Testa 2005; Shor 2006). Another 
approach offers a detailed examination of the allocation processes of one or a few federal 
agencies and draws conclusions about broad government outlays accordingly (Bertelli 
and Grose 2009; Chen 2009; Gasper and Reeves 2011). What unites these works is a 
theoretical assumption that distributive federal agencies operate similarly. As research in 
this area advances, a natural next step that has received less attention (but see Berry and 
Gersen [2010]) will be a focus on how institutional differences influence agency 
operation and responsiveness to political principals.
67
 Because specific agency 
characteristics are intended to affect political control over policy, an analysis that focuses 
on agency-level variation is critical to a comprehensive understanding of presidential 
control.  
 As such, research into the presidential porkbarrel must acknowledge as Moe notes 
that, “structural choices have important consequences for the content and direction of 
policy” (1989, 268). In other areas of policy research, scholars have discussed myriad 
agency structures and characteristics that condition agency responsiveness and outcomes. 
Generally, these characteristics fall into two categories: external design traits and internal 
behavior traits (which of course can emerge as a product of agency design). External 
traits are numerous and include politicization, centralization, insulation and 
independence, and discretion, among others. Internal behavioral traits can include agency 
ideology, professionalization and expertise, and the personality of bureaucrats.
68
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previous work has built the foundation for such an analysis. 
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 From a theoretical perspective, agency characteristics are critical to evaluating the 
presidential porkbarrel. Distributive decision making occurs within some agency (sub-
presidential) hierarchy. Because of this process, any theory of presidential intervention in 
policy making must consider both presidential preferences over outcomes and the 
structural features of agencies that may condition responsiveness to those preferences. 
 
Agency Responsiveness to Presidential Preferences over Pork 
 
 Which agency characteristics influence bureaucratic responsiveness to 
presidential electoral preferences? In order to address this question, it is important to 
consider the means, mechanisms, and tools presidents use to motivate agencies to be 
responsive. In this section, I argue that four specific institutional features condition 
agency responsiveness to presidential electoral interests. Discretion, agency insulation, 
the saturation of political appointees, and agency ideology all affect the personnel and 
processes within agencies as well as agency outcomes. These features are thought to have 
substantial effects on policy and political control, and I provide a theoretical foundation 
for evaluating their effect on the president’s ability to engage in porkbarrel politics. 
 Moe and Wilson (1994) explains that four attributes of agencies condition the 
elected branches’ power over the bureaucracy. “The design, location, staffing, and 
empowerment of administrative agencies,” all influence the ability to control the 
institutions of the executive branch (Moe and Wilson 1994, 4). Such structures serve as 
                                                                                                                                                 
Altfield and Miller 1984; Bertelli and Grose 2009; Bendor, Taylor and van Gaalen 1985; Carpenter 2001; 
Clinton and Lewis 2008; Gailmard and Patty 2007; Heclo 1977; Huber and McCarty 2004; Rourke 1984; 
Wilson 1989; and Wood and Waterman 2004.  
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key components to agency operations and can dictate not just the level of political 
control, but which branch will exercise such control.  
Presidents rely on institutional mechanisms to control bureaucratic institutions. 
The first means by which presidents garner greater responsiveness is delegated power 
from Congress. Discretion is the lifeblood of executive power and offers presidents the 
primary opportunity to affect policy making. Specific statutes allow Congress to outline 
meticulously not only the processes of public policy but also the expected outcomes. On 
the other hand, when the locus of decision making rests in the executive branch, 
presidential influence is its greatest. Such influence can occur when Congress directly 
relies on agencies to make policy decisions, through Congressional inaction that allows 
executive interpretation of vague statutes, or from unilateral action (Epstein and 
O’Halloran 1999; Huber and Shipan 2002; Moe 1999; Cooper 2002; Howell 2003; Lewis 
2003).
69
 Congress delegates to presidents discretionary spending authority over tens of 
billions of government dollars annually. It is this authority that serves as the foundation 
for the presidential porkbarrel.
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In addition to discretion, the internal structures and location of agencies can 
influence responsiveness. The intersection of structure and location can lead to insulated 
independence. Insulated independence occurs when an agency is designed in such a way 
that presidential control over the institution is dramatically limited. The definition of 
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below. 
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independence ranges from being located outside of a cabinet department (Seidman and 
Gilmour 1986) to an agency that has “no layers of bureaucratic organization above it” 
(Lewis 2003, 46). However, according to these definitions both the Executive Office of 
the President and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission are independent. Yet, presidential 
control is quite different in each. Thus, while institutional independence vis-à-vis location 
is important, it alone does not explain political control.  
 Instead, it is important to understand both independence and insulation. In this 
way, internal structures of agencies can insulate them from direct presidential control and 
thus allow them to be less responsive to presidential preferences. Here, certain agency 
rules and obligations can serve as a buffer to political control. Lewis (2003) explains that 
if an agency is governed by a commission structure, it tends to be insulated, “from 
presidential control by increasing the number of actors who must be influenced to change 
the direction of an agency” (46). What are called “specific qualifications for 
administrators” (Lewis 2003, 27) such as fixed or staggered terms and parity limit not 
only presidential influence, but the effectiveness of appointees as presidential agents. In 
this way, insulated independence closely reflects what George Krause calls, “the 
institutional proximity of bureaucratic and political institutions” (1999, 37). The location 
of an agency and the president’s access to the policy making mechanisms within that 
agency condition the effectiveness of presidential control and the president’s ability to 
extract policy benefits for political or electoral gain (Seidman and Gilmour 1986; 
Seidman 1998; Wood and Waterman 1994). 
When institutional dynamics such as insulated independence limit presidential 
influence, chiefs executive can rely on other institutional processes for effect. For 
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example, the leadership of individual agencies can have an important impact on 
responsiveness. The number of appointees within bureaucratic institutions varies 
dramatically across agencies. The saturation of political appointees within an agency 
(politicization) affects responsiveness, as well (Clayton 1992; Lewis 2008; Moe 1982; 
Randall 1989; Stewart and Cromartie 1982; Wood 1990).
71
 Presidents staff the upper-
echelons of federal agencies individuals who are sympathetic to their interests (including 
electoral interests), serve in key leadership and decision making posts, and have a 
dramatic effect on policy outcomes (Lewis 2008; Moe 1982, 1985; Nathan 1986; Snyder 
and Weingast 2000; Stewart and Cromartie 1982; Wood and Waterman 1991, 1994).  
The appointment power can have profound effects on how closely policy 
outcomes mirror presidential preferences. Agencies that are organized with few if any 
presidential appointees will likely be more responsive to other forces (Congress or their 
own agency preferences). However, more politicized agencies will likely respond to 
presidential will, as appointees often share presidential preferences or are subject to his 
influence directly. Nathan (1986) explains that presidents use signals to convey their 
(un)happiness and if signals are, “used skillfully…can reinforce the idea that presidential 
appointees should pursue presidential purposes and should devote time and attention to 
administrative process” (91). 
Appointees generally affect policy in two distinct ways. They serve as core 
decision makers or gatekeepers of outcomes, adjusting policy recommendations from 
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career staff (essentially an ex post appointee effect). Appointees also convey to careerists 
information about leadership and presidential preferences and make clear their 
expectations about policy outcomes (an ex ante appointee effect).
72
 In the context of the 
presidential porkbarrel, appointees can directly control the targeting of funds or create an 
environment that induces similar responsiveness among bureaucratic actors. 
Finally, ideological congruence between an agency and the president (a symptom 
of staffing and design considerations) serves as another important condition for 
bureaucratic responsiveness. This congruence—motivated by shared preferences and 
overlapping interests—will facilitate the production of policy consistent with presidential 
goals. The ideology of bureaucrats and appointees has been shown to influence the types 
of policy that is produced (Clinton and Lewis 2008) as well as the responsiveness to 
presidential preferences (Bertelli and Grose 2009). With a set of shared goals and 
preferences, ideologically proximate agencies will be more likely to produce outcomes 
consistent with presidential interests. Beyond a shared interest over policy, proximate 
agencies also see external benefits to an ideologically congruent president (or successor) 
being (re)elected. Thus, agencies with ideologies more proximate to the president will be 
more responsive to presidential (electoral) goals, facilitating his ability to extract 
preferred policy outcomes.  
The ideology of a bureaucratic institution can emerge for three key reasons. First, 
the mission and policy demands of an agency (such as the liberal nature of low income 
housing programs in the Department of Housing and Urban Development) naturally lend 
themselves to a specific range of outcomes. In addition to this mission-based ideology, 
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 Information can be conveyed in a multitude of ways including through staff meetings, memoranda, 
mission statements, or administrative directives the goals of the agency leadership. 
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individuals may self-select into agencies that carry out friendly policy goals, leading to 
staff-level homogeneity within an institution. Finally, burrowing—a concept by which 
appointees take career positions in agencies with which they align ideologically—can 
entrench agency ideology.    
 Thus, agency responsiveness depends on the unique relationship between 
agencies and presidential preferences and powers. By design, certain agencies are likely 
to be more responsive to presidential (electoral and policy) preferences because of their 
institutional proximity to the White House. However, in situations where agencies are 
more insulated (or an agency is subject to drift), specific dynamics such as politicization 
and ideological congruence condition presidential power and affect responsiveness. 
From this theoretical discussion, I proceed with a few basic hypotheses to test 
agency responsiveness to presidential electoral interests. These hypotheses predict the 
manner in which agency structures affect presidential influence over bureaucratic 
institutions and ultimately how responsive those agencies are to presidential electoral 
preferences. 
H1: Insulated Independence Hypotheses. Insulated agencies will be less 
responsive to presidents’ electoral interests. 
 
H2: Politicization Hypothesis. More politicized agencies will be more 
responsive to presidential electoral interests. 
 
H3: Ideological Congruence Hypothesis. Liberal agencies will be more 
responsive to a Democratic president’s electoral interests. 
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Data 
 
 To address this research question, I examine agency-level discretionary grant 
allocations from 1996-2008. The grants data for this chapter are drawn from the Federal 
Assistance Award Data System maintained by the US Census Bureau. The data have 
been organized, such that the unit of analysis is the agency-state-year. The result is a 
database of 59,650 agency-state-year allocations.
73
 Table 3.1a offers an overview of the 
average annual allocations by agencies in each cabinet department and independent 
institution. The Table shows that while some departments typically distribute large sums 
of money, grant making exists across the bureaucracy. 
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 Between 1996 and 2008, 152 agencies allocated grants to the states. However, not every agency allocated 
funds in every year. In this case, agencies that failed to allocate any funds in a given year do not appear in 
the dataset for that year. Also excluded were a set of data that were allocated not under an agency heading, 
but under a departmental heading. For example, the allocation label “Department of Agriculture” was too 
broad to be considered as consistent with other agency-specific data and were thus excluded. 
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 I employ two related dependent variables that measure grant distribution.
74
 First, I 
examine the logged number of grants allocated by an agency per state-year.
75
 Second, I 
measure real grant dollars per 100,000 people as a dependent variable. This dependent 
variable naturally controls for the effects of population differences among states and 
inflation over time.  
Independent Variables of Interest 
 The core concept in this analysis of federal fund distribution is agency 
responsiveness to presidential electoral interests. Because an attention to and a focus on 
swing states drive presidential electoral behavior, I rely on a common measure of state 
electoral competitiveness to denote states as “swing” (see Abramowitz, et al 2006; 
Ansolabehere, et al 1992). By using the incumbent party share of the two party 
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 All models will be separately estimated for each dependent variable. This approach will offer key insight 
into allocations at the agency level and serve as a robustness check on the general findings. 
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 I include a control variable measuring state population in millions in all models with this dependent 
variable. 
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presidential vote from the previous election, a state is labeled swing if it was decided by 
10% of less.
76
  
I use a four part measure to capture an agency’s insulated independence. This 
measure accounts for both the location and structure of agencies that may insulate them 
from (or wed them to) political control. Dummy variables denote a bureaucratic 
institution as being a cabinet secretary’s office, a cabinet bureau,77 an independent 
agency, or an independent commission.
78
  
Next, I include a measure of agency politicization, using the standard measure 
from Lewis (2008). Specifically, politicization is the ratio between presidential 
appointees and career-level SES managers within an agency.
79
 This measure notes the 
saturation of political actors in the decision making structure of agencies, compared to 
senior civil servants. 
To measure agency ideological congruence, I compare agency ideal points 
(Clinton and Lewis 2008) to the party of the president, creating a dichotomous measure. 
The measure takes the value of one for a liberal agency under a Democratic president 
(conservative agency under a Republican).  
Controls 
 Much of the literature on distributive politics focuses on the role of Congress as 
the chief appropriator. While this chapter examines a type of spending for which 
Congress has delegated allocation authority, legislative influence still serves as the chief 
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 For all analyses, the reference case is “non-swing”—a state decided by more than 10%. 
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 A “cabinet bureau” for the purposes of this chapter refers to any grantmaking cabinet institution that is 
not a secretary’s office. 
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 Data on agency structure and location are drawn from David Lewis’ Administrative Agency Insulation 
Data Set. 
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 A political appointee is defined as an individual who is Senate confirmed, a schedule C employee, or a 
non-career member of the Senior Executive Service. A sample of agencies and politicization scores can be 
found in Table 3.1b. 
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alternative hypothesis. As such, I rely on a host of Congress controls in order to evaluate 
this hypothesis.
80
 Specifically, I include standard measures of ideological, electoral, and 
institutional measures often associated with legislative distributive power. Additionally, 
because this analysis focuses on the agency level, I include measures of a state’s 
representation on House and Senate Appropriations subcommittees with oversight over 
given agencies. These measures offer a direct evaluation of Congress’ distributive power 
and the influence of key members. 
 Other research into the distribution of federal funds (most notably Larcinese, 
Rizzo, and Testa 2006) suggests presidents seek the distribution of funds to support states 
with gubernatorial copartisans. To account for such influence, I include measures of 
partisan alignment between president and governor, gubernatorial election year, and the 
interaction of the two. 
 Last, I consider the state need and demand for federal funding as an alternative. 
Measures of gross state product, miles of roads, and number of universities and hospitals 
measure the economic and research capacities of states. The inclusion of the percentage 
of the population that is elderly offers insight into the specific demographic demands 
facing a state. Finally, a disaster measure controls for the demand for funds in the 
aftermaths of the 2001 terror attacks in New York and Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana 
and Mississippi. 
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 A full listing of all dependent and independent variables and their operationalization can be found in 
Appendix 1. 
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Analyzing Agency Responsiveness to Presidential Electoral Interests 
 
For all models and both dependent variables, I first estimate the data using 
ordinary least squares with fixed effects appropriate for state and year. Second, I estimate 
the data using Tobit,
81
  given the left censoring of data at zero.
82
 The empirical effort will 
proceed as follows. First, I offer a direct test of hypothesis one, estimating the effect of 
insulated independence on agency responsiveness. Second, to evaluate clearly the effects 
of other institutional characteristics at each level of agency insulation, I divide the data by 
agency type. I next estimate the data that include politicization and ideological 
congruence for each level of insulation. In each model, I interact the independent 
variable(s) of interest with the swing state variable to evaluate responsiveness to 
presidential electoral interests. 
Table 3.2 reports the estimates of models that evaluate the effect if insulated 
independence on responsiveness to presidential electoral interests. This model serves as a 
direct test of Hypothesis 1, and uses ordinary least squares with fixed effects for state and 
year to estimate the data. In the first two models, I use a four part measure of insulated 
independence that divides cabinet institutions into secretary’s offices and bureaus and 
independent institutions into agencies and commissions. In the next two models, all 
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 Ordinary least squares offers insight into this variation in an important, conservative way. However, the 
abundance of “zero allocations” (left censoring of the data) presents a methodological challenge. In the data 
as much as 30% of the observations are zero, as many federal grant programs do not allocate universally to 
all states in all years. Estimating censored data with ordinary least squares can bias estimates downward 
(Amemiya 1984; Greene 1993; Tobin 1958). Employing Tobit accounts for this character of data. As a 
result, Tobit serves as an appealing alternative, while further demonstrating that ordinary least squares with 
fixed effects is a more conservative estimation technique. 
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 The Appendix provides estimates of all model employing Tobit to estimate the data. Generally, the 
findings are robust across estimation techniques and, at the very least, the Tobit estimates are imprecise but 
in the expected direction. For each Table in the “Results” section of this chapter, there is an Appendix with 
a corresponding number . 
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cabinet institutions fall under the same heading. Broadly, the results support the idea that 
insulation conditions agency responsiveness to presidential electoral interests. Cabinet 
institutions allocate approximately 28% more grants to swing states than non-swing 
states. This finding translates into a substantial increase in resources for states that are 
competitive in presidential elections. For a state of average population like Tennessee, the 
results suggest that if it were a swing state it could expect to see agency-level grant 
allocations increase by over $4 million per year. In addition to grant dollars, swing states 
can expect to receive a 10% increase in the number of grants allocated, as well. 
Conversely, yet consistent with the expectations of hypothesis 1, the most 
insulated type of institution—independent commissions—are less responsive to 
presidential electoral interests. Because independent commissions is the reference 
category for insulated independence, the estimate for swing state suggests that in 
independent commissions swing states receive significantly fewer federal grants than do 
non-swing states. This finding indicates that independent commissions allocate funds 
based on considerations other than the president’s electoral interests and offers further 
evidence of the effectiveness of insulation in limiting presidential power.  
 The estimates for the interaction between independent agency and swing state 
provide interesting results. Despite an effort to insulate independent agencies from 
political control with such institutional processes such as budgetary proposal power, 
limitations on regulatory review, and removal from the apparatus of Cabinet influence, 
these agencies are responsive to presidential electoral interests. Specifically, independent 
agencies allocate over 37% more grant dollars and 17% more grants to swing states than 
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non-swing states. The finding suggests that despite efforts to insulate independent 
agencies, presidential influence still motivates responsiveness to electoral interests.
83
   
 In addition to the precise estimates reported here the findings from these models 
suggest that insulated independence has an important effect on responsiveness to the 
president. Moreover, and in basic terms, the findings reported here suggest that different 
types of agencies function in dramatically different ways. Figure 3.1 offers a clear 
comparison on the findings reported in Table 3.2. The Figure demonstrates the 
responsiveness of less insulated agencies (those institutionally proximate to the 
president), while the most insulated commissions resist such influence. Moreover, this 
Figure offers insight into the substantive impact of agency responsiveness to presidential 
electoral interests. In agencies where presidents wield greater political control—cabinet 
institutions and independent agencies—agency-level allocations to swing states are 
hundreds of thousands of dollars greater than those to non-swing states. The result for 
states and their citizens is a real impact on daily life that is contingent on the electoral 
competitiveness of the state. 
 To evaluate more clearly how differences in insulation across bureaucratic 
institutions affect responsiveness, I divide the data according to each type of agency. In 
this way, I am able to control agency insulation and evaluate if other institutional 
characteristics influence responsiveness in similar ways. In so doing, I reestimate the 
divided data and include measures of politicization and ideological congruence (as well 
as the interaction of each with the swing state variable).  
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 It should be noted, while the dollar estimates for the interaction independent agency and swing are 
substantively more significant than the interaction estimates for cabinet and swing, the two are statistically 
indistinguishable. 
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 Table 3.3 reports the estimates for Cabinet-level data. Across the models, there is 
robust support for responsiveness to presidential electoral interests. Cabinet secretary’s 
offices allocate 46% more grants to swing states than non-swing states. Similarly, 
Cabinet bureaus benefit swing states by more than 12%. The interaction of ideological 
congruence and swing state produces null results, however. This finding suggests that 
Cabinet institutions are responsive to the president regardless of their ideological 
relationship to him. In this way, Cabinet institutions likely function in one of two ways. 
These institutions may operate under an expectation of responsiveness, viewing the 
president as the charge of the executive branch and essentially a bureaucratic CEO whose 
interests shall be promoted. Alternatively, presidential power is likely its strongest within 
the Cabinet as the chief executive is able to wield myriad powers without the types of 
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restrictions that exist in independent institutions. Regardless of the reasoning, presidential 
power within the cabinet is pervasive and allows presidents to engage effectively in 
porkbarrel politics. 
 Interestingly, in Cabinet secretary’s offices, the interaction of politicization and 
swing state produces a significant and negative estimate, suggesting that in more 
politicized secretaries’ offices, swing states receive fewer grant dollars than non-swing 
states. This finding is contrary to the expectations of hypothesis 2. There may be a few 
explanations for this outcome. First, politicization is not an entirely exogenous concept. 
Instead, presidents have the power to manipulate agency politicization by increasing or 
decreasing the number of appointees in a given institution. While the theoretical 
expectation was that in agencies with a greater saturation of political appointees, 
responsiveness would be stronger, politicization may be a more proactive tool in this 
setting. Presidents may politicize Cabinet secretaries’ offices that are less responsive in 
an effort to recapture control. In the same vein, if a small cadre of political appointees is 
ensuring responsiveness in another secretary’s office, the president may effectively and 
strategically de-politicize an agency without reducing his influence and the office’s 
responsiveness.  
 Another explanation for this scenario is that while Cabinet secretaries’ offices are 
likely the least insulated, Bertelli and Grose (2009) tells us that secretaries themselves are 
politically savvy, self-interested and under certain conditions may ensure that institutions 
under their purview are less responsive to the president. Finally, a methodological reason 
may motivate this result. Because of the limited number of Cabinet secretary’s offices 
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generally (N=14 or 15)
84
 and in this dataset specifically (n=7), a small number of offices 
in highly politicized agencies could drive such results.  
 The estimates for the relationship between politicization and responsiveness for 
Cabinet bureaus speak more clearly to this effect. In bureaus, there is no relationship 
between politicization and responsiveness. This finding once again suggests that 
presidential influence over the Cabinet writ large is substantial and pervasive and that 
Cabinet bureaus are broadly responsive to his electoral interests, regardless of ideology or 
the saturation of appointees. Once again, a null finding for the interaction of swing and 
politicization is inconsistent with the expectations of hypothesis 2. However, one 
explanation is that in the bureaus, sub-agencies, and offices captured in the “bureau” 
variable, grant decision making may not face a complex network of appointees. Instead, a 
small number of appointees may make such decisions. By having a small score of 
decision makers, White House influence can be more easily targeted and an agency can 
be responsive without a profound saturation of appointees. The result is that presidents 
can extract responsiveness from agencies whether there are several or few appointees in a 
bureaucratic institution so long as decision making is structured effectively.
85
 
Additionally, I estimate the effects of politicization and ideological congruence on 
responsiveness for independent institutions and report them in Table 3.4. In general 
terms, it is notable that independent institutions function quite differently than Cabinet 
institutions. Whereas Cabinet institutions are broadly responsive to presidential electoral 
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 During the time period analyzed in this project, the Department of Homeland Security was created 
(2003), such that from 1996-2002, there was a universe of 14 Cabinet secretary’s offices, and from 2003-
2008, the universe was 15. 
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 It should be noted that in cases where few appointees are required to approve grants, the risk of drift 
increases because the capability for intra-institutional monitoring is reduced. That said, it appears despite 
such risks (and perhaps because of the ability of presidents to move or remove political appointees), 
agencies remain broadly responsive to presidential electoral interests.  
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interests, there is no relationship between state electoral competitiveness and grant 
allocations. The results show either no relationship or a negative relationship between 
competitiveness and grant dollars in independent institutions. This finding speaks to the 
insulated nature of this segment of the bureaucracy and the limitations of presidential 
power vis-à-vis the Cabinet reflecting the predictions in Hypothesis 1. 
 However, while showing the limitations of presidential power, the findings also 
illustrate the reach of presidents to influence policy within independent institutions. The 
division of data allows for a more nuanced understanding of the function of independent 
agencies and commissions and helps clarify the findings. For example, while the 
estimates reported in Table 3.2 show that independent agencies were responsive to 
presidential electoral interests, the analysis reported in Table 3.4 demonstrates the 
manner in which esponsiveness manifests. The estimate for the interaction between 
politicization and swing state suggests the importance of political appointees to 
presidential administration in independent agencies. In more politicized independent 
agencies, swing states receive over 83% more grant dollars non-swing states.  
 Political appointees play a unique and important role. With structures such as 
limits on regulatory review and White House budgetary influence and review, these 
institutions are designed to be somewhat insulated from presidential control, and political 
appointees serve as the most critical means for presidents to influence policymaking. The 
president relies on his handpicked executives to convey his preferences and work to 
overcome insulating structures and ensure that policy outcomes are consistent with his 
interests.  
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 Figure 3.2 offers a visual display of the estimates reported in the first two models 
of Table 3.4. The effect of an increase in politicization on agency responsiveness to 
presidential electoral interests is clear. In agencies with low levels of politicization, state 
electoral competitiveness has no effect on grant allocations. However, in agencies with 
higher levels of politicization,
86
 swing states benefit substantially in the receipt of grant 
dollars. This finding illustrates that where presidential surrogates saturate the structure of 
independent agencies, presidents are able to extract electoral benefits from them. 
 Figure 3.2 also demonstrates another significant consequence of politicization for 
federal spending. The Figure shows that average baseline levels of funding in politicized 
agencies are markedly (and statistically significantly) higher than in less politicized 
agencies. In agencies with a higher percentage of political appointees, discretionary 
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spending authority is greater. This arrangement may come as a result of a strategic 
president negotiating with Congress for greater discretionary authority in agencies in 
which he has greater political control. Similar to the findings reported in Chapter II, in 
which presidents bargain for greater discretionary authority when elections are 
proximate, the effect of politicization suggests that presidents are also strategic regarding 
where discretion is targeted.  
 The results reported here demonstrate that politicization facilitates presidential 
influence and motivates responsiveness. The findings, taken together, speak to the 
importance of understanding the role of institutional characteristics in limiting or 
enhancing presidential power. The characteristics that insulate independent agencies are 
effective in limiting responsiveness. However, despite these efforts, presidents are still 
able to capitalize on specific tools in order to extract desired policy outcomes from the 
bureaucracy.  
 The estimates for independent commissions further emphasize the role of 
institutional characteristics in affecting responsiveness. The findings generally support 
the idea that independent commissions are insulated from political control. There is no 
relationship between state electoral competitiveness and grant allocations. Similarly, the 
interactions also fail to reach statistical significance. These results show that independent 
commissions do not allocate grants in a way that benefits swing states at the expense of 
non-swing states.  
 Unlike in independent agencies, politicization does not facilitate greater 
responsiveness. This result reflects the limitations on the president’s appointment power 
in commissions. Because of specific rules governing appointments such as party 
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balancing and fixed and staggered terms, appointees are not an effective means for 
presidents to induce preferred outcomes. In the end, commissions are effectively 
insulated against the presidential desire to extract outcomes consistent with his electoral 
interests.  
 In addition to commissions being insulated from presidential control, the 
estimates demonstrate that commissions are insulated from Congressional control, as 
well. Each of the estimates for variables measuring political, electoral, and institutional 
interests for Congress fails to reach statistical significance. The null results for 
Congressional influence in the independent commission models are even more stark 
when compared to the Congress effects in other models. For example, in independent 
agencies, a state with a senators serving on the Appropriations Committee can expect an 
additional 14.8% grants and 37.8% grant dollars.  
 Similarly, for the models that estimate responsiveness in Cabinet institutions, 
Congressional effects are robust. These results suggest that states with House members 
and Senators on the relevant Appropriations subcommittees with oversight over a given 
agency will benefit in the receipt of grant dollars. The focus of this chapter on agency-
level grant allocations allows a unique and nuanced analysis of the effect of legislative 
interests. Often, research into distributive politics considers the role of Congressional 
appropriators in affecting outcomes. However, these measures are often broad or blunt in 
nature. The allocations analyzed here allow an evaluation of the effect of Appropriations 
subcommittee overseers who should be the most influential possible benefactors of 
politically-influenced fund distributions. 
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 It is important to note, however, that it is unclear whether the Congressional 
benefits come from a direct intervention by Congress or a president placating relevant 
legislative actors. In fact, in the context of analyzing Appropriations subcommittee 
membership, it is impossible with these data to disentangle whether presidents and their 
surrogates simply direct funds to these key legislative constituencies in an effort to 
maintain their distributive authority. Finally, the estimates for legislative effects in 
independent commissions offer important results. Like presidents, the legislative effect 
within commissions is stunted. That Congressional effects influence grant allocations in 
other institutions more clearly further demonstrates the insulated nature of independent 
commissions. However, it also offers additional suggestive evidence that “Congressional 
effects” may actually emerge from the strategic behavior of presidents. The institutional 
structure of independent commissions limits the president’s ability to extract policy 
benefits to advance his own interests. Such structures may also limit his ability to satisfy 
his discretionary appropriators strategically. 
 
Implications for Future Work and Policy Making 
 
 This chapter illustrates the conditions under which federal agencies are responsive 
to the president. Specifically, I consider how the structural features of bureaucratic 
institutions condition the ability of elites to extract preferred policy outcomes. In so 
doing, I focus on federal discretionary grants and the president’s ability to influence their 
distribution. Although this chapter illustrates the manner in which responsiveness 
manifests in the administration of public policy, it also focuses on a unique approach to 
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responsiveness to the president. In particular, I examine the way in which agencies 
produce policy outcomes that are consistent with the president’s electoral interests. 
 This chapter provides additional support for the salience of electoral 
considerations among presidential incentives. The presidential electoral motivation 
suggests the need for a specific empirical approach to the study of executive branch 
politics that incorporates such interests. This research suggests the scope of the office and 
network of people and powers available to the president may mean that the administrative 
presidency has a more micro-level focus. Certainly, this research does not support the 
idea that the president makes a decision on every grant processed in the executive branch. 
Instead, through a transparent set of electoral preferences, institutional powers, 
ideological support, and an army of bureaucratic executives, agencies are responsive to 
the electoral goals of the president. The result is an administrative network that drives 
micro-level policy outcomes to be consistent with presidential electoral interests. 
Executive branch actors may be motivated to be responsive to presidential electoral 
interests for a host of reasons including loyalty, political alignment, or as a reaction to the 
creation of a highly politicized administrative environment in which such behaviors are 
expected. 
 The findings presented here show the importance of understanding the structure 
of bureaucratic institutions for the study of responsiveness to the president. The insulated 
independence of an agency that accounts for the proximity of federal agencies to the 
political power and influence of the White House is a critical first step in evaluating this 
phenomenon. Cabinet institutions are broadly responsive to the president’s electoral 
interests. However, independent institutions function differently. The mechanisms and 
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institutional designs that structure independent agencies and commissions limit 
responsiveness. Rather than rendering a president powerless in all circumstances, agency 
insulation channels presidential influence into critical avenues by which presidents rely 
on key institutional powers to extract policy benefits to support his electoral interests. In 
independent agencies, presidents rely on political appointees to ensure policy outcomes 
are consistent with his interests.  
 The importance of politicization as a means of influence and power within 
independent agencies is critical to understanding bureaucratic function. Even within 
independent agencies that are designed to resist political influence, presidents are still 
able to wield power. Political appointees allow presidents to affect policy outcomes even 
in the face of institutional structures that seek to limit such effects. The finding has 
substantial implications for the design of federal agencies, particularly at the legislative 
level. In designing an independent agency as a means of limiting presidential power, 
Congress should limit substantially the number of political appointees within that 
institution. Moreover, Congress should resist presidential attempts to increase the 
saturation of appointees, as they serve as a president’s central means of wielding political 
control and using policy outcomes as campaign tools. 
The findings for independent commissions further demonstrate the relationship 
between institutional design and bureaucratic responsiveness. In independent 
commissions, unlike in independent agencies, specific rules govern and limit the 
president’s appointment power. Such rules are intended to insulate further independent 
commissions. The results suggest two important aspects of the effectiveness of such 
rules. First, institutional traits such as fixed and staggered terms and party balancing 
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requirements for commissioners do limit the president’s ability to garner responsiveness 
through politicization. Second, these rules effectively insulate independent commissions 
from responsiveness to presidential electoral interests. 
The design of independent commissions has important consequences for 
presidential control. However, the implications of such design do not offer legislators an 
effective recommendation for corralling presidential power. While it is true that the 
commission structure limits presidential power, it also restricts legislative influence, as 
well. In this way, Congress should resist creating independent commissions because it 
interrupts their own ability to reap the policy benefits of federal spending.  
The results of this chapter illustrate ideal scenarios for political elites who want to 
use federal agencies for political gain. Presidents should prefer agencies be located in the 
cabinet because his ability to extract pork from those institutions is quite pervasive and 
not conditioned by politicization or ideology. Congress, on the other hand, should seek to 
create independent agencies in order to enjoy policy benefits, but limit the saturation of 
appointees to limit presidential impact.   
 
Conclusion 
 
Agency responsiveness to democratically elected officials is crucial to 
understanding how the machine of government functions and what forces generate public 
policy. Often, bureaucratic responsiveness is conceptualized as policy outcomes that 
reflect the ideological or partisan interests of political actors. This chapter examines 
bureaucratic responsiveness to the president’s electoral interests. I argue this behavior 
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most often occurs when a federal agency directs federal funds to key states in presidential 
elections. The National Park Service is one such agency.  
The National Park Service (NPS) administers hundreds of nationally protected 
areas. Chief among these areas, of course, are America’s national parks. Eight of the 
nation’s 58 national parks are found in the most populous state California—a protected 
area roughly the size of Massachusetts. In fact 30 sites protected by NPS can be found in 
California. By comparison, Pennsylvania is the home to no national parks and only 18 
federally protected areas. Between 1996 and 2008, NPS allocated more than 200% more 
grants to Pennsylvania than to California. Despite California’s population advantage 
(300%), geographic size advantage (400%), and advantage in the number of areas 
protected by NPS (67%), Pennsylvania, one of the most politically important states in 
presidential elections, saw dramatically more federal funds. 
This chapter demonstrates that bureaucratic structures and design condition 
agency responsiveness to presidential electoral interests. In key ways, the level of 
independence and insulation has a significant effect on presidential control of the 
bureaucracy. However, this chapter does not argue that insulated independence wholly 
stifles presidential control and agency responsiveness. Instead, institutional 
characteristics of bureaucracies intended to limit political (or electoral) influence simply 
redirect it through different avenues. 
The unique behaviors and motivations behind agency responsiveness mark 
important structural features that lead to variable agency outcomes. The results reinforce 
the idea that structure matters both for outcomes and the incentives of those individuals 
operating within an institution. The proximity of institutions to direct political and 
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administrative control, the presence of appointees and the rules governing their selection 
all condition power, influence, and ultimately, responsiveness. 
Similarly, this chapter shows the political responsiveness of agencies to extend 
both to presidents and to key Congressional constituencies. Rather than an approach that 
ignores or commits to the influence of a single branch, this work offer a more integrated 
view of responsiveness in the context of distributive politics. This chapter rigorously tests 
and finds robust support for presidential influence in conjunction with that of Congress. I 
further suggest benefits associated with Congressional constituency may come not from 
direct legislative intervention, but from a strategic president seeking to maintain 
discretionary authority.  
Thus, future work must evaluate federal fund distribution and agency 
responsiveness in more nuanced ways. From a broader government perspective, 
institutional and electoral incentives must be considered for both legislative and 
executive branch influence. A simple focus on one ignores important variation associated 
with the other. Within the executive branch, an understanding of institutional differences 
is central to evaluating the avenues and extent of political control as well as the 
incentives presidents face. In the same way that political elites’ interests and motivations 
are multi-faceted, so too are the institutional structures in which the component parts of 
the executive branch operate. These factors call for a more comprehensive and integrated 
theoretical and methodological approach to these important areas of public policy. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
 
ELECTORAL POLITICS INSIDE FEDERAL AGENCIES: PRESIDENTIAL 
SPENDING POWER FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF FEDERAL EXECUTIVES 
 
 
 Electoral interests drive presidents to manipulate the distribution of federal funds. 
The previous chapters have demonstrated that presidents target federal funds to swing 
states and that this electorally strategic behavior enhances in advance of elections. The 
president’s ability to induce agency responsiveness in a manner that reflects his electoral 
goals is pervasive in cabinet agencies and substantial in independent agencies, yet 
conditional on the saturation of political appointees. The findings presented in the 
previous chapters demonstrate that the presidential electoral incentive is a powerful force 
in policy making and ultimately affects outcomes in ways that benefit presidential 
interests.  
 The previous chapters also illustrate that distributors—executive branch personnel 
with direct spending authority—serve in roles critical to the realization of presidential 
goals. These individuals hold the key to the president’s ability to use the federal largesse 
as a campaign tool. These players must be responsive to presidential electoral interests in 
order for this strategy to be effective. This project has shown that with a few specific (and 
theoretically predictable) exceptions, distributors produce policy outcomes that are 
consistent with these presidential goals.  
 It is clear that presidents influence federal fund allocations in electorally strategic 
ways, but it remains to be shown how presidents can achieve these outcomes. The 
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president is a lone individual charged with overseeing a bureaucracy that includes nearly 
3 million civilian and 1.5 million military employees. One challenge he faces is inducing 
responsiveness from this burgeoning branch of government such that it supports his 
electoral goals. Does the president’s immediate staff contact distributive agencies and 
explicitly inform them of presidential preferences over allocations? Do presidents 
empower political actors to wield final decision making authority? Or is the process more 
subtle and varied with presidents relying on layers of contact to diffuse information 
through the bureaucracy? In evaluating presidential power over policy and the ability to 
engage in porkbarrel politics, it is vital to understand the mechanisms that facilitate such 
political (or electoral) control.  
 Ultimately, this chapter demonstrates that presidents target distributors. Presidents 
use common administrative strategies, including politicization, reorganization and 
centralization to position themselves to reap the rewards of electorally responsive federal 
spending decisions. Presidents make sure that distributive actors reflect the political and 
professional characteristics that are likely to provide loyalty. Additionally, distributors 
have a unique experience with and perception of political influence and pressure. 
Presidents focus particular attention on distributors because of the electoral benefits they 
can provide. In an effort to induce responsiveness to their preferences, presidents exert 
substantial power and apply pervasive and targeted pressure toward distributive actors.  
 I use data from a recent and large survey of federal government executives, the 
Survey on the Future of Government Service, to look at distributors—federal government 
executives who deal directly with grant, loans, contracts, licenses, and cooperative 
agreements. The Survey questions respondents in a host of critical areas including, 
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background characteristics; work, policy, and political experience; institutional and work 
environment; and policy influence and political contact. These topics and the individual-
level nature of the data allow a precise assessment of how distributors’ experience with 
politics differs dramatically from the experience of federal executives working in other 
capacities. The data provide key paths to evaluate how presidents expose distributors to 
the central tools of administrative control: politicization, centralization and 
reorganization. 
 This chapter is organized into five sections. First, I review the primary avenues by 
which presidents influence the bureaucracy: centralization, politicization and 
reorganization. In so doing, I highlight the gaps in our understanding and detail how a 
process-oriented approach to bureaucratic analysis can illuminate efforts at presidential 
control. Second, I detail how presidential incentives will induce him to treat certain 
institutional actors and agencies differently. Presidential electoral motives drive the 
White House to focus political control efforts toward agencies that can deliver electoral 
benefits. Third, I describe how the president will subject distributors to these tools of 
political control in a systematic way. Because distributors have the opportunity to provide 
presidents key electoral benefits, presidents work to induce responsiveness among these 
actors. Fourth, I use the Survey to explore whether distributors are more likely to exhibit 
traits that are consistent with presidential responsiveness, report greater policy influence 
from political actors, and are subject to greater political contact and pressure from 
executive branch actors. Finally, I conclude that presidents capitalize on precise 
institutional powers to influence public policy outcomes. Specific bureaucratic 
mechanisms and the political and electoral motivations of presidents not only drive policy 
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control efforts, but also determine the nature and focus of such influence. This chapter 
illustrates further that the institutional powers of the presidency allow the White House to 
influence micro-level policy and advance electoral interests. 
 
Administrative Control and Presidential Power 
 
 Presidents have three broad institutional means of influencing the policy process 
within agencies: politicization, reorganization, and centralization. Politicization is a 
process by which presidents increase the number or saturation of political appointees 
within an agency (Lewis 2008). Reorganization occurs when executive branch 
institutions are moved, merged or divided in ways that can facilitate political control or 
administrative efficiency (Seidman 1986). Centralization is a process in which agency 
decision making authority is transferred to executive positions such as agency and 
department heads or the White House (Rudalevige 2002). Each provides presidents 
greater opportunity to control outcomes and induce responsiveness. 
 One key context for institutional analysis in bureaucracy is personnel—career 
civil servants and appointees. Career-level bureaucrats are important actors in policy 
making. These individuals number in the millions and make daily decisions that affect 
policy in myriad ways. Their roles vary from overseeing state offices of federal agencies 
to serving as program directors to being the faces of customer service at local Social 
Security Administration offices. To varying degrees, the individuals enjoy civil service 
protections. Civil servants cannot be transferred, demoted, or fired without cause. 
Research on civil servants often examines their efforts and ability to develop autonomous 
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spheres of power within government. Bureaucratic autonomy arises out of a host of 
scenarios and characteristics including personality and expertise (Rourke 1984; Carpenter 
2001; Wood and Waterman 1994), the complexity of tasks (Carpenter 2001), poor 
monitoring (Miller 1992; Wilson 1989), policy motivated goals (Carpenter 2001; 
Gailmard and Patty 2007; Wilson 1989), discretion (Huber and Shipan 2002; Ting n.d.) 
and the design of bureaucratic institutions (Fiorina 1977; Gilmour and Seidman 1986).  
 Through a set of formal and informal tools, presidents work to ensure that civil 
servants make decisions consistent with presidential views (Nathan 1986). Politicization 
serves presidents as a key means of gaining political control. Politicization studies argue 
that presidents introduce politics into policy making through the use of political 
appointees (Lewis 2008; Moe 1985; Nathan 1986; Wood and Waterman 1991, 1994). 
Presidents politicize in multiple ways including increasing the saturation and penetration 
of appointees within federal agencies and selecting them on the basis of loyalty to the 
president. Appointees serve in leadership and decision making positions throughout the 
executive branch and these individuals largely serve at the pleasure of the president.
87
 
Presidents use these actors as surrogates of their own interests in an effort to ensure that 
policy outcomes reflect presidential preferences. Moreover, given the size and diverse 
nature of the bureaucracy, political appointees help limit the president’s organizational 
challenges, including shirking and drift (Miller 1992).  
  Sometimes efforts to gain control require larger structural solutions. 
Administrative reorganization empowers presidents to design decision making and 
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 Presidents also manipulate personnel at lower levels in order to maximize their influence. The president’s 
ability to relocate Senior Executive Service personnel can empower presidents to choose which individuals 
oversee specific operations and decisions (Lewis 2008; Wood and Waterman 1991, 1994). Additionally, a 
process known as burrowing allows political appointees to take positions in the civil service and shows an 
additional means by which presidents can influence the selection of career-level bureaucrats. 
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leadership structures in ways that enhance executive authority, empower appointees, and 
can be determinative of policy outcomes (Arnold 1998; Lewis 2003; Pfiffner 1996; 
Seidman 1986). The reorganization of institutions, such as the creation of the Department 
of Homeland Security in 2003, is often guided legislatively. However, such institutional 
reformation frequently offers presidents broad administrative discretion to redesign 
decision making structures, communication environments, policy direction, and 
personnel structures. For example, when Homeland Security was created, President Bush 
requested and largely received an increase in the number of political appointees, 
substantial control over a new and more flexible civil service system, and direct, 
hierarchical control over 22 previously fragmented agencies. 
 Reorganization needs not exist on as grand of a scale as Homeland Security 
entailed. Recently, President Barack Obama, “called on Congress to reinstate Presidential 
authority to reorganize and consolidate the federal government…”88 As part of a broader 
request for reorganization authority, the President’s first effort would be geared toward 
creating a new trade and commerce-centered cabinet department that would consolidate 
the operations of six existing agencies, including more insulated independent agencies 
and commissions and government corporations. This effort, while framed “to streamline 
government to make it work better for the American people while eliminating 
duplication, waste and inefficiencies”89 would empower the president to redesign 
executive branch institutions in ways that can enhance political control. Throughout 
the 20
th
 century the president, often with Congress’ assistance, augmented presidential 
staff and organization. This process allowed the president to centralize decision making 
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 “President Obama Announces proposal to reform, reorganize and consolidate Government,” The White 
House. Office of the Press Secretary. 13 January 2012.  
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 Ibid. 
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in newly established White House institutions. The presidency expanded to include the 
White House Office, the Office of Management and Budget, and a host of other 
institutions inside the Executive Office of the President (Ragsdale and Theiss 1991; 
Wyszomirski 1991). Additionally, the White House developed liaison offices for key 
groups, institutions and issues to provide greater information sharing and control in those 
areas (Tenpas 2000). The growth of what scholars refer to as “the institutional 
presidency” expanded the reach of presidential power, facilitated White House policy 
coordination and development, and placed greater authority in offices both institutionally 
and physically proximate to the White House. 
 Presidents not only augmented the power of the presidency internally, they also 
strengthened ties between the White House and agencies. Presidents sought to transfer 
decision making authority toward higher level political appointees (agency heads or 
cabinet secretaries) or the White House itself. Often rhetorically signaled as an effective 
means of improving communication and coordination, centralization serves as a way of 
decreasing shirking and ideological drift and increasing monitoring and presidential 
control of the bureaucracy (Galvin and Shogun 2004; Moe 1985; Robinson et al 2007; 
Rudalevige 2002). Centralization is a critical presidential response to a bureaucracy that 
fails to support presidential interests.  
 While previous work discovered important presidential strategies regarding 
political control, more work needs to be done to explain how such tools can be 
specifically targeted in ways that advance presidential electoral interests. It is to this issue 
that I now turn. 
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Incentives for Political Control 
 
 Presidents are motivated by electoral interests and desire policy outcomes that 
reflect those goals. Targeting such efforts at actors with distributive authority allows 
presidents flexibility to maximize benefits (strategic fund allocations) and minimize costs 
(policy failure). To evaluate how presidents induce responsiveness among policy making 
institutions, it is critical to understand how variation in agencies conditions presidential 
efforts at administrative control.  
 Presidential preferences over policy outcomes can vary dramatically across 
agencies because federal agencies administer policy in substantially diverse areas. As a 
result, it is important to understand presidential goals in context in order to evaluate the 
manner in which presidents approach political control. For example, the National Nuclear 
Security Agency (NNSA), a subunit of the Department of Energy, “ensures the nuclear 
warheads and bombs in the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile are safe, secure, and effective 
in order to provide the nation with a credible nuclear deterrent.”90 The NNSA provides an 
important service for the security and military power of the United States, and its tasks 
require a heightened level of expertise. The use of administrative tools of political control 
in an agency such as this one could not only be disastrous for the president who chose to 
do so, but would endanger the lives of Americans and others throughout the world. For 
the NNSA, presidents likely prefer expertise rather than politics to drive outcomes. Even 
a president seeking to implement political control in executive branch institutions would 
likely spare NNSA. 
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 “Managing the Stockpile.” National Nuclear Security Agency. 
http://nnsa.energy.gov/ourmission/managingthestockpile Online. Accessed: 13 January 2012. 
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However, the complexity of tasks and expertise required of employees at NNSA 
does not mean that presidents must forego administrative control broadly. Instead, it 
suggests that agency operations will condition a president’s decision to introduce politics 
into policymaking agencies. Politicization of personnel and policy at the expense of 
competence, experience or expertise offers presidents political costs and benefits. Both 
costs and benefits vary dramatically according to the task of the agency, the policy 
outcomes an agency generates, and the risks and implications of policy failure.  
 The stated goal of the Delta Regional Authority is “to enhance economic 
development and improve the quality of life for the hard-working residents of the Delta 
Region.”91 This agency provides such services through the distribution of federal grants. 
While individuals in the Delta region depend on these funds to pursue greater economic 
opportunities, politicization of this agency presents costs and benefits that differ 
dramatically from an institution such as NNSA.  
 The Delta Regional Authority distributes federal money and provides a context in 
which the president can engage in politically strategic fund targeting. Policy failures—in 
this case, imperfect allocations of federal funds—are unlikely to cause a problem of 
profound proportions. In fact, so long as funds are still distributed to eligible and needy 
applicants, but are done so in politically- or electorally-sensitive ways, such a policy 
“failure” may be difficult to identify. Compared to what could result from a policy failure 
in the NNSA, the Delta Regional Authority presents the president a low cost, high benefit 
context for politicizing personnel and administrative structures. 
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 “About DRA.” Delta Regional Authority. http://www.dra.gov/about-us/default.aspx Online. Accessed: 
13 January 2012. 
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 Generally, because political and electoral goals motivate presidents, agencies that 
provide political and electoral benefits and carry with them low risks and/or low costs of 
policy failure become appealing centers for political and administrative control. 
Presidents will use and manipulate the administrative apparatus of government to reap 
electoral benefits. In fact, presidents are uniquely positioned to identify, across and 
within agencies, potential benefits (and costs) and maneuver to maximize net benefits. In 
considering the risks and rewards of political control (concepts that vary across and even 
within agencies), presidents administer government based on a strategic political and 
policy calculus. 
 By implementing tools of administrative control in distributive agencies, 
presidents can effectively reap the electoral benefits that such institutions can provide. 
Treating distributive institutions and actors differently allows a strategic use of 
politicization, reorganization, and centralization that satisfies the preferences of an 
election driven president. Such calculated implementation of administrative control that 
exempts certain agencies also shields presidents from serious policy failures. 
 
Extracting Electoral Benefits through Political Control 
 
 Presidents are able to control policy processes and outcomes in spending agencies 
through a series of clear steps. First, as noted above, the executive branch personnel 
system is a key source of political control. The president’s appointment power allows him 
to select individuals who will lead agencies and offices and serve in key decision making 
roles throughout the bureaucracy. Presidents can politicize in multiple ways. First, they 
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can select appointees based on political, work, and background characteristics that will 
signal support for presidential interests. Second, presidents can affect the number of 
appointees in bureaucratic institutions. Third, presidents can give these actors substantial 
decision making authority and policy influence. The result is a multifaceted effort to 
create an army of appointees that is loyal, responsive, and politically sensitive. 
 Beyond the appointment power, the president’s ability to affect personnel extends 
to the civil service. The power over the Senior Executive Service (SES) allows presidents 
to transfer individuals throughout the SES and reassign responsibilities therein. This 
empowers presidents to move responsive SES actors into more influential roles, while 
rendering less responsive actors ineffective. Moreover, executive branch actors can affect 
hiring decisions even within the civil service. When political appointees or White House 
institutions have influence or authority over agency-level hiring decisions, 
administrations can work to ensure that new hires reflect presidential interests. This 
power is critical, as well. Because civil servants can play key roles in the context of 
federal spending, any power that political actors retain over staffing these positions 
facilitates the drive for greater electoral responsiveness. In the end, presidents and their 
surrogates wield broad powers to influence the character of the executive branch 
workforce through personnel politicization. 
 Presidents will identify bureaucratic actors with spending authority and work to 
ensure that these personnel have characteristics such as political experience, ideological 
alignment, or support for the White House. These traits will improve the likelihood that 
actors will advance presidential causes. Because key personal and professional 
characteristics can signal greater responsiveness, presidents will focus specific attention 
129 
 
on matching such characteristics with positions that offer greater electoral benefit. In so 
doing, he ensures that people administering distributive policy look fundamentally 
different than other policy makers and better reflect presidential interests. Politicizing 
distributors allows presidents greater opportunity to extract electoral benefits from policy. 
H1: Personnel Hypothesis: Presidents will choose more responsive personnel to 
administer distributive policy than non-distributive policy. 
 In addition to politicization, presidents can influence structures within federal 
agencies to ensure that politically responsive actors hold critical decision making roles. In 
this sense, presidents can centralize power to loyal agency staff.
92
 In some cases, 
politically appointed and other leadership positions are already assigned broad decision 
making authority ex oficio. In other cases, non-appointed officials lead agencies and 
offices and serve as key decision makers. For example, the National Resources 
Conservation Service (NRCS) operates state offices throughout the country. Although 
these offices are charged to make critical decisions affecting their local jurisdiction, 
career-level federal executives run each. When agency decision making rests in the hands 
of individuals likely to be less responsive to the president, institutional structures can be 
redesigned to empower those who are more supportive of presidential interests. 
Presidents should focus exceptional attention to redesigning decision making structures 
for distributive agencies and actors.  
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 An argument can be made that such a strategic behavior or tool of administrative control is truly an effort 
at intra-agency reorganization; however, presidents rely on political actors: appointees, White House 
personnel, officials at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and OMB’s liaison offices within 
departments and agencies to carry out presidential preferences. While these appointees are not the only 
executive branch actors who are responsive to presidential (electoral) preferences, they are, as a group, far 
more reliable than civil servants to advance the president’s goals. In this way, a reorganization or 
reapplication of decision making geared toward loyalists—appointed or otherwise—may be a tool 
presidents employ. However, centralizing power in the hands of political officials serves presidents more 
effectively and is more systematically observable as a result. 
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 Moreover, these efforts—unlike broader reorganization or centralization—can 
often occur unilaterally. Simply assigning different decision making roles to different 
actors within federal agencies often rests within the administrative authority of the White 
House or bureaucratic leadership. These efforts can help secure greater responsiveness at 
low cost. For an agency like the NRCS, one means of enhancing political responsiveness 
is close monitoring of agency decisions or ensuring that all final decisions pass through 
political appointees in the national office. Short of transferring powers directly to the 
White House or moving policy jurisdictions to different agencies, presidents can 
encourage greater appointee intervention at the intra-institutional level as a means of 
exacting greater political control over policy. The presidential focus on distributive actors 
will make certain that they have a different experience with political actors’ oversight, 
intervention, and scope of policy influence. Presidents and their surrogates will 
manipulate the bureaucratic decision making apparatus around distributors in order to 
control spending outcomes more effectively.  
H2: Empowerment Hypothesis: Political officials will have more decision making 
authority and policy influence over distributive policy than other policy areas. 
 Despite efforts to empower political actors and responsive individuals, the sheer 
size and responsibility of the federal government limits the ability of key personnel to 
make all policy decisions. Presidents must rely on career-level civil servants to make 
decisions. Because of the technocratic and professional nature and tenure protections of 
such positions, civil servants may have very different policy goals than presidents. As a 
result, presidents must take additional steps in an effort to control policy outcomes. They 
can use political appointees and White House institutions to foster an administrative 
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environment within agencies that is politicized and generates responsiveness. Presidents 
can essentially generate environmental politicization by maintaining an atmosphere in 
which political pressure and contact are pervasive and careerists are constantly reminded 
of presidential or administration preferences and expectations regarding policy making. 
Similar to personnel politicization, environmental politicization allows senior, loyal and 
responsive personnel to use a strategic informational setting to apply political pressure 
where responsiveness is lacking.  
 Once again returning to the NRCS, if political appointees struggle to find the time 
necessary to monitor all decision making by career-level state executives, they may seek 
indirect means of influence. Rather than playing an active and direct role in the daily 
affairs of state offices, central agency appointees may use frequent contact to discuss with 
career executives the preferences of the administration and the most efficient means of 
achieving those outcomes. By relaying constant information on administration priorities, 
appointees can convey behavioral and policy expectations that career executives should 
meet. Like in any organization, leadership can convey to staff their preferences and in an 
indirect way drive those individuals to reflect leadership goals. In a federal agency, staff 
are reminded of who they serve every time they walk into their office, as pictures of the 
president and department head are usually prominently displayed. 
 Fostering environmental politicization can be a highly effective means of 
communicating information about the preferences of political principals (presidents and 
their appointees) in a way that can induce responsiveness. Given the important benefits 
federal spending provides, distributors’ experience with political pressure should be 
unique. For example, White House staff or OMB may contact distributive actors to 
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remind them of critical projects being considered in key geographic locations (swing 
states). This effort involves a subtle signal to distributors of presidential preferences of 
fund allocations. Presidential preferences over the distribution of funds are thus easily 
conveyed to career members of the bureaucracy through frequent contact and a clear 
statement of behavioral expectations. Moreover, because so many funding decisions are 
made each day, this area of administration quickly becomes too unwieldy to control 
directly.
93
 Environmental politicization, laden with contact regarding the administration’s 
political and electoral goals, can allow this extensive are of policy outcomes to 
incorporate and reflect presidential goals.  
 Environmental politicization through the application of political pressure provides 
presidents a flexible tool with more precision than other efforts. Personnel politicization 
can affect dynamics within entire cabinet departments or federal agencies. Restructuring 
decision making authority can be geared toward distributors in an effort to induce 
electoral responsiveness in federal spending. However, centralization can have negative 
externalities by affecting decision making in other areas—an effect that is resource 
inefficient and can increase the risk of other unintended policy failures. The application 
of political pressure can be effectively applied to specific individuals, groups of 
individuals or entire agencies, depending on presidential need and intent. Distributors’ 
experience with and perception of the politicized environment should be distinct given 
the salient political and electoral benefits they can provide. What results are scenarios in 
which distributors face intense political pressure while their colleagues working in 
positions that cannot provide electoral benefits experience none of it.  
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 For example, between 1996 and 2008 almost 300,000 federal discretionary grants were allocated 
annually—approximately 6000 decisions every week. 
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H3: Influence Hypothesis: Federal executives administering distributive policy 
will be subject to greater political pressure than other federal executives. 
 Presidents, thus, rely on a set of administrative tools to induce policy 
responsiveness and can target these tools to distributors. Presidents both politicize 
personnel in strategic ways and give those actors decision making authority as a means of 
enhancing policy responsiveness. By ensuring that the right individuals staff the 
bureaucracy and that they are empowered with decision making authority over policy, 
presidents are able to generate direct policy responsiveness. However, the effects of 
politicized staffing and the strategic assignment of decision making authority have other 
benefits for a president seeking responsiveness. These agency leaders and the structure of 
decision making can foster a politicized environment within federal agencies through 
political influence and the application of political pressure. These efforts, born from 
initially manipulating personnel and process, contribute an additional means of garnering 
policy responsiveness throughout the bureaucracy. These tools can be targeted in ways 
that allow presidents to extract benefits from policy. In the context of presidential 
electoral goals—a driving force and critical incentive in presidential behavior—
distributors are particularly subject to these tools of control. By focusing administrative 
attention on actors with spending authority, presidents can induce electoral 
responsiveness and participate effectively in porkbarrel politics. 
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Data Analysis and a Closer Look at Distributors 
 
 To evaluate differences in background and experience between distributors and 
non-distributors, I rely on the Survey on the Future of Government Service. The Survey 
was conducted from 2007-8 and asks a series of questions of federal executives across 
government.
94
 The focus on federal executives ensures that all respondents play critical 
roles in the executive branch and the administration of policy therein. These individuals 
serve in leadership roles and are often intimately involved in decision making at the 
highest levels of bureaucratic institutions. The survey questions touch on a host of topics 
including respondents’ background, position, and qualifications. It also includes 
questions about myriad topics such as political pressure and the political and 
administrative environment inside bureaucratic institutions. This body of data allows for 
the assessment of important questions including expertise, political affiliation and loyalty, 
readiness to perform, and the saturation of political pressure in policy making. The 
Survey is an exceptional data source for testing important questions regarding federal 
personnel and the role of politics in administrative process. 
 The Survey also allows another distinction in the data that is critical to evaluating 
the above hypotheses. It gives leverage on which federal executives hold positions that 
involve federal fund distribution. One segment of the survey asks, 
Does your job deal directly with decisions about: 
 
 Procurement of the content of contracts with private firms? (Y/N) 
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 Details regarding the precise methodology used in this survey can be found in Clinton, et al (2012). The 
survey sampled 7,448 federal executives with 2,398 responding. Respondents included political appointees 
(259) and career-level federal executives (2,021).  
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 Licenses of loans granted to private firms or citizens? (Y/N) 
  
 Grants to states and local governments, other organizations, or  
 individuals? (Y/N) 
 
This question allows me to distinguish effectively those who I label “distributors” and 
those who work in other capacities.
95
 
 This question probes a fairly complete definition of distributional politics. 
However, it offers additional methodological appeal for assessing presidential power over 
the administration of government and the formation of public policy. Because of the 
comprehensive nature of this prompt and the structure of federal spending authority, this 
question offers a conservative assessment of the presidential role. Although the executive 
branch wields discretionary authority over large portions of federal spending, 
Congressional influence manifests through earmarks; block, formula, and categorical 
grants; guidelines about contract, license, or cooperative agreement eligibility; and in a 
host of other formal and informal ways. Unlike previous chapters that capitalized 
exclusively on discretionary spending authority, the Survey does not allow as clean of a 
distinction and thus risks underestimating the presidential effect. 
 The data used in this chapter include responses from 1,678 federal executives 
from across the government. Among these respondents, 11.1% or 187 are political 
appointees, defined as individuals who are Senate-confirmed, Schedule C or Non-career 
Senior Executive Service. Additionally, the data include 1,031 respondents who note that 
they are distributors, accounting for 63.8% of all respondents. The empirical effort seeks 
to test the hypotheses by asking a few straightforward questions. First, do distributors 
look different than non-distributors? Are distributors more likely to have characteristics 
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 I label a respondent a “distributor” if they answer “Yes” to one or more parts of this question. 
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associated with responsiveness? Second, do distributors experience greater levels of 
political control and policy influence from political actors? Finally, do distributors face a 
significantly different, more politicized agency environment in which political actors 
serve as the source of such administrative politicization? In the process, this effort offers 
a comprehensive and detailed look at how presidents affect both personnel and process to 
achieve political control and extract electoral benefits from public policy. 
Assessing the Personnel Hypothesis 
 Presidents can begin to seize control of the policy apparatus of government 
through strategic staffing. By carefully selecting political appointees and influencing the 
process to fill mid-level vacancies, presidents try to staff the bureaucracy with friendly 
faces—those sympathetic to their interests. Strategic staffing is a basic story of 
politicization, and the data drawn from the Survey support the notion that presidents 
engage in this behavior. However, the Survey also offers insight into politicization, as 
conditional on prospective political benefits.  
 Political appointees were asked to discuss their prior political experience in 
elected branches of government, service to a political party campaign or interest group, or 
affiliation with a partisan think tank. Of course, political appointees are often chosen 
because of their experience in politics, loyalty to the president or party in power, and 
connections to the establishment. The data effectively show this political experience 
among the appointed corps. For example, among appointed respondents in the survey, 
over 56% had prior political experience. In fact, 20% of appointees reported prior White 
House experience, suggesting the importance of political knowledge to the president in 
selecting surrogates. Beyond political experience, ideological alignment with the 
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president is also a critical consideration in selecting appointees. For self-reported 
ideology,
96
 58% of appointees reported being “somewhat conservative,” “conservative,” 
or “very conservative,” while 32% of respondents reported being “moderate.” That 
appointees are more politically experienced and ideologically aligned with the White 
House suggests presidents particularly value of loyalty and responsiveness in choosing 
individuals to lead bureaucratic institutions.  
 I also divide appointees into those who control federal spending (distributors) and 
those who do not (non-distributors) in order to evaluate presidential considerations of 
loyalty for electorally strategic positions. Consistent with the expectations in Hypothesis 
1, appointed distributors are also slightly more conservative than appointed non-
distributors, although the results are statistically indistinguishable. Similarly, I examine 
the percentage of politically appointed respondents who report having a role in 
distributive policy (n=107) and their ideology. I find that conservative political 
appointees are more likely to have a distributive role than less conservative political 
appointees, as well. These findings suggest that in an area of policy that can provide 
presidents political and electoral rewards, presidents make certain that key actors are 
loyal, responsive, and politically knowledgeable. 
 The Survey allows a greater look into the motivations driving career personnel, as 
well. While presidents wield less formal power over the selection of career-level staff, 
politics can certainly enter the civil service system. Appointees have formal and informal 
roles in the hiring of federal employees and job postings can critically target specific 
individuals within and without the civil service. To this end, it is important to examine 
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 For the purpose of this survey, ideological alignment with the White House is reflected in respondents 
with more conservative ideology. The Survey was conducted in 2007-8 during the administration of 
Republican President George W. Bush. 
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whether politics can affect the recruitment or hiring of career-level personnel. The Survey 
illustrates that there is little ideological alignment between career federal executives and 
the president. However, what is more important is careerists’ propensity to be responsive 
to political direction. I am able to examine this propensity by examining why federal 
executives chose to enter public service and analyzing their work environment.  
 The Survey examines respondents’ motivations for entering government services 
and this question allows insight into the political motives involved in that decision. The 
question asks 
Now thinking about your original decision to enter government service, 
how important were each to the following in your decision? 
 
 Enthusiasm for the party/person in power in the White House. 
  
 Personal request by higher agency official. 
 
Respondents’ choices included a 5-point scale: “very important,” “important,” 
“moderately important,” “not too important,” and “not at all important.” In this context, 
lower values signify greater importance (1= very important; 5 = not important at all). The 
results reported in Table 4.1 offers suggestive evidence that distributors were more likely 
to enter government service because of enthusiasm for the White House or because of a 
personal connection to someone selected by the White House. Because presidents seek to 
generate responsiveness particularly from individuals who serve in roles that can provide 
political and electoral benefits, they will try to assign supporters to distributive roles. 
Although not statistically distinguishable, point estimates indicate that those who enter 
government service because of support for the White House are more likely to be 
assigned distributive authority. It is often easy to deduce who in an applicant pool is 
enthusiastic for the president or the party in the White House. A candidate can easily 
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convey such support through a résumé or interview by including volunteer work for 
political campaigns or affiliation with specific organizations that denote political 
alignment with the White House.  
 Interestingly, distributors are significantly more likely to have entered 
government service because of a personal request from an agency leader (“higher 
official”) than non-distributors. Rather than an indirect effort at identifying possibly 
responsive individuals in a broad applicant pool, agency officials can use their own 
networking and familiarity with responsive individuals to target and recruit federal 
personnel. This effort is not only more active, but would likely be far more effective at 
achieving responsiveness, as familiarity with an individual reduces the risk of a hiring 
error.  
 Taken together, the results from Table 4.1 illustrate that politics affects executive 
branch personnel in two key ways. First, political motivations can affect one’s decision to 
enter government service initially. Individuals understand that the bureaucracy is an 
institution that is political in nature and one’s support for the president may make a job in 
his administration more appealing. Second, the personnel system in the executive branch 
is politically strategic in identifying and recruiting individuals who are likely to be 
responsive to the president and other executive branch principals. Although presidents 
want the entire bureaucracy to be responsive and thus have characteristics that foster 
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greater alignment with presidential goals, the results show that particular attention is paid 
to staffing strategically positions that can provide electoral benefits. Targeting the “right 
kind” of personnel allows presidents and their surrogates greater control over policy 
making. These results also show that this strategic allocation of personnel, particularly in 
the context of positions with spending power includes appointees but also extends to the 
civil service. 
Who is Influencing Distributive Decisions? 
 Not only are personnel selected in strategic ways, but decision making and power 
structures within the bureaucracy are designed to enhance the influence of key actors and 
generate policy responsiveness. Once politically responsive individuals are recruited to 
serve in the executive branch of government, it is critical to ensure these individuals 
serve in influential roles. Generally, respondents to this survey will play key decision 
making roles within the executive branch, as they are all federal executives. However, 
policy influence is not necessarily equal in type or amount across all respondents, and 
variation will certainly exist with regard to the level and scope of authority. This 
variation is true across the bureaucracy where different individuals and institutions are 
powerful or weak depending on the structure and context of an agency. 
 One benefit of the Survey in evaluating policy influence is that it asks federal 
executives directly about processes and behaviors within their institution. These data 
allow a first-hand look into the avenues of influence and loci of policy making power 
within the bureaucracy. One question asks 
In general, how much influence do the following groups have over policy 
decisions in your agency? 
  
 White House 
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 Office of Management and Budget 
 Political Appointees 
 Senior Civil Servants 
 Congressional Committees 
 Republicans in Congress 
 Democrats in Congress 
 
The responses are on a 5-point scale: “a great deal,” “a good bit,” “some,” “little,” or 
“none.” Lower values indicate greater influence (1= a great deal; 5 = none).  This 
question allows insight into how key actors in the executive and legislative branches 
affect “policy decisions” in particular. The appeal of this question is that it is targeted to 
policy influence, rather than a diffuse measure of “influence” that allows dramatic 
variation in respondent interpretation. Moreover, the broad base of groups that are 
referenced in the question allows an examination of non-elected officials’ influence 
(Senior Civil Servants) as well as the influence of political actors in both branches of 
government. This question allows effective comparisons of policy influence in multiple 
ways include inter-branch effects, intra-branch differences, as well as the relative impact 
of political and non-political forces in the policy process.  
  
 Policy influence rests at the core of understanding how decision making structures 
within agencies are designed and how that design empowers or hinders political forces in 
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the manipulation of outcomes. Further, it allows a direct test of Hypothesis 2 by 
exploring how these political forces differently affect various policy areas. The results 
presented in Table 4.2 are consistent with Hypothesis 2. Distributors report more political 
influence across the board and the most influence from executive branch actors. 
Specifically, from the perspective of those administering federal spending, policy 
influence is more pronounced for the White House, OMB, and political appointees.  
 The only group for which there is no statistical difference in influence between 
distributors and non-distributors is senior civil servants. This distinction for senior civil 
servants informs much about the relationship of politics and policy. If there existed a 
characteristic, unique to distributive policy, for which greater senior level influence was 
necessary for the standard administration of that policy, it should affect the data 
uniformly. That is, senior civil servants should be more influential and involved in 
distributive policy than other areas. Instead, the influence increase for distributive policy 
is only true for political actors, illustrating that this policy area is fundamentally political 
and uniquely important to politically-oriented actors.  
 Given that political actors across the two branches try to reap political benefits 
from federal spending policy, it is also important to understand relative political influence 
from the elected branches. That political actors in the executive branch influence 
distributive policy more than other policy areas provides support for Hypothesis 2. 
Decision making structures within policy areas with distributive authority empower 
political actors to influence outcomes. Table 4.2 illustrates effectively that distributors 
report greater policy influence from political actors than do non-distributors. However, 
these results do not explain the relative influence of political institutions in policy 
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making. Table 4.2 also shows the significant influence of executive branch actors vis-à-
vis legislative actors.
97
 Executive branch actors are powerful forces in the administration 
of policy—even in the context of micro-level decision making. For example, distributive 
respondents reported, on average, that executive branch actors had “a good bit” or more 
policy influence. In fact this average reported influence was greater than that of 
Congressional actors. Table 4.2 challenges previous work that suggests the executive 
branch role in the distribution of federal funds is limited and subordinate to the legislative 
role. This analysis shows that both executive and legislative influence is critical, but that 
executive branch actors assert a strong role in the policy process. 
 The results of Table 4.2 confirm that Congress has greater influence over 
distributive policy than they do in other areas of policy. As the appropriator and overseer 
of federal spending, Congressional committees and legislators can have profound 
influence on distributive policy. In addition, because legislators insert earmarks into bills 
and committee reports and craft formula and block grants with the intention of targeting 
key constituencies, the Congressional impact cannot be ignored. However, what these 
results show is that unlike traditional work that speaks to the dominant Congressional 
role in federal spending policy, the executive branch is also quite powerful.  
 As mentioned above, certain institutional structures within the executive branch 
can limit the effect of political actors in extracting policy benefits. A central means of 
insulating bureaucracy from political control is the creation of independent institutions: 
agencies and commissions. Chapter III demonstrates that under certain circumstances, 
institutions can be insulated; however, presidents still maintain some avenues of power. 
                                                 
97
 Appendix 4.A1 includes a table of pair-wise difference of means tests of key political actors’ reported 
policy influence. This appendix allows the comparison of interbranch levels of influence in a way that 
Table 4.2 suggests.  
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The questions in this survey that probe the policy influence of political actors allow an 
evaluation of common theories of political insulation. The Survey also asks respondents 
to identify the agency in which they work. These data provide for isolation of responses 
by agency type to evaluate political power within such agencies and commissions. 
Analyzing the impact of independent institutions allows a more rigorous test of theories 
of presidential policy power and administrative control. 
  
 Table 4.3 reports the influence of political actors for both distributive and non-
distributive policy areas in independent institutions. The results are generally mixed. 
Broadly, political actors in the executive branch have more policy influence than 
Congress.
98
 This finding suggests that institutional structure does condition the policy 
influence of political actors in independent institutions. Of particular note in the more 
insulated independent commissions, respondents report far less overall policy influence 
from Congress and executive branch political actors than they do in other institutions, 
consistent with conventional views about the political insulation of these commissions 
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 Although differences between executive branch and legislative institutions are not tested, the differences 
are clearly observable and are found to be statistically significant than in separate tests. 
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(see Lewis 2003). The difference in means between distributors and non-distributors 
shows that distributors report greater influence from political actors even in institutions 
where the policy influence of political actors is limited.
99
 These findings further 
demonstrate the importance presidents place on the role of politically responsive in the 
arena of federal spending, even when institutions are designed to limit political control 
and influence.  
An Econometric Assessment of the Empowerment Hypothesis 
 Although the assessment of Hypothesis 2 thus far has produced convincing results 
regarding the ability of presidents to structure decision making processes to empower 
political and politically-responsive actors, more can be done empirically to investigate 
these claims. So far, the analysis has relied on difference of means to tests to tease out 
variation in the decision making power of political officials among distributors and non-
distributors and among various institutional actors. Yet, this variation could be caused by 
omitted factors such as institutional characteristics of agencies and other individual level 
attributes that predict both political influence and federal spending power. As such, I 
estimate models with appropriate agency- and respondent-level controls. Specifically, I 
control for whether a respondent is a political appointee, whether she works in a regional 
office, her position in the administrative hierarchy, and experience in her current 
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 The difference in means between distributors’ and non-distributors’ responses regarding executive 
branch political actors’ policy influence is significant for independent commissions and approaches 
significance for independent agencies. The difference in means for independent agencies’ responses 
regarding the influence of OMB and political appointees is in the expected direction (favoring greater 
influence among distributors). One reason for the lack of precision for some of these findings involves a 
character of the data. The data reported in Table 4.3 are divided repeatedly, such that some cells contain 
fewer than 10 observations and increase the size of standard deviations. Additionally, the consequences of 
dividing data in this way can introduce concerns over robustness. However, because the findings support 
theoretical expectation both within this chapter and dissertation and in the literature more generally and are 
well complemented by other similar findings, it offers additional confidence that the findings so not reflect 
a faulty rejection of the null hypothesis. 
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position.
100
 Additionally, I control for whether the respondent’s agency is cabinet-level, 
independent, or an independent commission as well as logged agency employment. 
Because the dependent variable is ordered and categorical, I estimate a series of ordered 
logit models. Table 4.4 reports the model estimates where higher values indicate higher 
levels of political influence.  
 Most importantly, even when controlling for all of these factors, distributors 
report significantly greater policy influence from political actors. The estimate reaches or 
approaches statistical significance across all four models and is robust in terms of being 
positive, in concert with expectations in Hypothesis 2. The administration places key 
political actors in influential distributive positions more than in other policy areas. 
Respondents directly involved in federal spending report greater policy power from 
executive branch political actors including the White House, OMB, and political 
appointees. Distributive respondents are 3.8% more likely than non-distributors to report 
the White House having “a great deal” of influence and 7.6% more likely to report the 
same influence from appointees. These effects demonstrate the scope of political power 
in the executive branch over federal spending. In fact, while Congress is traditionally 
considered the source of power in the distribution of funds, the estimated effects of these 
models show the powerful influence of executive branch actors compared to Congress. 
For example, distributors report OMB having “a great deal” of influence with a 
probability of 39.2%. However, the same respondents are only 18.3 percent likely to 
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 Political Appointee is an indicator variable with a mode of zero, indicating the abundance of career-level 
respondents. Regional Office is an indicator variable with a mode of zero, indicating that most respondents 
serve in central offices of agencies. The Hierarchy variable is 4-category variable indicating whether a 
respondent is an Senate-confirmed appointee, a different appoint, a career member of the SES, or a 
different careerist. Hierarchy has a mean of 1.86 with higher values indicating a higher position in the 
hierarchy (4=Senate-confirmed appointee). The Current Position variable is measured in years with a mean 
of 6.6. 
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report the same level of influence from Congressional committees. These findings and 
effects are critical to understanding both the importance of distributive policy for the 
president and how presidents can structure executive branch decision making to advance 
their goals and satisfy their preferences.  
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 Further, one’s position within the executive branch conditions his view of policy 
influence from political actors. The Political Appointee indicator variable denotes a 
careerist as the reference case. Career-level federal executives are more likely to report 
policy influence.  The estimates for this variable are robust across the three models 
measuring influence from executive branch political actors. This estimate shows that the 
impact of political actors within the administration is felt throughout the civil service. For 
example, distributive careerists are 23.5% more likely to report that appointees have “a 
great deal” of influence than are appointees themselves. Similarly, distributive careerists 
are 13.1% more likely to report the White House having the same level of influence over 
policy. That appointees report less influence from political actors may reflect the 
politically guarded responses of appointees, particularly with regard to their own impact 
on the process.  
 After controlling for political appointees, one’s position in the bureaucratic 
hierarchy also substantially affects reported policy influence. More senior individuals 
note that political actors in the executive branch have more of an effect on policy 
outcomes. Conversely, one’s position in the hierarchy has no effect on the reported 
influence of Congress. This estimate likely reflects the information environment within 
federal agencies and the top-down decision making structure of the federal government. 
It is likely that lower level federal executives observe less policy influence from political 
actors because they have less interaction with those individuals and institutions. Instead, 
as decisions over policy trickle down through the bureaucracy, the source of such 
decision making or the influences acting on it become less clear. Senior executives, 
dealing directly with political actors, understand more thoroughly and observe first-hand 
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the amount of policy influence that the White House, OMB, and political appointees 
have. More precisely, a one unit change in the four-point scale
101
 of executive branch 
hierarchy (from “2” to “3”) translates into a 7.7% greater likelihood of a distributor 
reporting “a great deal” of White House influence, a 5.6% greater likelihood of reporting 
the same level of OMB influence, and an 8.9% greater likelihood of reporting the same 
level of appointee influence. 
 Finally, the results reported in Table 4.4 offer additional insight into the impact of 
executive branch structures on the policy influence of political actors. As the difference 
of means tests showed above, independent institutions appear to function differently than 
cabinet-level institutions. The estimates from the models presented here support this 
argument and add nuance to the conclusion. Individuals in cabinet institutions and 
independent agencies are more likely to report increased policy influence from the White 
House, OMB and Congress compared to independent commissions. Distributors from 
Cabinet agencies are 23.9% more likely than independent commission distributors to 
report “a great deal” of White House influence. Similarly, cabinet distributors are 28.2% 
more likely to report “a great deal” of OMB influence compared to commission 
distributors. This finding shows that presidential policy influence is pervasive across the 
vast majority of bureaucratic institutions. This means that presidential preferences are 
likely to affect dramatically the way a majority of policy affects citizens and other 
institutions. Moreover, these findings continue to highlight an empirical regularity in this 
dissertation: the effective insulation of independent commissions. Independent 
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 The Hierarchy variable ranges in value from 1-4 with higher values indicating a higher position in the 
hierarchy. 1= Non-Senior Executive Service career-level bureaucrats. 2= Career members of the Senior 
Executive Service. 3= Schedule C or Non-Career Senior Executive Service political appointees. 4 = Senate-
confirmed appointees. 
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commission respondents report significantly less policy influence from the political 
institutions most proximate to the president. This finding echoes the idea that the unique 
design features of independent commissions, including fixed and staggered terms and 
party balancing rules for appointed commissioners, do well to limit presidential influence 
over policy making. 
 However, the findings reported in Table 4.4 with regard to independent 
commissions do not suggest political forces have no effect in commissions. Commission 
respondents are likely to report more influence from political appointees than do 
respondents in other bureaucratic institutions. This estimate suggests that the institutional 
structure of independent commissions appears not to buffer them from political officials’ 
policy control entirely. Instead, appointees within those institutions—sometimes 
presidents’ only avenues into commissions—provide substantial policy influence. It 
shows that in an institutional context in which White House (and possibly Congressional) 
influence is lacking, the leadership of commissions is able to exercise substantial and 
independent policy influence. This finding also reflects the results presented in Chapter 
III that suggest the policy making power of political actors in independent commissions 
is severely restricted.  
 Despite the limitations in the data for independent institutions, the analysis of 
policy influence highlights another means by which presidents control policy making. 
They ensure that key individuals have decision making authority and policy influence 
broadly, but also greater influence in areas of policy that can provide presidents political 
and electoral benefits. Scholars frequently argue that by placing political actors in key 
decision making roles within the bureaucracy, presidents are empowered. The above 
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analysis suggests that this process is pervasive throughout the bureaucracy and its effects 
are particularly salient in the area of distributive public policy, where presidents are able 
to engage in porkbarrel politics. 
Fostering a Political Environment: Testing the Influence Hypothesis 
 In many situations, presidents and their surrogates can have influence over policy 
decisions in agencies. The previous section illustrated that such influence can be 
pervasive. However, this influence over decision making is not absolute. While 
politicizing personnel and assigning duties to key actors can help ensure that policy 
outcomes reflect presidential preferences, agency drift can still occur for reasons such as 
unresponsive careerists or rogue appointees. However, presidents have another tool to 
induce policy responsiveness and reduce shirking: political pressure. 
 Typically, measuring political pressure can be difficult. However, one means of 
insight into this concept is through contact. If political actors seek to influence policy 
makers’ behaviors, they should contact them with some regularity. Although contact does 
not occur exclusively to convey political interests, it is difficult to express such 
information without contact. The Survey asks respondents about contact with a wide 
variety of individuals and institutions. This question reads: 
How often do you have contact with: 
 
 White House 
 Members of staff of congressional committees 
 Republicans in Congress or their staff 
 Democrats in Congress or their staff 
 Political appointees in your department or agency 
 
Respondents’ choices included a 5-point scale: “daily,” “weekly,” “monthly,” “rarely,” 
and “never.” Lower values signify more frequent contact (1= daily; 5 = never). The 
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precision of this question helps evaluate how often career executives deal directly with 
the system’s political forces. 
  
 Table 4.5 compares the reported contact career-level federal executives have with 
political actors and institutions. The data are divided according to whether respondents 
deal with distributive policy in order to evaluate Hypothesis 3. The results suggest that 
with the exception of the White House, distributors report greater contact with political 
actors than do non-distributors. This increased contact with distributors is true for both 
legislative actors
102
 and political appointees. This finding comports with the idea that 
distributors provide elected officials opportunities to participate in porkbarrel politics, 
and pols will contact those bureaucratic actors more frequently.  
 These results not only demonstrate that distributors report more contact with 
political appointees than do non-distributors but also shed light on the extent of appointee 
influence. It is apparent from the results in Table 4.5 (and confirmed in separate tests) 
that career-level federal executives have significantly more contact with political 
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 As mentioned previously, because the data include individuals who deal with more Congressionally-
dominated types of spending, the contact with Congress is sensible. Respondents likely deal with 
distributive decisions over earmarking, formula and block grants. Additionally, because Congress requires 
reporting as part of the oversight process and often those dealing with budgetary matters have additional 
demands for such reports, legislative institutions (committees and members’ offices) would be expected to 
contact distributors more often. 
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appointees than with Congress or the White House.
103
 In fact, the values of average 
responses in Table 4.5 add substance to this claim. On average, respondents report that 
contact with appointees occurs about “weekly.” Contact with Congress occurs almost 
“rarely.”104 These results suggest that information and contact comes from one’s more 
immediate supervisors rather than from the highest levels of the executive branch. As 
further evidence of the structure of the communication environment, White House 
contact with federal executives is not only indistinguishable between distributors and 
non-distributors, but is also muted in absolute terms. On average, career-level 
respondents note White House contact occurring slightly less than “rarely.” This suggests 
that the president does not reach out to careerists to convey information. Instead, career-
level executives rely on contact from political appointees.  
 These differences and ubiquitous appointee contact emerges from a president 
relying on a complex, hierarchical network of surrogates to foster a politically-charged 
information environment in which pressure is used to induce responsiveness. Presidents 
face constraints because of the size of the executive branch and the number of policy 
decisions he would like to influence. As a result, presidents rely on political appointees to 
influence the distribution of funds rather than through direct White House intervention. In 
addition to being a resource-saving option, relying on appointees is appealing because 
they often have a more personal relationship with distributors. Because of this 
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 It would be difficult to rule out the role of Congressional intervention filtering through executive branch 
institutions, except that Congressional contact with the executive branch is muted. Under an alternative 
scenario, the executive branch actors contacting federal executives are simply responding to efforts of 
Congress to politicize policy outcomes (and distributive decisions). However, this scenario is difficult to 
support when Congress’ contact with the executive branch is limited. 
104
 The response value for “weekly” is 2, and the average response for distributors regarding contact with 
political appointees was 2.18 (2.35 for non-distributors). The response value for “rarely” is 4, and the 
average response for distributors regarding contact with legislative institutions ranges from 3.61 to 3.73 
(3.78 to 3.91 for non-distributors). 
154 
 
relationship, communication may be more fluid in conveying presidential needs. To this 
end, presidents inform political appointees of their preferences. Political appointees 
subsequently inform other appointees and career-level personnel of these preferences 
with expectations of responsiveness permeating the communication environment. 
 The flow of contact from appointees to career-level federal executives shows this 
communication environment in part. However, to understand fully the structure and 
nature of executive branch contact, it is also necessary to evaluate communication to 
political appointees. Essentially, in order to assess whether this hierarchy exists, it is 
critical to examine both the top and bottom of the structure. In separate analysis, I find 
that appointees report higher levels of contact with the White House than do careerists 
(see Appendix 4.A2). The results also offer suggestive evidence that the White House 
contacts distributive appointees more often than non-distributive appointees.
105
 The 
results show a White House that is cognizant of the constraints on direct communication 
capabilities, given the size of the executive branch. Rather than direct contact with 
career-level policy makers, the White House relies on contact with appointees who in 
turn communicate frequently with other appointees and career-level executives. 
 Moreover, while contact, in itself, does not provide conclusive evidence of 
political pressure, differences across distributors and non-distributors do. Given the 
senior-level nature of federal executives, contact with administration leadership is an 
expected part of an organizational environment. However, that such communication with 
political actors increases exclusively in the context of federal spending suggests that 
politics is at the root of much of this contact.  
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 Additionally, appointed respondents report higher levels of contact with political appointees—
approximately monthly). 
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 The results in Table 4.5 offer preliminary support for Hypothesis 3. They suggest 
that political actors in both the executive branch and Congress—and particularly political 
appointees—have contact with career-level federal executives and that this contact 
increases for distributors. Political elites recognize the benefits that federal spending can 
provide, and they contact bureaucratic actors charged with exercising such authority with 
greater frequency. Although these findings reflect theoretical expectations, a more 
rigorous test of Hypothesis 3 can offer more convincing evidence of the relationship. To 
this end, I estimate models of political contact with the appropriate controls for individual 
and institutional characteristics used in the models reported in Table 4.4. Once again, 
because of the format of the survey question used for the dependent variables, I employ 
ordered logit to estimate separate models of political contact by institution. I report the 
estimates from these models in Table 4.6 with higher values indicating greater levels of 
political contact.  
 Overall, the results provide fairly strong support for the claim that individuals 
with distributive policy authority will receive more contact from political actors. The 
estimates for the Distributor indicator variable are positive and significant for contact 
with political appointees and Congress. Distributors are 2% more likely to report “daily” 
contact with political appointees than are non-distributors.
106
 This result offers additional 
support for Hypothesis 3’s predictions, but also sheds light on the political nature of such 
contact. Because federal executives typically have decision making authority ex oficio, 
contact with political appointees—agency leaders—would make sense as a reflection of 
the organizational structure of any federal agency. Such contact should occur regardless 
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 This substantive effect appears small, but the probability of reporting “daily” contact with political 
appointees is quite high across the board. Non-distributors are 93% likely to report that level of contact, 
while distributors are slightly more than 95% likely. 
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of a respondent’s specific role and be due to the senior-level nature of a federal 
executive’s post. However, the results in Table 4.6 challenge this idea and show that 
contact increases for those charged with the specific tasks that can provide the president 
key electoral benefits: federal spending power. The estimates for distributors’ contact 
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with political appointees suggest the politically motivated and strategic basis for this 
contact. 
 The Hierarchy variable offers additional evidence of the top-down nature of 
communication within the executive branch.
107
 The estimate for this variable illustrates 
that more senior federal executives receive more contact from political institutions. A one 
unit change in the Hierarchy variable (a change from being career SES to being a 
Schedule C or non-career SES appointee) makes a respondent 3.0% more likely to report 
“daily” contact with Congressional Committees and 6.3% more likely to report the same 
level of contact with the White House. These results illustrate that political officials’ 
contact is intended to affect outcomes in meaningful ways. Contact from political 
institutions is targeted to more senior federal executives who either have a greater direct 
effect on outcomes or are well-positioned to induce behaviors among bureaucratic actors 
working beneath them. This finding also reflects the idea that contact begins from higher 
level decision makers (in the White House and Congress) and trickles down through the 
bureaucracy. While lower-level agency actors do not deal directly with political affairs, 
they may subsequently feel their effects. Moreover, this finding is robust even while 
including the Political Appointee indicator variable as a control, suggesting that even at 
the career-level, more senior executives are subject to greater direct political pressure 
than are junior executives. This provides further evidence that political pressure in the 
executive branch is not simply targeted to key actors (distributors, political appointees, 
etc.), but also manifests in a complex hierarchical system of communication and 
politicization. 
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 Ibid at 9. 
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 The estimates reported in Table 4.6 for Distributors echo the findings from the 
difference of means tests for White House contact. The difference in White House 
contact between distributors and non-distributors is statistically indistinguishable. 
However, this result does not mean that the White House avoids the application of 
political pressure, but rather that it focuses it differently and perhaps indirectly targets 
pressure on distributors. The estimate for the Political Appointee variable in the White 
House contact model shows that the White House communicates with appointees 
substantially more than it does career-level federal executives. In fact, appointed 
distributors are 7.6% more likely than distributive career executives to report “daily” 
contact with the White House. This demonstrates that presidents target their contact 
directly to their appointed surrogates rather than the broader army of career-level federal 
executives. However, this result also indicates an indirect White House effect on 
distributors. Taken together, the findings paint the picture of a coordinated hierarchical 
effort to apply political pressure to individuals who are best positioned to deliver benefits. 
The White House directs greater contact toward political appointees. Political appointees 
then, in turn, contact distributors more frequently than non-distributors. This information 
environment and system of communication means that White House-directed political 
pressure can be targeted toward federal executives with spending authority.   
 In the analysis of political contact, I also control for agency insulation in order to 
examine whether institutional structure conditions the president’s ability to apply and 
target political pressure. This aspect of institutional design sets up interesting and 
competing notions of policy politicization. Presidents will want to foster a politicized 
environment in agencies that are less responsive; however, some agencies are constructed 
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for the express purpose of being insulated from political control. How such clashing 
concepts play out is critical to understanding presidential power over public policy and 
administrative process. I ask whether presidents seek to apply greater political pressure in 
more insulated agencies as a means of generating greater responsiveness or if agency 
design features intended to insulate bureaucratic institutions are effective at warding off 
political pressure. 
 To examine this question, I include two indicator variables each denoting a 
Cabinet Agency or Independent Agency with Independent Commission serving as the 
reference case. The estimates reported in Table 4.6 generally support the idea that 
insulated agencies can resist political pressure. Independent commission respondents, the 
reference case for institution structure, report less frequent contact from Congress and the 
White House than do independent agency or cabinet agency respondents. Cabinet 
distributors are 5.8% more likely to report “daily” contact with the White House than are 
distributors from independent commissions and cabinet distributors are 2.2% more likely 
than independent commission distributors to report the same level of contact with 
Congress. Political appointees, on the other hand, contact federal executives at similar 
rates across the three institutional types.
108
 Although presidents may be motivated to 
apply greater political pressure in independent commissions, they may be restricted for a 
few reasons. Because independent commissions are institutionally designed to be 
resistant to political pressure, they may generate a culture in which political pressure is 
seen as inconsistent with the intent of the commissions’ authorization legislation and 
overall institutional design. For instance, it is seen as improper for the president to call 
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 This result is found in the estimates for Cabinet Agency and Independent Agency being statistically 
indistinguishable from the effect of the reference case. The estimates for Cabinet Agency and Independent 
Agency are also statistically indistinguishable from each other. 
160 
 
the Chairman of the Federal Reserve to tell him what interest rate policy should be. 
Additionally, because the structure of commissions means that several commissioners are 
appointed by other presidents, the White House may realize that politically-motivated 
contact—particularly toward commissioners of the opposite party—would be futile. 
Thus, while presidents desire fostering a politically charged commission environment, 
they may be institutionally restricted from doing so. Political contact will be less effective 
and as a result underutilized. Instead, political actors will target political pressure to less 
responsive institutions with less insulated design features. The results of this analysis 
show that even when controlling for differences across agencies and respondents’ 
position in the hierarchy, distributors still face significantly greater political contact than 
respondents serving in other capacities. 
 Once again, the analysis of contact with political actors provides strongly 
suggestive evidence that the basis of such communication is to apply political pressure. 
However, other data from the Survey help illuminate pressure from political actors. As 
mentioned above, political appointees are often chosen because of their likelihood of 
generating policy responsiveness. As a result, another way in which presidents can foster 
a more political environment is through increasing the number of political appointees in 
an agency. When asked about whether the number of political appointees has increased in 
their agency, distributive respondents reported (3.16) statistically significantly larger 
increases than non-distributive respondents (3.01).
109
 This difference shows that 
distributors are more likely to report an increase in appointees than non-distributors and 
that the mean response is to report some level of increase. This result shows the effort of 
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appointees or noncareer executives in your department or agency:?” Responses ranged from 1(Decreased 
Significantly) to 5(Increased Significantly).  
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presidents to foster an environment that is more political in nature in policy areas for 
which they are most interested. More clearly, in agencies that are involved in distributing 
federal funds, President Bush sought to increase the number of political appointees 
compared to agencies that operated in other capacities. 
 Political pressure can also make careerists unhappy in their jobs and may motivate 
them to leave government service. The Survey asks respondents about their likelihood of 
leaving their job for a host of reasons and many of these reasons reflect political pressure 
or influence. Specifically, the question asks 
How important are each of these factors for your decision to stay or leave? 
  
 Problems with political appointees 
 Problems with White House 
 Policy Disagreement with current administration 
 Problems with Congress 
 
Respondents’ choices included a 5-point scale: “very important,” “important,” 
“moderately important,” “not too important,” and “not important at all.” Lower values 
signify greater importance (1= very important; 5 = not important at all). 
 Table 4.7 reports the results of the analysis. The findings offer additional support 
for Hypothesis 3. They demonstrate that distributors are more likely to leave their jobs 
because of problems with political actors and institutions. The results suggest that the 
environment in distributive institutions—or at least around distributive personnel—is 
more political in nature. Across the board, distributors report that they are more likely 
than non-distributors to exit government service because of conflict with political actors. 
Respondents also noted the biggest political factor affecting their employment decision 
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was an issue involving executive branch political actors: appointees.
110
 In this way, 
political pressure that is applied to career-level federal executives can have serious 
implications. These individuals identify such processes as a “problem” or a 
“disagreement.” Most striking is that there exist universal differences in reported issues 
for those with federal spending authority. This result shows that distributors face greater 
challenges in dealing with political actors and suggests that politics affects them in more 
substantial ways than it does others. The threat or possibility of exit means that such 
issues are a serious problem for respondents and that they are more intense in distributive 
policy areas.  
  
 The fostering of this politicized environment in which individuals with spending 
authority are more likely to exit government service has additional implications. Federal 
executives’ decisions to exit the government workforce allow presidential surrogates to 
fill those critical decision making positions as they see fit. Such a scenario can allow 
presidents to enhance the political environment by selecting more responsive individuals 
for those positions. In fact, these results combined with those reported in Table 4.1 
suggest that a complex strategy could involve political actors driving individuals from 
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distributive positions and then recruiting more responsive replacements. Such a system of 
personnel replacement would enhance the president’s control over policy and increase his 
ability to extract electoral benefits from the system.  
 In sum, federal executives who oversee distributive policy are more likely to 
experience pressure from political actors in the executive and legislative branches. These 
actors apply pressure in an effort to induce policy responsiveness, particularly in 
politically salient policy areas. Because of the importance of federal spending for 
presidential electoral interests, presidents are driven to intervene, directly or through 
surrogates, in a way that ensures actors throughout the executive branch are continually 
aware of the preferences and expectations of the leadership. Increased contact with 
career-level federal executives and increasing displeasure with political actors within the 
bureaucracy can be so significant that distributive respondents note a greater likelihood of 
exiting government service as a result. Such informal efforts at motivating 
responsiveness—beyond politicization and the structuring of policy influence and 
decision making authority—can have real effects on both the civil service and the 
outcomes it produces. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In the pursuit of policy responsiveness, presidents have many options. In broad 
terms, presidents can affect personnel and process to help ensure that policy outcomes 
reflect their political and electoral preferences. To do this, presidents politicize the 
personnel and processes surrounding federal spending. Specifically, presidents work to 
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ensure that both appointed and career staff in federal agencies reflect characteristics that 
generate responsiveness—political experience, ideological alignment, etc. Additionally, 
presidents position responsive and/or political actors in decision making roles so that they 
can exact maximum policy influence in concert with presidential (electoral) preferences. 
Finally, through a complex, hierarchical network of communication, presidents and their 
surrogates can foster a politicized administrative environment that makes bureaucratic 
actors aware of presidential goals and preferences. These efforts can be targeted across 
the executive branch, but presidents target them significantly toward distributors and 
agencies that handle the distribution of federal funds. 
 Mechanisms of political control exist below the macro-level. Unlike broad 
approaches to concepts such as politicization, reorganization and centralization, this 
chapter examines new and related ways that presidents can induce a large bureaucracy to 
support his interests. The mechanisms described here are unilateral and more importantly, 
flexible for presidential use. As a result, structuring internal decision making to empower 
political actors and applying of political pressure can work in conjunction with broader, 
comprehensive efforts (i.e., bureaucratic reorganization) or in place of such techniques. 
The appeal of the mechanisms and methods described in this chapter is that they often do 
not require legislative authorization, can be done quickly and efficiently, and often exist 
behind the scenes, outside of the eye of the public or Congress. 
 The more private, internal nature of the president’s ability to affect personnel and 
administrative process in these ways provides additional insight. Often media, the public 
and Congress discuss policy politicization in the context of embarrassing, yet infrequent 
policy failures. This chapter helps explain why visibility of such behaviors is so rare. The 
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processes of administering policy and structuring the executive branch are opaque and 
difficult to observe even among those working within those institutions. Efforts such as 
the application of political pressure are done subtly. Often, direct political pressure flows 
down a chain of command, first through political actors and eventually to careerists. In 
this process, the source of policy direction is not abundantly clear because of the 
complexity of the communication environment. The opaque and intricate processed that 
seek to induce policy responsiveness may lead observers to miss or underestimate the 
true effects of politics and presidential control on public policy.  
 In the end, the administration of government is a complex and highly political 
process. The president and his surrogates manipulate personnel and policy processes to 
affect outcomes in ways that are consistent with his preferences. The effects of this 
political control are enhanced for distributors, allowing presidents to extract electoral 
benefits from policy. This chapter takes a step toward a more micro-level analysis by 
relying on survey responses from federal executives. It essentially seeks to open the black 
box wrapped in red tape: political influence in the American bureaucracy. The next 
chapter seeks to continue this process and examine institutional and administrative efforts 
at political control and offer a textured view of presidential influence over policy. By 
using elite interviews with individuals intimately involved in the federal grants process, I 
gain offer an individual-level understanding of the precise mechanisms of political 
influence over federal spending. I examine how institutional forces such as White House 
contact and OMB oversight as well as program-level influences such as criteria design 
and allocation decision making empower presidential forces to affect outcomes in ways 
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that are consistent with their electoral interests and reflect the politicization described in 
this chapter. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
EVALUATING THE ELECTION DRIVEN PRESIDENT THROUGH ORIGINAL 
ELITE INTERVIEWS 
 
 
 In 1981, Congress opened an investigation into the Environmental Protection 
Agency’s Superfund cleanup program. The Energy and Commerce Committee alleged 
that EPA strategically delivered (or withheld) funds from states and localities because of 
electoral politics. In an effort to uncover internal EPA processes, Chairman John Dingell 
(D-MI) subpoenaed agency documents. The EPA administrator refused to turn over these 
documents that were thought to detail administrative process. In the end, the EPA 
Administrator, Anne Burford, resigned; the Assistant Administrator, Rita Lavelle was 
fired and imprisoned for perjury; and President Reagan refused to turn over the 
documents, citing executive privilege. Ultimately, the documents were transmitted to 
Congress, but not before the EPA Administrator was held in contempt of Congress and 
the Department of Justice sued the House of Representatives.
111
  
 In the regular administration of policy, bureaucratic process is difficult to 
understand and navigate. When politics enters policy making, that process becomes even 
more veiled and opaque. As the above example illustrates, political officials are interested 
in keeping the details of influence and manipulation away from public eye for personal, 
reputational, and often legal reasons. In this case, the EPA administrator resigned her 
office rather than release documents or testify about the appropriation of discretionary 
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A. Bradley. Foundation: Eagen, MN. 
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dollars within her agency. This additional layer of complexity makes an already intricate 
process even harder to comprehend and evaluate. 
Often, bureaucratic outcomes are readily observable, as government reporting—
particularly in the context of federal spending policy—is pervasive and public. However, 
the internal machinations that produce such outcomes are often far less visible. Research 
into public policy and administration often makes inferences based on the observation of 
policy results and draw on theory to explain outcomes. The previous chapters of this 
dissertation take this approach. They illustrate that electoral interests motivate presidents 
(as well as Congress) to influence policy. Each successive analysis works to analyze 
internal agency processes and assess the mechanisms by which presidents affect policy. 
However, it remains difficult to identify precisely how influence occurs. 
There exist multiple explanations for how presidents control bureaucratic process 
and incorporate their own preferences into policy. One explanation is direct intervention 
by presidents and their surrogates. Presidents direct bureaucrats and appointees to make 
policy decisions that are consistent with their interests. For example, the Secretary of the 
Interior may call a policy administrator in the Bureau of Indian Affairs and explain their 
expectations about the design of a specific housing program. Another explanation is that 
bureaucrats may be strategic, understanding presidential preferences and realizing that 
there can be consequences leveraged at rogue bureaucrats and agencies. In this case, 
presidents need not intervene, as their preferences are met through a type of 
administrative autopilot. In this case an administrator in the Bureau of Indian Affairs is 
well aware of the preferences of the Interior Secretary and designs a policy that reflects 
those interests, knowing it will pass any hierarchical approval processes.  
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In both cases, as is a standard view in bureaucratic studies, presidential 
preferences are simply substituted for other policy considerations so that outcomes reflect 
what presidents want. This process is fairly linear in nature. Preferences exist, and some 
institutional actor (or actors) intervenes in the process to implement those preferences. 
However, the precise procedures that facilitate or hinder presidential influence are often 
overlooked in research. This limitation frequently occurs because of the increasing use of 
systematic data in bureaucracy and presidency scholarship. Such analysis often cannot 
illuminate such nuance and mechanistic process. Yet, it is vital to capture fully the public 
policy processes of American government in order to understand how elected officials 
affect the delivery of public goods.  
This chapter adds texture and detail to the analysis of politics in distributive 
policy.  Through the use of elite interviews, I examine precisely how presidents influence 
public policy, how electoral politics affects outcomes, and how administrative procedures 
can be designed to serve presidents effectively. To accomplish these goals, this chapter is 
organized in five parts. First, to provide context, I briefly sketch the federal grants 
process in general terms. Although federal grant programs operate according to a varied 
set of institutional processes, several similarities and trends are observable and are 
incorporated into this section. In describing this policy area, I illustrate competing 
explanations regarding who influences federal spending decisions and precisely the 
mechanisms by which influence manifests.  
Second, I discuss the use of elite interviews in this project. I describe the benefits 
of elite interviewing to the study of executive branch politics and note some of the 
methodological and empirical challenges commonly facing its use. I detail how I 
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overcome these challenges through the use of across-group sample diversification, 
explaining specifically the design of elite interviews used in this project.  
Third, I detail the results of the elite interviews and shed light on precisely how 
presidential power over executive branch processes translates into electorally-preferred 
policy. This section demonstrates the substantial impact of executive branch political 
actors in the administration of federal spending policy. More clearly, the results of the 
elite interviews demonstrate not only the mechanisms and processes political actors use 
to affect outcomes, but explain the impact of presidential electoral interests on the 
distribution of federal funds. In so doing, the results of the elite interviews provide a clear 
picture of presidential power over mirco-level policy and add context to the systematic 
results reported in previous chapters. Finally, I discuss the implications of these findings 
and conclude. 
 
The Federal Grants Process: An Overview 
  
 Federal spending is a diverse tool of public policy born from formal and informal 
administrative procedures often developed and implemented in the federal bureaucracy. 
A lack of uniformity limits the effort to design a single visual representation of the 
process or detail the manner in which grant programs are administered; however, this 
section will provide a general outline of this process with a specific focus on federal 
discretionary grants. This overview serves two purposes. It is intended to provide a broad 
framework within which unique processes and procedures operate. The discussion of the 
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process also sheds light on the competing explanations of how political elites, including 
Congress and the president, influence micro-level policy formation and administration.  
 Generally, federal grant programs operate along a four part process. First, 
programs face a design and conception stage. Second, grant programs are made public 
and invite applicants to seek funds. Third, applications go through a consideration and 
evaluation stage. Finally, grant programs allocate funds. I will describe each in turn. 
 The design and conception of federal grant programs can involve the input of 
several actors and institutions. Because Congress appropriates and authorizes money, it 
can play a role in the design of grant programs. Even though the focus of this section (and 
the dissertation broadly) is federal discretionary grants, legislative influence can exist, 
particularly at the design stage. Some legislative language provides the executive branch 
broad discretion over the distribution of grant money. For example, in the Omnibus 
Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-8) Congress authorizes to the Department of Justice  
$178,000,000 for discretionary grants to improve the functioning of the 
criminal justice system, to prevent or combat juvenile delinquency, and to 
assist victims of crime (p. 580).   
 
This authority provides great leeway for the Justice Department to design a program as it 
sees fit. Often, Congress authorizes distributive programs in this way, delegating 
substantial authority to the bureaucracy. However, Congress can also insert specifics into 
discretionary funding authorization and appropriations legislation that bounds discretion. 
In the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-117), Congress appropriates 
$600,000,000 to the Department of Transportation and notes 
That the Secretary of Transportation shall distribute funds provided under 
this heading as discretionary grants to be awarded to a State, local 
government, transit agency, or a collaboration among such entities on a 
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competitive basis for projects that will have a significant impact on the 
Nation, a metropolitan area, or a region: Provided further, That projects 
eligible for funding provided under this heading shall include, but not be 
limited to, highway or bridge projects eligible under title 23, United States 
Code; public transportation projects eligible under chapter 53 of title 49, 
United States Code; passenger and freight rail transportation projects; and 
port infrastructure investments: Provided further, That in distributing 
funds provided under this heading, the Secretary shall take such measures 
so as to ensure an equitable geographic distribution of funds, an 
appropriate balance in addressing the needs of urban and rural areas, and 
the investment in a variety of transportation modes: Provided further, That 
a grant funded under this heading shall be not less than $10,000,000 and 
not greater than $200,000,000: Provided further, That not more than 25 
percent of the funds made available under this heading may be awarded to 
projects in a single State: Provided further, That the Federal share of the 
costs for which an expenditure is made under this heading shall be, at the 
option of the recipient, up to 80 percent: Provided further, That the 
Secretary shall give priority to projects that require a contribution of 
Federal funds in order to complete an overall financing package: Provided 
further, That not less than $140,000,000 of the funds provided under this 
heading shall be for projects located in rural areas: Provided further, That 
for projects located in rural areas, the minimum grant size shall be 
$1,000,000 and the Secretary may increase the Federal share of costs 
above 80 percent: Provided further, That of the amount made available 
under this heading, the Secretary may use an amount not to exceed 
$150,000,000 for the purpose of paying the subsidy and administrative 
costs of projects eligible for federal credit assistance under chapter 6 of 
title 23, United States Code, if the Secretary finds that such use of the 
funds would advance the purposes of this paragraph: Provided further, 
That of the amount made available under this heading, the Secretary may 
use an amount not to exceed $35,000,000 for the planning, preparation or 
design of projects eligible for funding under this heading: Provided 
further, That projects conducted using funds provided under this heading 
must comply with the requirements of subchapter IV of chapter 31 of title 
40, United States Code (p. 3036-7). 
 
In this case, Congress exerts much greater influence in the design of this grant program, 
although ultimately, the bureaucracy has substantial allocation authority within these 
bounds. In fact, it is clear that Congress seeks to place restrictions on the president’s 
ability to target funds to states. 
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 Within the bounds of discretionary authority, several executive branch actors 
influence the structure and nature of grant programs. Political appointees in many cases 
have formal and final decision making roles over their design or effectively convey 
preferences to those who do. Presidential and other White House policy initiatives can 
motivate grant programs to reflect specific goals and charge agencies to focus on specific 
priorities. Career-level civil servants with substantial and long term policy and program 
experience can also weigh in on program design offering suggestions about effectiveness 
and administration. Depending on the program, issue area, agency, and governing 
administration, different combinations of elite actors’ inputs affect the manner in which 
requests for proposals are crafted, criteria are developed, eligibility is determined, and 
programs are structured and managed. These actors include political appointees, White 
House officials and the Office of Management and Budget and their liaison offices within 
federal agencies. 
 After grant programs are designed, agencies publicize funding availability. In 
all cases, grant programs’ announcements are printed in the federal register and published 
on the US government’s grants clearinghouse website.112 Additionally, federal agencies 
use other informal means of publicizing funding opportunities. State, local, and regional 
offices are often charged with developing and implementing information campaigns. 
These campaigns include standard advertising, but also communication with state and 
local officials and participation in town hall meetings in an effort to notify citizens of 
such funding opportunities and possible eligibility. Additionally, agencies often work 
closely with interest groups and other issue-based stakeholders to communicate these 
opportunities and identify key groups that may benefit by such funding. Because unused 
                                                 
112
 http://www.grants.gov/ 
174 
 
appropriations are often returned to the Treasury, it is in the interest of agencies to 
increase knowledge and ensure that they are able to allocate their full grant program 
appropriations.  
 During this time, prospective applicants begin preparing materials in the pursuit 
of federal funds. The application process can be time consuming and complicated, though 
resources often exist to assist the effort. The federal grants website provides program 
specific and general guidelines and tips on application preparation, but other institutions 
help as well. Federal agencies themselves, particularly those with regional, state, and 
local offices, frequently have staff liaisons who specialize in assistance or conduct 
workshops that aid applicants. Additionally, interest groups often specialize in grant 
preparation and work on applicants’ behalf or work closely to answer questions and 
provide guidance in the application process. These efforts intend to make applicants more 
competitive and ensure that federal funds are allocated.  
 Once applications are receive a more complex, varied, and often opaque process 
begins: evaluation. Federal agencies evaluate the quality of grants in determining 
eligibility and ultimately to make decisions regarding which applicants receive funding. 
This process entails myriad different parts that work together to determine outcomes. It is 
important to understand how grants are judged. Grants are typically evaluated according 
to the criteria listed in grant announcements and the ability of an applicant to meet those 
guidelines. However, there often exist informal or discretionary criteria beyond those 
listed in funding publications that offer greater leeway in the decision making process. In 
this case, the published criteria serve as a minimum for consideration and additional 
factors may affect the evaluation of applications. Often, applications are scored using a 
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numeric rubric which assigns point values to certain criteria and judges portions of the 
application accordingly. However, this scoring rubric can include other discretionary 
point values as well,
113
 and such values are often difficult to access or understand. This 
sometimes informal process allows factors of influence to affect consideration and 
empowers decision makers to manipulate outcomes.  
 Although a scoring system serves as the standard method in evaluating grants, it 
is important, too, to know who participates in such scoring. Internal and/or external 
participants take part in grant evaluations. Internal to federal agencies, an administrative 
review process often involves a combination of career program staff and political 
appointees play roles in evaluating grant applications. These individuals may serve in 
central agency offices in Washington, DC, or in regional, state, and local offices 
throughout the country. Frequently, political appointees have formal approval authority 
over grant determinations from careerists’ recommendations. Additionally, the Office of 
Management and Budget or its liaison offices within agencies and departments play a 
role not only in checking funding decisions, but even in the development of criteria and 
program details in order to ensure that the ultimate evaluation processes reflect both 
budgetary and administration priorities. 
 Internal evaluation of grants is one means administering this policy area. 
Another way involves the inclusion of external actors—often policy experts and 
stakeholders—for peer review. Agencies and programs request the services of these 
individuals to provide expertise in the evaluation of applications. This procedure is used 
particularly in the context of large grant programs and ones that require specific 
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expertise. For example, university faculty are often familiar with the evaluation processes 
at the National Science Foundation and National Institutes for Health. In these cases, 
because grant proposals include scientific specificity, the agencies rely on outside experts 
to provide insight into the quality of applications, likelihood of success, and reflection of 
agency aims through research. Experts rate proposals and often make recommendations 
to career or appointed agency leaders who can set thresholds, determine final funding 
levels and make allocation decisions.   
 The grant consideration process also varies in terms of the timing of evaluations 
and such timing can have serious implications for applicants. Essentially, grants are 
evaluated on either a rolling basis or en masse. When applications are evaluated on a 
rolling basis, funds are often distributed according to a first-come, first-served approach. 
This process means that those applying later can have a reduced chance of being funded, 
regardless of application quality. When materials are evaluated at once, distributors are 
able to see funding decisions from a broader perspective, and get a better grasp on who is 
benefiting from funding nationally.  
 The final stage in the federal grants process involves allocation. After agencies 
make funding determinations and OMB and other budget offices approve funding 
decisions, applicants receive their money, often with very specific guidelines and 
restrictions for their use. Typically, the design of programs and specific commitments in 
the details of grant applications determine the nature of such restrictions. To ensure that 
funds are being used in the ways the agency intended, grant recipients must comport with 
(sometimes extensive) federal reporting requirements. Politics can even influence federal 
reporting, depending on the type of information an administration considers politically 
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relevant or salient. For example during the Obama administration, reporting requirements 
emphasized job creation and the manner in which such numbers were calculated, an 
obvious reflect of the political implications of economic policy at the time.  
 What results is a complex system through which federal spending policy is 
administered. Through this intricate bureaucratic process emerge several competing 
hypotheses regarding who influences policy making and how that influence manifests. 
First, the appropriation and authorization of legislation offers Congress the opportunity to 
play a critical role in distributive policy. The literature is flush with research illustrating 
legislative impact in the distribution of federal funds. However, the federal grants process 
also demonstrates a set of opportunities for executive branch actors to affect policy. In 
fact, the process suggests that these actors can range from the President, himself, and 
White House/OMB staff to political appointees within agencies to career level civil 
servants making daily distributive decisions. Beyond several competing ideas regarding 
who influences policy making, there exist a host of rival explanations with respect to how 
influence occurs. This overview illustrates clearly that influence can occur during the 
broad design of programs and the creation and authorization of program criteria. 
Additionally, influence may manifest while grant applications are being evaluated, as a 
host of actors can and do participate in the scoring and rating of applicant materials. 
Finally, because allocations decisions are not automatic upon evaluation, the final 
distributive decision making offers another opportunity for actors to affect outcomes.  
 Although the federal grants process offers presidents myriad opportunities to 
influence the allocation of federal grants, it may be surprising that little public attention is 
paid to such behaviors. This lack of attention emerges generally from limited awareness. 
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While several stages of the grants process allow political influence, strategic actors are 
incentivized (politically and in many cases legally) to be less than transparent when 
capitalizing on such opportunities. As a result, subtle or private efforts create institutional 
processes in which politics has quietly and preemptively entered. Moreover, behaviors 
that affect outcomes in the final stages of the process may only be observable by a few 
select decision makers, such that even some involved in the process are unaware of the 
role of politics. 
 What is clear from this overview is that influence can occur in a multitude of 
ways. However, what have been unclear from prior research and the previous chapters in 
this dissertation are the precise mechanisms of this influence. It is critical to assess which 
of these actors affect the process and understand how and when such impact occurs. The 
previous three chapters have demonstrated clearly that influence occurs, and this chapter 
seeks to demonstrate how it occurs. Because systematic analysis struggles to identify 
mechanisms and causal effects with such precisions, alternative means are necessary to 
complete the understanding of this phenomenon. One method scholars use to illustrate 
such a causal relationship and explore micro-level political processes is elite 
interviewing. This chapter relies on this technique to accomplish the same. 
 
Employing Elite Interviewing 
 
The Benefits of Elite Interviewing 
Across the social sciences, elite interviewing serves as a key tool to provide 
researchers greater detail about institutional behaviors and processes. Elite interviews 
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also provide access and support for causal explanations of phenomena, often where 
systematic data is unavailable or unable to provide such traction. Research on executive 
branch politics and public policy employ this useful research tool frequently because it 
offers both methodological and empirical benefits. Methodologically, elite interviews are 
resource efficient in their ability to target empirical topics and access critical information 
in a short period of time. Additionally, and unlike large data sets, interviews allow 
clarification and greater empirical exploration when necessary. In this section, I will 
discuss each of these benefits and explain how they enable executive branch researchers 
to understand comprehensively micro-level processes within this branch of government. 
Elite interviews allow access to information from respondents who have 
expertise, knowledge or experience with the phenomena under investigation. For the 
purpose of this project, I focus on respondents who participate directly in the federal 
grants process. In elite interviewing, respondents are targeted because they hold a wealth 
of information. Interviews allow “a useful way to get large amounts of information 
quickly” (Marshall and Rossman 1999, 108). While the researcher must approach 
interviews with specific details related to the topic of interest, interviews allow the 
respondent to motivate the exploration of new information. Thus, interviews are 
commonly open-ended and conversational in style, such that “the investigator is willing, 
and often eager to let the interviewee teach him what the problem, the question is—to the 
limits, of course of the interviewer’s ability to perceive relationships” (Dexter 1970, 5-6). 
Elite interviewers balance focusing the interview on topics relevant to the 
research and allowing the discussion to be organic in nature. The conversational format 
typically encourages openness and increases access to key data. Moreover, the perceived 
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level of autonomy the elite enjoys by moving forward the conversation works in tandem 
to enhance respondent confidence and motivate their continued participation (information 
sharing).
114
    
Another benefit of interviewing that also signals to the respondent her value and 
level of expertise is that “immediate follow-up and clarification are possible,” (Marshall 
and Rossman 1999, 110). This benefit is fundamental to the method. Such detail and 
clarification often cannot be gleaned from an antiseptic, systematic, multivariate dataset; 
it may only be inferred from a set of parameter estimates. However, the interview allows 
texture to be added to data in an immediate and efficient way, while signaling to the 
respondent the interest in and attention to her information. Because the interview serves 
as an interactive data gathering operation, the researcher can simply request more 
information when necessary. 
In many ways, elite interviews allow access to data that rest beyond the reach of 
systematic analysis. While not systematic, first-hand insight into individual-level 
processes, accessed through interviews, can confirm or disconfirm findings or 
conclusions from quantitative analysis, build or refine hypotheses, and/or aid in making 
causal arguments. 
Given the complex and often seemingly impervious nature of executive branch 
policy and political processes, elite interviews are common in this area of research. 
Previous work in executive branch politics either employs elite interviews as the central 
research method or, as is the design of this dissertation, uses this technique in concert 
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181 
 
with systematic analysis. In so doing, this technique provides a wealth of knowledge 
regarding policy processes and formation. 
Typically, in order to gain insight into micro-level processes in the executive 
branch, scholars identify key personnel who have broad perspective and participate in 
bureaucratic decision making. However, the approach to identifying key personnel varies 
dramatically. Many scholars interview political appointees, as they are bureaucratic 
power players. Chosen by the president, these agency executives administer subunits of 
the government (large and small) while serving as all the presidents (wo)men. 
Pfiffner (1996) targets these appointees for elite interviews in an investigation 
into the administrative state. Because appointees are meant to carry out the president’s 
wishes (preferences) through the innumerable decisions that must be made across the 
executive branch daily, they serve as key institutional actors. Pfiffner (1996) diversifies 
his sample by selecting appointees across agencies and issue areas. Such variation is 
important as agencies can function quite differently and may lead to different behaviors 
and outcomes. For example, generalizing about administrative process through interviews 
with the Navajo and Hopi Indian Relocation Commission would be a mistake. 
Diversification aids Pfiffner in drawing conclusions by allowing awareness of extreme 
cases and finding relationships across different individuals. Pfiffner provides a broad 
understanding of the strategy involved in selecting presidential personnel. Through 
reliance on interviews with senior-level White House staff and other political appointees, 
he accesses not simply an observation of presidential strategy but the motivations behind 
it. The interviews demonstrate clearly that presidents actively organize the president’s 
staff in way expands power and influence over policy making in Washington.  
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Other work notes that the bureaucracy is larger than the appointees who lead 
agencies. In a modern day classic, Heclo (1977) conducts interviews with both appointees 
and senior-level bureaucratic careerists. This approach offers a more varied view of 
administration. Because career civil servants tend to serve in the bureaucracy for 
extended periods and serve in positions that differ from political appointees, they offer 
unique perspectives on public policy. Like Heclo before him, Maranto (1993) uses a 
combination of permanent and political personnel to gain greater insight into empirical 
questions of interest. This more diverse sample of respondents seeks a unique set of 
perspectives on policy processes. In any organization, the leadership may have a different 
view than staff, yet both groups can offer important data. Moreover, such different, yet 
related perspectives offer an effort “to counterbalance self-serving statements” (Heclo 
1977, xii). 
Both Heclo and Maranto document how respective interests differently motivate 
career and political administrators. Rather than the bureaucracy working as a machine in 
unison, there exist profound sticking points that lead to disagreement and conflict and can 
have serious implications for the formation of policy. Through the use of various elite 
interviews among both groups, these scholars identify not only the sources of problems, 
but the conditions under which such issues are amplified. In the end, the employment of 
elite interviews offers invaluable insight into the inner workings of bureaucratic 
institutions—a contribution beyond the reach of the observation of policy outcomes.  
Of course, because policy making extends across the branches of government, 
some empirical questions drive scholars to design elite interviews accordingly. Whereas 
Heclo and Maranto interviewed bureaucrats and appointees to evaluate their interaction 
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and conflict, others use interviews to investigate legislative and executive branch 
interactions. Because one’s perspective can largely be shaped by the institution within 
they work, a diversified sample can address questions involving inter-branch dealings. 
Krause (1999), in considering simultaneous inter-branch impact on public policy, 
interviews staff and officials in the legislative and executive branches. He finds how 
internal constituency and policy motivations motivate different actors and ensures that 
legislative and administrative processes are more collaborative and coordinated, rather 
than isolated and sequential. Krause capitalizes on different respondents’ abilities to 
discuss their own experience as well as their interaction with actors in the other branch to 
illustrate how discrete influences affect policy production and execution.  
The executive branch of the American government is often described as a black 
box in which inputs (legislation) and outputs (policy) are readily observable, but the 
process in between is unobservable or indecipherable. This perspective contributes to the 
view of a complex or burdensome bureaucracy. Even for researchers who rely on large, 
systematic data sets to analyze public policy, bureaucratic process is an elusive concept, 
often assumed away or modeled in a stylized way. Elite interviewing empowers the 
researcher to understand, assess and evaluate bureaucratic process in order to gain 
leverage on its connection to and role within a given empirical question. The authors 
discussed above perform this empirical task in high-quality ways. Their use of elite 
interviews illustrates how the interaction among specific actors and institutional 
constructs leads to policy outcomes. By detailing how motivated behaviors work within 
and change the shape of institutions, elite interviews allow the curtain to be pulled back, 
184 
 
the red tape to be cut, and a picture of policy making in the United States to be clear and 
observable.  
 
Problems with Elite Interviewing 
Despite the benefits that elite interviewing brings to the social sciences, this 
technique faces a series of methodological challenges that if not addressed can lead to 
empirical limitations. Generally, similar types of concerns or challenges facing the 
collection and analysis of quantitative data also face interview data. These concerns 
include selection effects, the tradeoff between depth (concept validity) and breadth 
(generalizability), and response validity. This section will describe each limitation and 
note standard solutions to such problems.  
Elite interviews typically use a small sample from a specified, limited population. 
As such, issues can exist over selection effects. Will the respondents offer a uniform, 
non-diverse view of a concept or process, not because of the uniformity of the concept 
but due to the similarities among interviewees? Concerns over a non-random sample can 
carry great weight and give pause to the acceptability of the conclusions. However, 
randomization can actually detract from the level of textured data sought through elite 
interviews (see Aberbach 1990, Appendix A). Non-randomization should be not 
considered non-scientific, but rather serves as a benefit in the use of elite interviewing. In 
fact, Hugh Heclo, in discussing his interview methodology bluntly and honestly explains, 
“I do not claim to have constructed a random statistical sample” (1977, ix). Because elite 
interviews seek to provide deeper detail on specific processes and phenomena, a non-
random sample becomes necessary to access such information. 
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It must be noted that the technique’s benefits of non-random sampling do not 
insulate it from selection concerns. Instead, the interviewer must carefully craft 
interviews in an effort to overcome this limitation. The aim of a project will affect both 
the size and structure of the sample. In designing interviews, the researcher must account 
both for the specific empirical question and the institutional context of the phenomena 
being investigated.  
Another concern facing the use of elite interviews is a tradeoff between depth and 
breadth. All scholars across methodological approaches face this tradeoff. When 
interviews provide great depth into a single process or phenomenon, the analysis is able 
to offer a thorough understanding with strong conceptual validity. At its extreme, this 
technique is a case study. With it, the effort has specific benefits including the concept-, 
theory-, and hypothesis building, but also faces empirical challenges (see George and 
Bennett 2005; Gerring 2004; and Mahoney 2007 for key discussions of the topic). 
Namely, the opportunity cost of stronger conceptual validity is conceptual travel. Case 
studies can limit theoretical development and confound concepts because of homogeneity 
in the information source. 
The limitation on conceptual travel in addition to being a challenge to empirical 
rigor leads to a concern over generalizability. By focusing an interview to one respondent 
or set of closely related respondents, the researcher surrenders an assessment of relevant 
phenomena that is applicable and relatable to similarly situated scenarios. The use of a 
diverse set of respondents with unique perspectives provides a greater breadth of 
understanding and enhances the reach of ideas and conclusions. However, such benefits 
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are not implicit in the use of elite interviews; instead, it requires a careful design that 
seeks to maximize such benefits while minimizing costs. 
For example, in the study of the American bureaucracy, one can sample across 
issue areas, agencies, employment levels, etc., in order to offer a comprehensive and 
generalizable understanding of public policy. Essentially, the researcher observes 
commonalities across differences, while remaining sensitive to and aware of unique 
characteristics and phenomena. 
The third concern facing researchers who employ elite interviews involves 
response validity. Concerns over response validity emerge from two sources: respondent 
knowledge and distortion. Both present obstacles in collecting usable and insightful data 
from an elite interview. 
Limits of respondent knowledge or “demands on competence,” pose problems, 
particularly when interviewees fail to admit that questions probe beyond their area of 
expertise (Marshall and Rossman 1999, 114). What results is the dissemination of data 
that do not accurately explain phenomena being analyzed. Because a respondent may be 
unaware or unwilling to admit that his answers may be incorrect or speculative, the 
burden rests with the researcher to evaluate such responses. Dexter explains that it is 
difficult to weigh the validity of data or have “knowledge of an informant’s mental set” 
(1970, 127) if the researcher’s knowledge on the topic or subject is limited (1970, 14-15). 
Key to the successful employment of elite interviewing in research is the 
respondent’s ability to recognize patterns, trends, or systematic phenomena in the process 
or institution under inquiry.
115
 However, it is possible that respondents’ limits of 
knowledge constrain them from recognizing such patterns or even being aware of certain 
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phenomena. When this occurs it limits the interviewer’s ability to gather useful data even 
with a well-designed instrument. For example, in the context of EPA rulemaking, a 
researcher may interview environmental policy officials in state government about the 
effects of a given rule. An official may be aware that a rule weakens carbon emission 
standards. However, he may be unaware that members of the EPA previously held 
meetings with General Motors, Chrysler, and Ford. In this case, the respondent is aware 
of the effect of an administrative rule but is unaware of the interest group influence that 
led to such an outcome.  
Although this example may exaggerate the naiveté of state political elites, it 
illustrates a weakness a respondent may carry. Respondents may observe a symptom of a 
larger concept without observing (or being aware of) that concept. The difficulty for the 
interviewer centers on distinguishing between what a respondent knows and what he does 
not know (but still discusses). 
Distortion also offers a related, but difficult challenge to response validity. With 
limits to knowledge, valid data are not collected because they are outside the 
respondent’s information set. However, with distortion, data are within the respondent’s 
information set, but cannot be properly accessed because the respondent has modified 
them, unintentionally or purposely. Dexter writes that when assessing respondent 
honesty, the researcher must ask, “what factors can we expect to influence this 
informant’s reporting” (1970, 122)?116 Overcoming distortion is critical to the collection 
of valid and usable data in interviewing. There exist many ways in which distortion may 
influence interviewees’ answers. Some are casual, unintentional effects of memory, while 
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others are purposive efforts to misinform. Dexter once again clarifies most eloquently 
that distortion manifests through selective perception, unconscious modification, or 
conscious modification (Dexter 1970, 126).
117
 Thus, distortion occurs either through a 
failure or adjustment of memory or as a means of revision. 
While Dexter notes failures in memory as a source of distortion, a lack of 
truthfulness may emerge from a more active and purposive respondent behavior 
including self-promotion and self-protection. Self-promotion stems from an effort by 
some respondents capitalizing on perceived (or real) information asymmetry to present 
themselves in a more important and influential way than reality dictates. I was once told 
by a senior Congressional aide, “if you have talked to one person in a (federal) agency, 
you’ve talked to the most important person in Washington.” Of course, this tongue-in-
cheek comment highlights that some individuals have a vested, personal interest in 
overestimating their own importance. As a result, the freshman Congressman is a power-
player; the mid-level manager is a baron of business; and the high school educator is the 
ideas person for the school district.  
Similarly, self-protection may occur when the interview probes difficult, nuanced, 
and private information. In this situation, the respondent may omit data or fail to be 
forthcoming. Such omission may occur because of financial, personal, professional, legal, 
political, or reputational reasons. For example, the technology firm’s lead engineer may 
avoid discussing new research and development projects and the incumbent mayor may 
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fail to reveal controversial campaign tactics. In either case, researchers receive 
information at odds with empirical realities. 
All interviewees are prone to memory limitations and failures as a human 
condition. However, elite interviewees are particularly subject to self-promotion and self-
protection, as they are typically being questioned with regard to their professional 
position and qualifications. Often, researchers interview related respondents to collect 
data about similar topics from diverse sources. What this tool of interview design allows 
is “to counterbalance self-serving statements with responses from other participants 
whose views could be self-serving in a contrary direction” (Heclo 1977, xii). More 
formally and generally, a key to revealing, accounting for, and minimizing distortion in 
elite interviews is “some quasi-independent or independent test…in order to believe what 
(interviewees) say” (Dexter 1970, 7). Thus, scholars use various sample diversification 
techniques to overcome distortion and enhance response validity. 
 
Overcoming Challenges to Elite Interviewing 
 As mentioned in the previous section, a common way of overcoming many of the 
methodological challenges associated with elite interviewing involves sample 
modification and expansion. For the purpose of this project, I employ a similar 
technique—across-group sample diversification—in a unique way to improve the 
methodological strength of this research device. In this section, I briefly describe across-
group sample diversification. Next, I discuss three key benefits that this technique offers 
the study of executive politics. Additionally, I illustrate how this sampling approach is 
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incorporated into this project. Finally, I note how this specific design improves the 
empirical effort. 
 Sample expansion is common in the use of elite interviews, but the manner in 
which this technique is used is critical. Some work seeks to expand samples within 
groups. In this case, researchers simply speak to many similarly-suited respondents in the 
pursuit of data. For example, an interviewer may speak to all of the appointees at EPA. 
However, this technique introduces limitations in terms of the diversity and validity of 
data collected.  
 An alternative technique is to diversify the sample across groups. With this 
method, the interviewer identifies several diverse groups of respondents who are involved 
in or connected to a process or phenomenon of interest and conducts interviews within 
each group. By relying on various groups, the researcher deals with respondents who 
have different motives, perspectives, and priorities. In this way, across-group sample 
diversification targets a specific context and extracts data from heterogeneous but related 
sources. This construct allows the interviewer to limit the impact of distortion, overcome 
selection effects, and have greater agency in balancing concept validity and 
generalizability.  
The across-group diversification approach to sample design in elite interviewing 
carries three broad methodological and empirical benefits to the study of executive 
politics and political institutions. First, it offers a diversity of views that enlighten a 
complex, multi-faceted public policy process.
 118 
The actions of myriad individuals inside 
and outside institutions can affect outcomes and provide unique perspective. Given this 
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However, the federal bureaucrat serves more as an archetype of an institutional actor, rather than an 
exclusive example that illustrates this point.  
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intricacy, sampling respondents across multiple types or categories offers greater detail 
and facilitates a more nuanced understanding of such institutional processes and can help 
enhance conceptual validity.  
While certain respondents or even respondent types may face knowledge 
limitations, a diversified sample can dramatically increase the likelihood that 
interviewees can identify patterns and trends in a thorough and complete way. In so 
doing, the researcher decreases the likelihood he will make inferences or draw 
conclusions from data that lack validity. Thus, given the complexity of bureaucratic 
processes and the risk of response error, across-group diversification in sample design 
improves the methodological foundation of elite interviewing.   
 By combining broadened intra- and inter-institutional observations (within- and 
across-group sample expansion and diversification), researchers gather a more 
generalizable evaluation of policymaking, as well. A heterogeneous set of respondents 
and respondent types, sometimes work with multiple issues, can identify trends common 
in large portions of or throughout the bureaucracy. In this way, the multitude of 
viewpoints enhances the ability of the researcher to provide greater generalizability and 
theoretical understanding. 
The second benefit of across-group sample diversification is that it allows for a 
clearer evaluation of the decision making structures in the policy process. In 
understanding the politics and behaviors that drive institutional and bureaucratic process, 
it is vital to know who the power players are and where influence originates. Specifically, 
by conducting interviews across a broad range of institutions all intimately connected 
with and involved in the grants process, the researcher can improve concept and response 
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validity. It is crucial to sample individuals who are institutionally incentivized to have a 
thorough knowledge of the areas of inquiry. In the public policy arena groups inside and 
outside of government are more successful when they know who makes decisions and 
which actors have an impact on outcomes. In the context of this project, the structure of 
the grants process drives key respondents to have the knowledge necessary to assist in 
this empirical endeavor. 
In addition to increasing concept validity in evaluating decision making and 
influence, this sampling technique also aids in enhancing response validity. Whenever 
interviews probe power and influence dynamics among a group of individuals, especially 
in federal government service, the researcher risks respondent distortion. Respondents 
may overemphasize their own power and influence. Additionally, executive branch actors 
may underestimate the influence of internal political or external group forces on policy. 
As a result of these concerns, the sample should rely on respondent types who serve as a 
“quasi-independent or independent test…in order to believe what the other” respondents 
discuss (Dexter 1970, 7). Across-group sample diversification serves as the central 
technique in achieving this goal. In this way, each respondent type allows the researcher 
to assess the others’ response validity. 
Third, when conducted and designed properly, elite interviews can offer the 
additional benefit of a longitudinal evaluation of political phenomena. Where quantitative 
analyses can often include time varying data, qualitative data can be used in a similar 
manner. In order to gain a longitudinal understanding of a political concept or process 
with qualitative measures, the researcher must seek out individuals who have the 
experience in and exposure to the phenomenon for multiple time periods. Across-group 
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sample diversification can substantially assist this effort. In fact, in some contexts, this 
technique may be the lone means of accessing longitudinal data. For example, if a string 
of recent retirements leaves a given policy program under the purview of relatively new 
bureaucrats, a sample that selects only agency staff means that access to a longitudinal 
analysis is quite difficult. However, by extending the sample to include other types of 
respondents who are intimately involved in the process and have been for an extended 
period of time, the researcher can access usable data for that policy area.  
Thus, across-group diversification in the design of the sample of respondents for 
elite interviews is an important piece of qualitative methodology. In a broad sense, the 
use of sample diversification offers much to political science and for the study of political 
institutions. It enhances the researcher’s ability to explore key empirical subjects 
including decision making and influence structures, internal processes, and long-term 
trends. Further, this technique improves the research methodologically. Across-group 
sample diversification enhances generalizability and the validity of both the responses 
and concepts being investigated. To this end, across-group sample diversification is 
crucial to conducting rich and informative research. 
 
i. Across-Group Sample Diversification in Studying the Presidential 
Porkbarrel 
It is important for the specific research question to drive sampling choices when 
conducting elite interviews. The most efficient means of performing this crucial task in 
sample design is to pinpoint the relevant institutions and actors responsible (or believed 
to be responsible) for the phenomenon under investigation. In an article that investigates 
inter-branch relations and oversight, Bert Rockman explicitly describes this requirement 
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by noting that one must identify key players in the area of inquiry before “we can focus 
on what we know of each” (1984, 395). In short, the identification of these actors and 
institutions serves as a necessary condition for a properly designed interview sample. 
In any study of bureaucratic process including federal spending policy, scholars 
must focus on the agencies of the executive branch. These institutions serve central roles 
in public administration and provide a wealth of knowledge and insight on the topic. As 
mentioned previously, previous research samples within the bureaucracy in various ways. 
For the purpose of this project, I design a sample that includes individuals working in 
federal grant programs across a series of issue areas and agencies. In addition, I diversify 
federal agency respondents through the inclusion of both careerists and appointees.  
However, bureaucratic institutions are not the only actors in this area of policy. 
Interest groups often play consistent roles in the context of federal spending policy. These 
organizations seek to advance their interests through lobbying, media efforts, and 
information sharing and exchange. This relationship is true within Congressionally-
dominated spending programs, including formula and block grants and executive-
controlled spending, such as discretionary grants and procurement, as well (Freeman 
1965; Gais, Peterson, and Walker 1982; Heclo 1977; Lowi 1969; Polsby 1978; 
Schattschneider 1960). These groups offer broad, local or both views of policy efforts, 
effects, implications, and the impact on constituents and other constituent groups. This 
information is often difficult or cost prohibitive for the government to ascertain on its 
own (see McCubbins and Schwartz 1984 for an example), and interest groups make it 
their business to gather such information and make available this commodity to interested 
parties, including the legislative and executive branches. 
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In the policy making process, interest groups are not only information providers. 
They play a more dynamic, self-interested role. Beyond their assistance in conveying to 
agencies the impact and performance of grant programs and their role as the suppliers of 
broad-based monitoring, interest groups also function as policy demanders. These groups 
seek to advance their interests, further their agenda, and when relevant, support their 
members’ access to policy benefits. In the realm of federal grants, interest groups serve 
all three of these critical roles. Many interest groups have a national network that 
includes regional, state, and/or local offices and serve a body of dues-paying members. 
These groups often communicate which areas need policy attention (or here, federal 
funding) and actively use the resources of the network to help their issue-based 
constituency reap benefits. 
This discussion of the dynamic role of interest groups demonstrates the 
importance of examining both policy suppliers as well as policy demanders when 
conducting elite interviews in the area of executive politics. In addition to interest groups, 
grant applicants serve as the core group of policy demanders for this project. While grant 
applicants come in many forms, a recurring type is the state government agency. Each 
year, state agencies seek funding through discretionary grant programs.
119
 In fact, several 
federal grant programs require that funding requests originate with state government 
agencies. 
State agencies are appealing data sources for three reasons. First, states have 
institutionally shared experiences in the federal policy process. In this sense, different 
states face similar institutional rules when applying for grants. While resource differences 
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exist across states in terms of the ability to direct time and effort toward the pursuit of 
funds, such variation is relatively muted when compared to variation among other policy 
demanders.
120
  
Second, state agencies are consistent demanders of federal grants. Often, states 
seek the same federal funding opportunities on an annual basis. Given the consistency 
and dynamic needs at the state level, they are a more appealing demander than local 
governments, private citizens or other entities that may not seek grants as frequently. The 
regularity in the states’ pursuit of federal grants allows the researcher better access to 
longitudinal comparisons, as well. 
Third, and related to the consistency of state applicants, is that state agencies 
develop and maintain accumulated experience and knowledge about the grants process. 
Often, state agency employees serve long careers in the same issue area and many tend to 
work in the same position with similar responsibilities for a number of years. The result is 
a more knowledgeable, better functioning, experienced bureaucracy. Such accumulated 
knowledge allows state bureaucrats to build a comprehensive, clear, and long term 
understanding of the policy process. These individuals can thus identify loci of power, 
explain how the process has changed, and assess which influences have a real impact on 
policy outcomes. 
In sum, I propose (for this project) an across-group diversified sample design that 
relies on data from three diverse respondent types who play the most critical and 
consistent roles in the policy process. Each respondent type offers a perspective that 
complements or supplements the others. Specifically, the sample is composed of 
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respondents from federal agencies that supply grants, state agencies that demand them, 
and interest groups that play intermediary or joint roles. While each individual offers 
unique insight into the process, all respondents are part of a common grants process. This 
diversified design helps overcome some of the challenges discussed in previous sections 
by targeting data that have greater concept and response validity and are more 
generalizable across policy contexts. Overall, this sample design ensures the elite 
interviews will provide rich data that address the broader research question of this 
project. 
 
Observing Political Influence in the Federal Grants Process 
           
 The interviews described above will allow a clear assessment of the key research 
questions in this chapter: Do presidents influence policy outcomes (grant allocations) to 
support their electoral interests? And if they do, what administrative mechanisms and 
processes to they use to extract these benefits and control micro-level outcomes? To 
provide a more detailed and nuanced answer to these questions, I employ broad-based 
elite interviewing with individuals who play critical and diverse roles in the federal grants 
process. Through these interviews, I examine political and electoral influence over 
federal grants. Specifically, I consider the extent to which elected officials influence 
administrative outcomes, and what mechanisms, structures, and processes facilitate such 
behavior. The key to this effort is the analysis of the internal design and workings of 
bureaucratic institutions in the context of the strategic allocation of federal funds. 
Reliance on interviews with federal and state agency employees and interest group 
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lobbyists allows a thorough assessment of trends and regularities across distributive 
programs. 
To do this, I conducted 27 elite interviews with career and appointed staff at 
federal grant making agencies, interest group lobbyists who deal with federal grants, and 
bureaucrats from swing and non-swing states who actively apply for federal discretionary 
grants. Respondents worked in a diversity of programs and issue areas; however, in 
several instances, issue consistency existed across respondent types. In this way, some of 
the individuals interviewed in multiple respondent groups were directly or indirectly 
linked by the same grant programs. Interviews were generally open ended and explored 
consistent aspects of the grants process. Interviews lasted between 35 minutes and two 
hours, and with the exception of one interview, they were conducted in person.
121
 A more 
comprehensive appendix outlining the precise interview methodology follows this 
chapter. 
The interviews explored a host of topics with each respondent type. Broadly, the 
interviews explored political influence from elected officials in the grants process. 
Specifically, these questions probed direct and indirect ways that the White House, 
political appointees, OMB, and Congress seek to and ultimately are able to advance 
political and electoral interests. I asked respondents to describe how the federal grants 
process works and to detail their role within it. Additionally, I explored which actors have 
decision making authority, influence within the process, and influence over outcomes. 
Other questions involved how changes in agency and department leadership, presidential 
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administrations, party control of Congress and legislative leadership affect bureaucratic 
process and influence outcomes.  
The elite interviews conducted as part of this research demonstrate the myriad 
ways in which presidential interests are not only conveyed throughout the policy process 
but are implemented. Ultimately, respondents noted that political influence—and 
particularly presidential influence—over the grants process is substantial and manifests in 
many ways. Presidents and their surrogates can affect outcomes in direct ways through 
decision making authority and through indirect ways such as program and criteria design, 
OMB oversight, and strategic communication environments. In so doing, I illustrate that 
common views of how presidents and Congress influence distributive policy are 
misguided and elementary. In reality, political influence is a complex, multi-part process 
that acts on administrative decision making in unique and pervasive ways. 
I focus on respondent views relating to five key issues that reflect the president’s 
ability to manipulate personnel and process for political or electoral gain. I examine the 
power of political appointees in federal grants policy and how decision making structures 
in the process facilitate presidential influence. Second, I detail how control over the 
development of formal, informal, and discretionary grant criteria serves as a critical tool 
in influencing federal grant outcomes and how political actors are charged with these 
actions. Third, I explain how the Office of Management and Budget and its satellite 
offices within agencies and cabinet departments effectively work to influence outcomes 
so that they are consistent with administration preferences and priorities. Fourth, I discuss 
the limited role that Congress plays in the distribution of funds, providing insight into 
Congress’ restricted path to influence. Finally, before concluding, I discuss the apolitical 
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nature of the federal grants process, offering a different perspective to the substantial 
evidence of political influence. In this section, I explain that while politics affects the 
grants process in a systematic way, many individuals seek to produce outcomes that 
reflect need and public policy success. 
  
The Power of the Appointee in the Grants Process 
 Political appointees serve as critical players in bureaucratic decision making and 
public policy formation and affect the federal grants process in a multitude of ways. They 
are often positioned to influence outcomes in both direct and indirect ways and serve as 
effective surrogates in propagating presidential preferences throughout a vast 
bureaucracy. This section uses data from the elite interviews to describe the precise 
mechanisms political appointees use to influence the federal grants process and its 
outcomes. I first focus on indirect means that appointees use to affect outcomes, drawing 
particular attention to the way appointees foster a communication environment and policy 
context. Often, political scientists conceptualize presidential control and appointee 
influence as a linear process by which elites substitute political and administration 
preferences in place of technocratic policy proposals. This section challenges this 
common view and argues that the president and his surrogates also maintain indirect and 
less publicly transparent ways of affecting outcomes. Next, I engage the more common 
view of influence and explain how political appointees can intervene directly in grant 
policy decision making, but political appointees also serve as an effective means of 
conveying and implementing presidential preferences over policy. 
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i. The Indirect Impact of Political Appointees 
 Political appointees can have an indirect influence on outcomes. They can foster a 
communication and administrative environment that breeds responsiveness to presidential 
preferences and priorities and makes clear to careerists what expectations are regarding 
their policy behavior. Participation in the grants policy and observation of changes 
between administrations and agency leadership illustrates the effect of this environment.  
 Consistent among almost all respondents was a reaction that political appointees 
and even the president himself set clear public policy priorities and objectives that they 
hoped policy outcomes would accomplish. At the presidential level, policy priorities are 
painted with broad brush strokes. However, the army of political appointees, serving at 
the pleasure of the president, conveys more clearly administration objectives at the 
micro-level. An appointee heading a subnational office of a federal agency explained that 
“the president and the (cabinet) secretary set clear priorities that are easy to follow.” In 
fact, a senior careerist in a federal agency who deals predominantly in the distribution of 
federal funds explained that it was quite clear that the tone for policy making was set in 
the White House, but that cabinet secretaries could make small adjustments. Both 
respondents noted that these priorities from on high are considered controlling and while 
the lower-level and subnational appointees have some discretion, the information 
environment in both the agency and the department writ large is hierarchical and top-
down in nature.  
 The communication of administration objectives through appointees is pervasive 
and observable among most players in the federal grants process. One federal careerist 
described a process his agency employs for each discretionary funding program. Often, 
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Congress offers the agency broad discretion over the objectives and goals of a program or 
for the development and design of the program itself. In developing the procedures for 
each project, careerists, who deal with different aspects of the program, meet as a group 
with a political appointee. The appointee makes clear administration objectives and 
preferences, either in advance of or during the meeting, and the career-level 
administrators are then charged to operate within that framework. In fact, another career-
level staffer in a different agency explained that because administration preferences are 
so important, longer serving appointees facilitate the process. As careerists build better 
and longer-lasting relationships with appointees, the careerist understands clearly the 
information being conveyed and the precise preferences they seek to advance. 
 One subnational federal agency appointee detailed precisely the information 
dynamics of influence. He noted that contact between central agency appointees (and 
their immediate staff) and subnational appointees occurred at least daily, through phone, 
email, or fax. Essentially his office received a flow of briefings from the White House, 
the leadership of the department, and even the department’s White House liaison 
regarding the administration priorities. Additionally, agency and departmental appointees 
travel frequently to observe the administration of policy within subnational units. In-
person visits become critical events for the subnational appointee and his staff to convey 
administration preferences, monitor how funding programs are being administered and 
visit sites that are effectively utilizing such funding. 
 Respondents inside and outside the bureaucracy reported an information 
environment in which presidential and administration preferences are conveyed to key 
actors in the process. One interest group official dealing mainly in federal grant policy 
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noted that while career-level bureaucrats or lower-level appointees were contacting the 
interest group seeking potential applicants for funds from targeted areas, the source of 
such efforts clearly came from higher up the chain of command. According to this 
respondent and consistent with several interviews with interest group officials, this 
behavior was most notable in advance of election years when administrative 
environments and distributive outcomes changed considerably. That the information 
environment changes in advance of presidential elections demonstrates that electoral 
concerns motivate behaviors and the efforts of political actors in the executive branch.  
 Even state bureaucrats expressed frustration with the overarching impact of 
administration preferences. One state bureaucrat who, over the course of her career, 
served in multiple state agencies explained the necessity of communication with 
appointees at the federal agency as a means of facilitating success or at least 
understanding the federal grants process. This need is particularly true in the context of 
competitive federal grants. Either senior state civil servants or state appointees have 
regular contact with federal appointees in order to learn the interests and preferences of 
the administration with regard to given programs. 
 Moreover, universal across interviews with state bureaucrats and interest group 
officials, it became clear that for many grant programs, there exists a bifurcated system of 
information. There is a body of information for each grant program that is formal and 
published. Such materials are often contained in a Request for Proposals (RFP). The RFP 
details funding ranges, eligibility, purpose, and other application procedures. However, in 
addition to this formal language exists more information that embodies the actual goals of 
the funding program and the objectives (political or otherwise) the administration pursues 
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with that funding. One is publicly available; the other, as an official with a state-based, 
grant-centered interest group explained, is acquired by fostering and maintaining 
relationships and an information-sharing environment with key agency actors. 
 Fostering a communication environment laden with presidential preferences and 
priorities is one means by which presidential politics influences public policy. However, 
it alone does not necessarily mean the pressure connected to these priorities translates 
into an electorally-strategic influence.
122
 Yet, several of the interviews shed light on how 
presidential objectives can be pursued in electorally-strategic ways. 
 One political appointee who headed a subnational office of a federal agency 
explained that geographic bias in the distribution of funds can be accomplished in a 
preemptive manner. He explained that often programs are designed at the central, federal 
level within an agency. Those decisions are often influenced by and incorporate 
administration priorities. These priorities may be purely policy-oriented, but he noted, 
“issue-based priorities can favor certain states.” An interest group official similarly noted 
that some agency priorities geographically preclude areas, states, and regions. As a result, 
when grant programs incorporate administration priorities, they can affect the distribution 
of funds in clear, predictable, and strategic ways. 
 These two respondents clearly noted that policy priorities have not only 
distributional implications but geographic implications. Surely, a single policy priority 
cannot exclusively target all swing states. However, developing objectives that benefit or 
preclude states based on population or demographic regularities, industrial of service 
                                                 
122
 For example, during the George W. Bush administration, faith-based initiatives became a presidential 
priority. While such efforts could be construed as an electoral tool in a position-taking context, it is not 
clear how such priorities can be used to advance electoral goals in a manner described in this dissertation (a 
focus on gaining support in swing states at the expense of other states).  
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sector prominence, natural resources or other reasons can bias the geographic distribution 
of federal funds in critical and strategic ways. This system allows presidents or his 
surrogates to develop funding programs that institutionalize an electoral strategy cloaked 
in a publicly presentable, issue-centered, non-electoral justification. 
 In this way, the formal language of grant program may suggest that eligibility is 
fairly universal, but the administration’s emphasis within such a program may narrow the 
programs’ scope and have serious distributional implications. For example, during the 
1990s and 2000s and in response to an amendment to Superfund laws, the Environmental 
Protection Agency began a focus on “brownfield” cleanup in an effort to transform 
polluted land into economically usable space.
123
 This program formally applied to a 
broad set of areas, as environmental pollution of all kinds exists in all 50 states. However, 
in response to the Brownfields Law, the Bush administration made “mine-scarred lands” 
a priority.
124
 With an emphasis on former mineral mine sites, environmental cleanup 
eligibility narrowed dramatically, as mineral mines are not geographically universal. 
Although mine site cleanup certainly achieves noble goals, particularly for the residents 
in those areas, this administration priority had distributional and electoral implications. In 
presidential electoral politics, mineral mine sites exist in key swing states including 
Pennsylvania, Ohio, West Virginia, Nevada, and Colorado, among others. In this case, 
administration priorities sought to focus a broad grant program into a narrow subset of 
areas, and an emphasis on those areas provided the president key political benefits. 
 Beyond discrete observations about the information environment in federal 
agencies, I gained additional leverage from respondents who participated in the federal 
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 See Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act, P.L. 107-118 
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 Environmental Protection Agency. 2005. “Mine Site Cleanup for Brownfields Redevelopment: A Three-
Part Primer.” Office of Solid Wate and Emergency Response: Washington, DC. 
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grants process for several years. The ability to observe change (or stability) from long 
term experience provides great insight into bureaucratic process. Almost universally, 
respondents noted that the transition from one president to another causes dramatic 
changes in the priorities and focus of agencies, in the administrative procedures and 
processes governing the federal grants process and in the information environment. One 
long serving careerist in a federal agency explained that while new presidents 
dramatically change processes, changes in agency leadership can also affect policy and 
distributive outcomes. She detailed that such changes in appointed management had little 
effect on the day to day operation of an agency because of the stability of the civil 
service. However, real effects were felt in funding preferences and the demands for the 
entertainment of new ideas. Another career bureaucrat noted that discretionary programs 
can face dramatic redesigns under new leadership for a variety of reasons, some of which 
are political in nature.  
 The interest group perspective also reflects the effects of managerial changes in 
federal agencies. Most interest group officials and state bureaucrats noted the absolute 
need to foster relationships with federal agency officials. These contacts with the 
bureaucracy are strengthened in formal and informal ways. He went on to describe the 
relationship as being helpful in terms of understanding administration priorities. 
However, he explained that leadership changes cause transitions and periods of 
adjustment, and it is under this circumstance that lobbyists and other interest group 
officials rely on their relationships with careerists to understand the preferences and 
priorities of the new administration. Because changes can be so profound, external actors 
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must rely on the stability of the civil service to understand fully the nature of a new 
administration’s priorities. 
 This information environment demonstrates clearly the means by which 
presidents can affect even micro-level policy. A constant communication flow of 
administration goals and preferences down a complex chain of command can accomplish 
two tasks. First, it serves as an effective monitoring mechanism by which individuals 
closer to the president are constantly being informed about the effectiveness, behaviors, 
and productivity of those individuals working throughout the administrative apparatus of 
government. This process helps enhance accountability and institutionally limit shirking 
and drift. Second, this communication (and more importantly its frequency) ensures that 
appointees at the lowest levels and career-level staff are constantly informed of the 
interests of the president, of how well performance reflects those interests, and of any 
changes or adjustments in preferences that should have an impact on outcomes. In this 
way, lower-level actors are not only kept informed of administration priorities through 
this information environment, but it is made clear that they are expected to incorporate 
them into policy.   
 
ii. Political Appointees’ Direct Influence 
 In addition to the control and conveyance of administration priorities and 
objectives, political appointees often have a more direct role in the execution of federal 
grants policy and agency allocation outcomes. Administrative procedures affect the 
manner in which outcomes come to be. In fact, one long serving careerist in a federal 
agency noted that it was clear to him that the nature and adjustment of administrative 
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procedures can have a direct and meaningful impact on policy outcomes. In this way, 
many agency structures empower political appointees to be the final arbiters for grant 
allocations. In agencies in which such mechanisms do not exist, appointees often have the 
ability to modify administrative procedures in a way that offers them decision making 
authority. One senior career official in a federal agency explained that the role of the 
appointee in the final allocation decision making “honestly, depends on whether they 
care.” She went on to note that some appointees arrange processes such that they play a 
substantial and critical role in allocations. Others, however, are comfortable delegating 
that power to career staff in order to focus on other priorities. This “lack of caring” may 
not reflect an appointee’s discretionary decision but the priorities of the White House vis-
à-vis that agency or issue area. 
 What results is a decision making structure that varies depending on appointee 
interest and initiative and the existing structures within the administrative process. A 
long-serving senior lobbyist for a Washington -based interest group explained that he 
lobbies multiple agencies and his decades of experience demonstrated that appointees do 
not influence all agencies equally. However, what became a chorus among interest group 
officials both within and without Washington was that the tone set by an appointee or a 
new administration had a direct effect on the access of a lobbying organization, which 
can have real distributive consequences. 
 When appointees take an active role in distributive decision making, their impact 
is not only direct but can have political and electoral implications. A national interest 
group grant manager centered in Washington, DC, described an initiative in which she 
sought funding assistance for her members and subnational sister organizations. A federal 
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agency worked closely to identify applicants—affiliated with this organization—to 
distribute funds for a pilot program. The respondents explained that the agency delivered 
these funds almost exclusively to swing states. When I pressed the respondent about 
whether this distributive behavior was unique, the question was met with humor and an 
additional example of another funding program in which federal dollars were funneled to 
a particular swing state in advance of a presidential election. In fact, in this case the 
agency asked the respondent to identify prospective applicants in this state, as it was the 
geographic target for the program. 
From the perspective of appointees, the ability to influence outcomes is clear. A 
federal appointee in charge of an agency’s subnational office noted that he could simply 
change or veto distributive outcomes in a direct way, but he explained his ability to 
influence was broader. He noted that he could indirectly apply pressure and highlight to 
career staff certain distributive preferences. Although this appointee explained that while 
this power structure was available and not unique to his subnational office, he resisted 
such behaviors because they could complicate an important working relationship between 
him and his staff.  
However, an appointee’s deference to careerists’ policy recommendations is not a 
universal behavior and in fact, can lead to an internal conflict for a political appointee. 
Another subnational federal agency head explained, “I am torn between serving the 
president and being part of a customer service system.” In his case, he estimated that he 
defers to staff in about 95% of cases, but that individuals from the national office deliver 
a steady flow of information and demands and “there is a need to make central office 
suggestions a priority.” In this way, this appointee found the need and hierarchical 
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motivation to step into the allocation decision making and exercise his own discretion. 
Serving as the formal and final decision maker for a set of grants passing through this 
subnational office, the appointee was positioned to, when necessary, affect outcomes. A 
careerist in a federal grant making agency noted that appointee involvement in final 
allocation decisions can occur for a host of reasons, but “clearly the process can be 
political.” 
The power of appointees to serve as the locus of authority was clear across 
respondents in federal and state governments and within interest groups. However, the 
reach of that power and the character of that influence vary. One senior careerist at a 
federal agency explained that while an appointed agency head wields formal approval 
authority over allocations, the process was simply a formality—a behavior attributed to 
the bipartisan and technical nature of that specific policy area.  
 Other federal careerists noted the myriad and institutionalized ways in which 
appointees exercise decision making authority over federal grant allocations. As noted 
above, a careerist explained that in his agency the program design stage offers the 
appointee the opportunity to make his objectives clear and encourages—even if tacitly—
the implementation of those objectives in the program. Another career-level program 
director described a similar process in her agency, but also explained that when proposed 
allocations are presented to the appointee, the appointee has veto power. This veto power 
becomes a blunt instrument of administrative influence. Rather than having the ability to 
make micro-level adjustments in allocations as was described in other agencies, this 
agency essentially allows the appointee an up or down vote on a set of allocations. 
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Not all decision making authority is as blunt, however. Another long serving non-
appointed program director explained that a career-level program staffer will prepare a 
set of different proposed allocations and then formally present them to the appointee. The 
appointee then chooses the allocation schema that he or she prefers. While this ability to 
present a series of allocation designs could place discretionary power in the hands of the 
career staffer, the program director explained that the staffer has a feel for what the 
appointee prefers and those preferences become institutionalized into the system. 
Essentially, it would be a waste of man hours for the staffer to propose allocations that 
are inconsistent with the appointee’s preferences, as he is unlikely to choose that 
proposal. Furthermore, beyond the ability to choose a proposal, the appointee retains the 
authority to “tweak” allocations. The respondent explained that such tweaking is 
uncommon, attributing it not to a lack of administration influence but instead to the fact 
that appointee preferences are already institutionalized into the process.  
 As suggested above, the influence of administration appointees does not only 
affect career-level members of the federal bureaucracy. Other appointees feel the impact 
of political actors in the president’s administration in unique ways. A federal agency 
appointee heading a subnational office noted an additional way that the central office can 
target funds geographically. There is a pressure for subnational units of federal agencies 
to spend (distribute) all of their allocated funds or they are returned to Washington. 
However, they are not sent to the Treasury. Instead, they are transferred back to the 
central office of the agency head. The agency head is then free to redistribute those 
excess or unspent funds to subnational offices as he or she sees fit. Such power facilitates 
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a geographically-targeted distribution schema, but it at least presents the opportunity for 
one of the president’s surrogates to influence directly the distribution of grants. 
 A challenge in evaluating presidential influence over micro-level policy is 
understanding how one individual charged with the leadership of a massive bureaucratic 
organization can affect outcomes at the individual-level in a manner consistent with his 
needs. The structure, decision making context, and information environment of 
administrative agencies clearly facilitate and in many cases institutionally assure that 
presidential interests become the interests of those throughout the system. Appointees are 
able to capitalize on these formal and informal mechanisms and act as presidential 
surrogates in order to provide the president critical electoral and political benefits. 
 
Criteria: A Cornerstone of Control 
  
 Criteria are an important part of the federal grants process. They outline eligibility 
requirements that serve as an initial impetus for or disqualifier of prospective applicants. 
The creation of criteria can hold with it immense power over influencing or determining 
the allocation of federal funds. This section explores two critical aspects of criteria that 
are crucial to understanding policy outcomes. First, I consider formal and published grant 
criteria. Formal criteria are often considered central in understanding who receives grant 
funding. If criteria are determinative of outcomes, then it is vital to assess who has final 
authority over the design and approval of them. The second part of this section challenges 
the importance of formal criteria and instead examines how informal or discretionary 
criteria can empower decision makers and have serious implications for the distribution 
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of federal funds. I explore how external actors seek to gather knowledge on, understand 
and capitalize on informal criteria, and how political appointees or other actors can affect 
distributive outcomes by effectively superseding eligibility requirements with 
discretionary criteria. 
 The development of criteria is often a political process. To this end, political 
appointees often position themselves at the center of criteria design in order to craft grant 
programs in strategic ways. A Washington-based interest group grant manager explained 
that appointees can design criteria so it is targeted in nature. Because criteria can benefit 
or preclude certain applicants, appointees use criteria in a strategically. The respondent 
noted that relations with the administrative agency and its appointees are always careful 
because criteria can be (re)designed to punish or reward certain recipients, organizations, 
or geographic areas.  
 Those working within the administration also describe the breadth of power that 
political appointees wield in designing criteria. As agency executives who are often 
committed to administration priorities, appointees utilize this authority to ensure that 
programs and ultimately the distributive outcomes they produce will reflect such 
priorities. Several interest group officials spoke candidly of the distributional power 
appointees maintain through criteria design. One lobbyist explained that frequently the 
distributional implications of criteria are observable from outcomes. For example, broad-
based grants to improve waterways could provide eligibility to a large number of areas 
throughout the country. However, if criteria are designed to give particular priority to the 
Great Lakes region, priority can be given to critical states in presidential elections 
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including Minnesota, Wisconsin, Michigan, Ohio, Indiana, and Pennsylvania.
125
 That 
criteria design is almost exclusively reserved for political actors suggests it is a critical 
avenue to influence policy outcomes and control administrative decisions. 
 Even agencies that have central and subnational offices face unique yet still 
appointee-designed criteria. One subnational federal appointee explained that he has final 
approval over criteria at the subnational level. Other criteria are created at the central 
office and almost always require appointee approval. He explained that the manner in 
which programs are designed and priorities are implemented through that design ensures 
that certain individuals and states are better positioned to receive funds. This positioning 
can occur both through choices over issues (as mentioned above) or through the details of 
eligibility within any program. Another appointee noted that some programs include 
criteria with immense distributive implications such that “one concern [is] that the 
process is too formulaic that works for one or two recipients and essentially becomes an 
entitlement” (sic). 
 Another Washington interest group grant manager explained that political 
appointees do not simply influence the design of criteria, but can affect the rules 
governing the process by which criteria are created. One way appointees affect criteria is 
to inform career-level staffers of the administration desires and objectives for a given 
program and then charging them to design the program (and its criteria) within that 
framework and information environment. In describing this process, one federal 
bureaucrat explained that staffers must present these pre-influenced criteria to the 
                                                 
125
 It should be noted this anecdote is used for illustrative purposes and was not provided by the respondent 
referenced in this paragraph. 
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appointee for final approval. At that stage, such approval is typically a formality, as the 
appointee’s (or administration’s) preferences are already incorporated. 
 Despite the import of criteria design, such control is not always absolute or 
precise. Many interest group lobbyists and administration officials explained that both 
grant criteria and the evaluation processes associated with a grant program do not always 
result in outcomes that align exactly with the objectives of political appointees. In many 
cases, political appointees wield additional power over the process through the 
development and exercise of informal or discretionary criteria.  
 Interest group lobbyists noted in several interviews that just as important as 
understanding the formal criteria listed in a Request for Proposals is an awareness of the 
subtext or informal criteria. The chance of success is enhanced only by understanding 
how criteria will truly be evaluated. Of greater importance, these respondents noted that 
political appointees typically determine, exercise, and fail to disclose publicly or 
transparently the nature of such informal criteria.  
 One interest group official who dealt with grant applications at the state-level 
explained that one agency maintained a liaison who served as a key information 
distributor to relevant interest groups and stakeholders. With recent budget reductions, 
the agency leadership cut several liaison positions. The respondent was concerned about 
the group’s ability to compete effectively for federal funds without this representative. He 
explained that while reading the criteria within a Request for Proposals served to start the 
application process, understanding which criteria would be of greatest focus and how 
agency leadership would evaluate them was a fundamental means of accessing funds. He 
further explained that changes in agency leadership frequently led to changes in both 
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formal and informal criteria and expectations for applicants. The liaison relationship was 
critical to understanding these changes in a direct, rather than trial-and-error way. This 
liaison example, although itself a significant part of the administrative process, reveals 
the important role that political appointees play in the design, interpretation, and 
evaluation of grant criteria. The elimination of such positions—a consequence of fiscal 
constraints and appointee decision making—also helps mask the influence of informal 
criteria. 
 In addition to informal, issue- or priority-based criteria, appointees can use other 
considerations in the grant evaluation process. Often this power manifests with 
appointees using discretionary criteria that can assist specific applicants or groups of 
applicants. This tool empowers appointees to make exceptions to the (peer) review 
process. 
 Many grants are evaluated through a peer or administrative review process. Under 
this process, a group of individuals evaluate, score and rank proposals based on 
quality.
126
 Panelists read and evaluate each proposal, often based on a criteria-centered 
rubric that results in a score for each application. Applications, based on their scores, are 
then ranked and those rankings become a recommendation. Those recommendations are 
then made to political appointees and/or senior career-level administrators for approval, 
disapproval, or, in some cases, adjustment.  
 The adjustment of these recommendations is born out of a discretionary ability of 
appointees to make final allocation decisions. A grant manager for an interest group 
explained simply that appointees distribute funds to certain recipients and geographic 
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stakeholders, and citizens to offer diverse views.  
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areas, even in the face of the peer review process. While this claim was sharp, several 
other respondents corroborated the point, noting the ability and actions of appointees to 
override certain peer or administrative review processes. 
 A long serving state bureaucrat explained that he not only observed the peer 
review process as an applicant, but he also participated in the process as a reviewer. He 
described the precise manner in which recommendations, though frequently adhered to 
and accepted, were not done so universally. He explained after he and his peers ranked 
proposals, the political appointee in charge of the program played two key roles in this 
process. First, the appointee was able to set the cut point above which programs would be 
funded. Second, appointees had the discretion to determine outcomes by changing the 
ranking of applications after the peer review process concluded. This administrative 
discretion though not exercised in dramatic fashion affected outcomes. The respondent 
noted that some proposals were raised or lowered on the list, and in a few cases, 
proposals that were not well-regarded found their way to the final distribution list. This 
respondent could not recall specifically who benefitted through such adjustment, but 
noted that the institutional actors responsible for such decisions—appointees and OMB—
are political. 
 At the subnational level, central office appointees will utilize discretion in order 
to affect outcomes. Both subnational and central office appointees can add administrative 
or discretionary points to application scores as a means of enhancing the competitiveness 
of certain proposals. A career-level staffer at a federal agency’s subnational office 
explained that administrative points added to scores by central and subnational 
appointees are handled differently. Subnational appointees often devise a justification for 
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this addition, noting that the justification can include reputational considerations. The 
respondent explained that while the motivation can be political, the appointee devises an 
apolitical public justification in case a Freedom of Information Act request is filed. 
However, administrative points added by the central agency appointees are not made 
public, but can lead to real changes in the distribution of funds. Despite this discussion, 
the respondent explained that the role of politics is at the margins and that all funding 
decisions—peer reviewed or administratively influenced—assisted applicants with real 
need.  
 Another subnational federal agency head echoed this perspective, explaining that 
central agency leadership can influence outcomes over subnational funding allocations. 
However, some discretionary criteria at the subnational level allow him to influence 
outcomes. The respondent explained that while these discretionary criteria can be used 
for political influence, his office typically relied on them to lift proposals that will be 
more competitive nationally and overcome formal criteria that target funds to a small and 
select subset of applicants. While this appointee’s approach to the use of discretionary 
criteria or administrative points was offered as magnanimous in nature, he noted that the 
criteria designed at the national level certainly affect how and where funds are 
distributed. Often, the respondent described the different uses of discretionary criteria at 
the subnational and federal levels to be a competition between apolitical and political 
efforts, respectively.   
 In sum, presidential preferences can affect outcomes through the design and 
manipulation of criteria. Because the preferences and objectives of senior administration 
officials and the president motivate political appointees, the avenues of influence that 
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appointees can access become key means of translating presidential goals into policy 
outcomes. In the context of federal grant programs, one such avenue is administrative 
criteria. Not only are appointees empowered to create the criteria upon which grant 
allocations are evaluated, but when those criteria result in policy outcomes inconsistent 
with appointee goals, there exist additional paths to influence. Appointees are able to 
adjust scores, rankings and outcomes from peer and administrative review processes to 
advance and hinder certain applicants. These powers allow presidential goals to filter 
through the offices of political appointees to influence distributional outcomes at the 
micro-level in critical ways. 
 
OMB: A Checkpoint on the Road to Presidential Influence 
  
 The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has long been recognized as an 
important political institution for the White House to advance the goals and preferences 
of the president. The federal grants process is not spared from this effort. In fact, federal 
grants fall under the purview of OMB for multiple reasons. First, because of the 
distributive nature of federal grants the “budget” aspect of OMB oversees fund 
allocations for fiscal reasons. Second, OMB often serves as an information clearinghouse 
for federal agencies, ensuring that published communication is consistent with the legal 
and political expectations of the administration. To this end, the budgetary aspects of 
OMB offer it a jurisdiction over federal grant allocations and the political motivations of 
the White House insist upon its role in the policy process. 
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 In addition to its budgetary role, OMB serves as an information control center that 
can dramatically affect both administrative process and policy outcomes. Specifically, 
OMB and its satellite offices within departments and agencies affect communication 
flowing into (such as contact from Congress) and out of bureaucratic institutions. This 
role positions OMB to be highly influential in administration and in the context of this 
project, distributive policy. 
 In detailing the mechanisms of influence afforded to the Office of Management 
and Budget, this section is divided into three parts. First, I explain how OMB controls the 
flow, nature, and content of published agency materials. This portion illustrates the 
manner in which this authority dramatically affects the role of politics in policy making 
and administration. Second, and of equal importance, I describe how OMB limits and 
controls external political contact and influence. This discussion outlines OMB’s role as a 
buffer between Congress and bureaucratic institutions and notes how this informational 
role enhances political control and strategy. Finally, as the budgetary arm of the White 
House, OMB affects distributive outcomes in direct and formal, yet politically-strategic 
ways. I explain how this authority allows OMB to affect policy and inject politics into the 
process. 
 Senior career-level staff within agencies almost universally noted that OMB 
contact is a critical aspect of their jobs. One staffer explained that because OMB is such a 
key player in the administration of funds and flow of communication, it is absolutely 
critical for her office to get to know them and understand their priorities. It became clear 
from this discussion that like most procedures respondents describe, efficiency is gained 
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by understanding and possibly preemptively incorporating OMB preferences and 
expectations into outcomes. 
 As part of the legal and political efforts that OMB asserts regularly, every federal 
agency respondent noted, to some degree, contact and influence of the institution in their 
daily lives. One senior careerist explained that every published document from his office 
required not just OMB approval, but editing. In fact, in his cabinet department an OMB 
extension office existed to which all proposed publications were sent. He detailed clearly 
the various procedures the office used to monitor publications. In some cases, a document 
would be submitted and then returned with proposed changes. Other times, after a 
document is submitted, OMB edits and publishes a final version without first returning it 
to the agency. Final versions were not always changed in dramatic ways, but he noted, 
“some were unrecognizable.” 
 Another long-serving career-level program director explained that in her agency, 
OMB clearance was needed to for all publications, grant criteria, and even distributive 
decisions. She described OMB’s role more broadly as regulators of the information 
environment within an agency. Each document was reviewed and edited (when 
necessary) by these officials. However, as the respondent detailed, the control was not 
simply over information but by editing publications and criteria and placing checks on 
distributive decisions, OMB effectively influences public policy outcomes at all stages of 
the process. Another career-level agency official explained that included among such 
influence is the ability to outline or detail the precise processes to distribute funds in 
ways that have substantial influence on who gets what and when. 
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 The influence of OMB extends beyond control over the information being 
disseminated from an agency; it also includes a strict control over the information coming 
into an agency. Because so much of the literature on distributive politics examines the 
role of Congress, one could imagine that Congress may seek to influence federal grant 
allocations by contacting agency staff. For career-level staff, I sought to evaluate the 
level of contact they had with Congress. Quite broadly, respondents noted that OMB 
handles contact with “the politicals.”  
 One senior career-level federal bureaucrat explained agency policy restricts 
staffers from discussing program details with Congress (members and staff). In fact, if an 
individual receives a phone call from Capitol Hill, he must immediately transfer it to the 
department’s OMB staffers to handle the inquiry. Any information deemed necessary 
from that communication will be relayed to agency staff only through the internal OMB 
office and not from Congress directly.
127
 Of course, OMB determines what it and the 
administration considers necessary or important for agencies to learn from Congress. 
 This institutional dynamic offers increasingly centralized power in multiple ways. 
First, it ensures that all information being distributed from the agency comes from or 
flows through a common source ensuring tight messaging and consistency. Second, this 
intra-institutional structure buffers Congress from influencing those individuals working 
within federal agencies. In many cases, Congress cannot even suggest to career staff 
where funds should be distributed, unless administration officials convey that 
information. Like presidents, legislators have a substantial interest in directing federal 
funds to key constituencies. Given Congress’ oversight and appropriations roles, direct 
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contact from Capitol Hill could easily intimidate bureaucrats into legislative 
responsiveness, at the expense of White House control. By structuring a communication 
buffer that is staffed by an institution from the Executive Office of the President, it 
ensures greater executive branch control over distributive powers. 
The effects of OMB were also felt outside of Washington and beyond the federal 
government. Even for state bureaucrats, OMB influence is not simply administrative in 
nature. A state bureaucrat noted that contact with OMB is quite frequent as monitoring of 
funds is fairly pervasive. However, beyond such checks, the political nature of OMB 
shows itself through the implementation of changes. Specifically, as new administrations 
take office the behavior and expectations of OMB for state grant recipients can change 
fairly dramatically. However, of greater import, the respondent noted that OMB can 
change reporting requirements to reflect the preferences and priorities of the incumbent 
president. For example, during the recent recession, the administration—through OMB—
increased the emphasis on reporting job creation through federal funding, even changing 
the accounting practices for job creation multiple times. Although this requirement did 
not have distributional implications, it highlights the highly political nature of the Office. 
 More to the point, a long serving state bureaucrat who, as mentioned above, sat on 
federal peer review panels in the past, noted the power of this institution from a 
distributive perspective. He explained that both his first-hand experience within the 
review process and his relationships over the years with many federal government 
officials shed light on the OMB role. It functions not simply as a blind budgetary check 
that compares bottom lines. Instead, he explained OMB has more specific powers noting 
for many programs after a peer review process produces a ranking of grant applications 
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by quality scores, OMB can change the order in which proposals are funded. This power 
can influence the timing, location, and likelihood of funding. Given the political nature of 
this institution and its institutional position as a political liaison, affording it authority 
over the manipulation of federal fund allocations will have substantial distributive 
implications in political and electoral terms. 
 The respondents describe OMB as a powerful institution within the executive 
branch. This Office and the subsidiary offices within departments and agencies strictly 
control the information flow in and out of distributive institutions and have a direct 
impact on federal fund allocations. This influence, both active and informational, of the 
Office of Management and Budget controls legislative influence, facilitates presidential 
control and enhances the ability of the White House to affect micro-level public policy 
decision making. 
 
Limitations on Legislative Leverage 
 As mentioned above a dominant theme in the study of distributive politics is the 
role and influence of Congress. Congressional influence over the distribution of funds has 
been well catalogued in many areas; however, the focus of this project being on 
discretionary federal grants should dampen the influence of Congress. A lack of evidence 
of Congressional influence—as has been outlined in the previous chapters—does not 
necessarily reflect a weakness in legislative power, but instead the institutional design of 
the grant programs being analyzed. Despite this expectation, legislative influence serves 
as a primary alternative hypothesis for this project and one that was extensively explored 
in the elite interviews I conducted. 
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 In this section, I examine the role of Congress in federal discretionary grant 
policy. This section addresses this issue in three ways. First, I described respondents’ 
assessment of the direct role of Congress in the context of grant policy. Respondents 
universally report little communication and influence from the legislative branch. In the 
second section, I engage this limited communication by focusing on the role that the 
Office of Management and Budget plays and suggest ways in which Congress may have 
an impact that bureaucrats have difficulty observing. Third, I discuss avenues of 
influence Congress maintains in this policy area. Specifically, I note that while Congress 
is largely restricted in directly affecting distributive outcomes, its institutional role in the 
legislative process allows a path of influence.  
 Generally, federal bureaucrats noted a lack of contact with Congress in terms of 
legislators seeking funds for their constituencies. Instead, one senior careerist explained 
the extent of dealings with Congress dealt mainly with reporting requirements and 
discussions about the upcoming appropriations legislation. He noted the extent of 
legislative impact on the distribution of funds centered not on general grant programs, but 
on legislative earmarks. With some regularity, legislators will include earmarked 
appropriations in legislation or in committee reports, and in most cases, agencies are 
required or expected to honor these Congressional requests. In such situations, a given 
portion of funding is set aside for that specific (often geographic purpose). However, 
despite media attention to earmarking, the behavior consumes a very small portion of 
discretionary funding and has little impact. Beyond earmarking, respondents largely 
noted that contact with Congress was essentially non-existent. 
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 In fact, as further evidence of the limited influence of Congress within federal 
grant making agencies, state bureaucrats do not seek help from Congress when 
applications are under review. In fact, one state bureaucrat noted that it is far more 
effective to contact relevant interest groups who maintain positive relationships within 
federal agencies. These applicants often build and foster contacts that advance both their 
understanding of the grants process and their likelihood of success. That these contacts 
often do not include congressmen demonstrates the lack of legislative influence within 
administrative agencies. 
 State bureaucrats provide additional insight into the limited role of Congress. One 
would expect that because state bureaucrats apply for funds for select constituencies and 
federal legislators seek to claim credit with those funds, congressmen may encourage 
state bureaucrats to seek federal funding opportunities out of mutual benefit. However, 
interviews with state bureaucrats universally demonstrated that they have little or no 
contact from members of the national legislature. These bureaucrats did note that 
pressure comes from state legislators and the offices of governors, particularly because 
federal funds help balance state budgets. Generally, state bureaucrats suggest that while 
state and local officials understand the beneficial implications of pursuing federal grants, 
congressmen make little effort to achieve the same. 
 Instead of direct contact, interaction between many agencies and Congress flows 
through OMB, as mentioned above. This system ensures that legislators have limited 
influence within agencies and that contact with agencies is made directly with political 
appointees. In fact, the constancy federal bureaucrats observe across transitions in party 
control of Congress is evidence of the limitations on legislative influence. Two senior 
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careerists in federal agencies explained that because their contact with Congress was so 
infrequent (and in the case of one individual, was restricted), changes on Capitol Hill 
would have little impact. One suggested that even though communication flows through 
OMB officials within the cabinet department, the information flowing from those 
officials to the program staff remains fairly constant. 
 This constancy in information, even in the face of transitions in Congress suggests 
one of two scenarios. Congressmen rising to committee power or a party seizing the 
majority make no new demands on a federal agency, allowing them to continue to 
administer the law without political pressure. Alternatively, this steadiness may 
demonstrate that the OMB officials within the government effectively shelters 
bureaucratic staffers from legislative demands and influence. 
 However, OMB’s control of the information environment in federal agencies does 
not mean Congress has no influence over the process. Congress cannot simply apply 
pressure directly to federal bureaucrats. Instead, it must work with key executive branch 
institutions to seek influence. In specific cases, and considering the inter-institutional 
nature of the legislative process and the cooperative nature of policy making, it is safe to 
assume that OMB will accept some legislative requests and actively influence 
bureaucrats to be responsive to them. Yet, unless the source of such a request is clearly 
discussed between OMB and the bureaucrat, the latter will simply observe political 
pressure and influence from the former. In this context, civil servants are unable to 
distinguish the original source of influence. Thus, respondents noting that the Office of 
Management and Budget applies political pressure do not necessarily reflect an absolute 
reflection of executive branch interests. Instead, OMB pressure reflects some 
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combination of presidential interests and Congressional policy preferences that are 
administration approved. 
 The relationship between interest groups and Congress can illustrate the existence 
or extent of legislative influence in the context of the federal grants process conceived 
more broadly. Generally, interest group lobbyists and grant managers explained that their 
relationship with Congress exists on two fronts: information sharing and appropriation 
seeking. One lobbyist explained that because his organization was a leading voice in that 
given policy area, Congress relies heavily on information from it. The organization has a 
broad network and comprehensive understanding of public policy issues and maintains an 
expertise that is unmatched in Congress. In a similar way, Congress largely conveys to 
the interest group legislative proposals and discusses the possible (in)ability for 
legislative success in upcoming sessions. The relationship that this lobbyist describes is a 
traditional one, long profiled in the political science literature, but that remains stable in 
contemporary policy contexts. 
 In terms of interest in specific appropriations, Congress has profound influence in 
federal grant policy. Interest groups are motivated to increase appropriations for the 
policy areas that they support. In this way, interest group respondents explained that they 
frequently work closely with Congress in an effort to increase, or at least maintain, 
funding levels, particularly for federal grant programs. One interest group grant manager 
explained that because of the persuasive effectiveness of interest groups and their policy 
expertise, federal agencies often contact these organizations in an effort to lobby 
Congress for their own appropriation. While federal agencies serve policy communities, 
they do not have a constituency in the same way that an interest group does. These 
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organizations are effective at mounting information and/or grassroots campaigns in an 
effort to securing funding. This relationship between agencies, interest groups, and 
Congress was also echoed by federal agency staffers as a crucial element of securing 
funding. And in this context, Congress is a critical player. 
 An interview with a subnational federal appointee demonstrated this 
Congressional role most clearly. This appointee oversaw a subnational region in which 
his “cardinal” hailed. That is, the subnational region included the congressional district of 
the House Appropriations Subcommittee chair with jurisdiction over that agency. This 
institutional alignment should present the most effective opportunity for legislative 
influence over executive branch fund allocations. However, the appointee explained that 
he experienced no influence from the cardinal to distribute funds to that congressional 
district or in any other way. Instead, rather than the proximity of the cardinal being a 
challenge or source of political influence, the appointee found it to be a perk. The 
appointee had greater access to the individual charged with shepherding the 
appropriations bill that funds his agency and found the relationship to be beneficial to that 
segment of the executive branch. 
 This relationship distinguishes the role of Congress in fiscal matters. Often the 
legislative branch’s appropriation power is conflated with distributive power. It is true 
that the legislators are often successful at securing funding for their constituencies, but 
that is true under specific institutional contexts such as legislative earmarking, block and 
formula grant programs, and contact with the Office of Management and Budget and 
other political appointees. However, for funding programs that are discretionary, 
legislative influence is not as pervasive. Although Congress does have some opportunity 
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to influence outcomes, other preferences factor into distributive outcomes. In this way, it 
is important to distinguish the appropriator from the distributor. For all programs, 
Congress serves as the appropriator and the interview respondents for this project 
suggested an awareness of this institutional dynamic in their dealings with the legislative 
branch. However, with regard to the funding programs being analyzed in this project, the 
executive branch and particularly the political appointees within it play the role of 
distributor. 
 Thus, Congress is limited in its ability to influence the distribution of federal 
funds in the context of discretionary grant programs. Most agencies have little contact 
with federal legislators or their staffs. Instead, much of the communication between the 
branches flows through specific channels, often officials affiliated with the White House. 
This effectively limits the ability of the legislature to influence directly administrative 
agencies. Instead, Congress must cooperate and communicate with the political 
institutions of the executive branch in order to extract policy benefits. As a result, federal 
discretionary grants provide an important context to distinguish appropriation power from 
distributive authority, and illustrate the power of the president relative to that of 
Congress. 
 
The Apolitical Nature of the Federal Grants Process: A Commentary 
 The results from the systematic analyses in this dissertation do not suggest that 
federal grants provide the president unfettered political and electoral tools. Instead, the 
findings provide evidence that an electoral strategy in the allocation of funds is observed 
at the margins. While federal discretionary grant dollars are spread all over the United 
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States, those states that are electorally important to the president receive 
disproportionately more funding. The results of the elite interviews conducted as part of 
this project also support this finding.  
 A senior career-level federal bureaucrat best put this concept into perspective. He 
explained that there is no doubt external forces influence grant allocations and that some 
of those forces are political in nature. However, he noted that despite the influence of 
politics and efforts to direct funds in specific ways, “people who get grants are all in 
need.” He distinguished the way that politics manifests in the grants process. Even when 
political or electoral forces influence outcomes, agencies do not deliver benefits to those 
who have much, but instead identify those in need for whom delivering funds may be 
politically or electorally beneficial to principals.  
 The universal nature of need allows individuals involved in public policy—and 
specifically in federal grants—to work effectively within a political framework. An 
interest group grant manager explained that even when politics influences the system and 
programs are designed to have geographic biases, it is easy to identify people in need in 
those geographically- targeted areas. In fact, the respondent noted that need in her policy 
area is substantial and universal and that the demand for assistance always outpaces 
supply. In this way, politics does not enhance this shortfall, but rather, she explained it 
simply directs that shortfall. She described a situation in which the administration chose 
to target certain states for federal grants and even under this scenario, there existed no 
shortage of prospective applicants in those states. 
 Every respondent had a keen awareness that they were working to create policy in 
a system that politics influences. Rather than it motivating discontent, it was accepted as 
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an aspect of their working life. Further, the role of politics did not function as a limitation 
on their ability to help those in need. Instead, several respondents including state 
bureaucrats, federal bureaucrats and political appointees claimed that 90-95% of grants 
were allocated because of technocratic considerations, rather than for political reasons. 
This estimate reflects the results reported from the systematic data analysis in previous 
chapters.  
 Despite an institutional framework that either allowed political actors to 
determine outcomes or at least internalize into the system specific preferences, those who 
I interviewed believed that need was being met by the assistance they could provide. In 
fact, the focus on both need and the ability to help emerged as a driving force the in the 
work ethic of respondents. Their jobs were not carried out with a mechanized, 
stereotypically bureaucratic, faceless monotony. Instead, these respondents saw the 
human aspect of their work, realizing that, in most cases, their decisions affected the lives 
of Americans. In this way, respondents clearly understood that need—sometimes serious 
or dire need—existed and that the federal government was charged with helping citizens. 
However, because government was called upon to act, so, too, was politics. This 
perspective was nearly universal despite diversity among interviewees. I interviewed 
individuals at the start and nearing the end of their careers, young and old, Democrat and 
Republican, liberal and conservative and found a general uniformity in this viewpoint, 
despite expected differences.
128
 
 In an effort to meet need and be increasingly effective as policy makers, 
respondents also demonstrated bureaucratic innovation—a concept often deemed 
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many volunteered that information during the course of the interview or it was easily observable based on 
responses.  
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paradoxical. A senior career official in a federal agency explained in an effort to meet 
growing and changing needs, her agency has a constant focus on modifying program 
details to reflect these changes. She describes this process not as an internal, 
administrative effort, but one that integrates staff, policy experts, prospective applicants, 
and key stakeholders in the community. The goal is to get the program “right” in the 
sense that it effectively meets the needs of the policy community. 
 Another senior career official in the federal government detailed similar processes 
in his agency. He explained that previously, allocations were made on a first-come, first-
served basis. However, it became clear over time that this procedure helps states that are 
more efficient in applying for funds—a characteristic not necessarily correlated with 
need. The program was eventually redesigned in an effort to level the playing field and 
serve those in greatest need. This respondent further explained that short term events can 
also lead to short term need-based responses. He noted that the economic recession 
placed greater need on his agency (and many others) but was not accompanied with 
increases in appropriations. Rather than staying the course, he and his colleagues worked 
actively to modify programs in an effort to help more people in a more effective way. 
This process revealed a responsive and responsible aspect of discretionary programs. 
While the malleability of programs can and are exploited for political purposes, it can 
also be used to help those facing hardship. 
 Beyond the efforts of individuals in the Washington, DC, offices of federal 
agencies, the focus on the apolitical nature of the federal grants process extends. Officials 
on the ground and in the field constantly work to understand local need, changes in that 
need, and the ways in which agencies can respond. The network of policy makers 
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includes a web of contact among federal and state government officials and interest 
groups nationally and locally to try to stay informed as to citizen need. 
 An interest group official at the state office of a national organization explained 
that he and his colleagues go into communities to help information about funding 
opportunities and even help individuals with grant preparation. He explained that some 
applicants truly struggle to prepare materials for grants. However, his organization’s 
expertise and experience with a process that can be complex and at the mercy of informal 
criteria can help deliver increased grant funds to those in need.  
 This approach of responding to and meeting local need drives the behaviors of 
those at subnational offices of federal agencies—even at the appointee level. An 
interview with one such appointee revealed that a large part of his job involves holding 
(or being invited to) town hall meetings in which he and his staff mount an information 
campaign to spread the word about relevant funding opportunities. He also explained that 
he and his staff recognize a serious problem in the grants process involving applicants. 
Those applying for funds were typically struggling with need or faced enormous time 
constraints as they seek to deal with such need. As a result, prospective applicants often 
had limited time and training to complete what had become onerous amounts of 
paperwork to apply for funds.  
 The solution that his office implemented was two-fold. First, they worked to 
streamline the application process to make it less intimidating for prospective applicants. 
Second, in addition to making staff available to help with grant preparation, they also 
modified the evaluation process to take into account resource limitations among 
applicants. This change allowed staff to meet the needs of applicants based not on the 
235 
 
perfection of a grant proposal but by a thorough identification of real need. What this 
discussion revealed was that a political appointee—one who acknowledged that political 
demands enter the policy process and influence outcomes—still saw his role as an 
assistance provider to the community, and despite serving at the pleasure of the president, 
he worked to assist communities and provide public goods.  
 There is no doubt that presidential politics plays an influential role in the 
distribution of federal grants. Although this dissertation focuses on the political and 
electoral forces that affect fund allocations, it must be noted that the system is not purely 
political, stripped of technocratic and need-based considerations. Instead, bureaucrats at 
the state and federal levels, interest group officials, and even political appointees 
understand that while political principals must be satisfied, the core part of the policy 
process involves service to the public.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 In this chapter, I offer a textured look at the federal grants process and illustrate 
decision making structures, loci of power, and mechanisms of influence. To accomplish 
this empirical effort, I employ elite interviews and design an across-group diversified 
sample that includes federal and state bureaucrats and interest group officials to probe 
political and electoral influence over distributive public policy. These interviews 
demonstrate how presidents are able to affect federal grant policy in a substantial way. 
Unlike common perceptions of presidential power that focus on broad-based authority 
over macro-policy issues, this chapter illuminates the mechanisms by which presidents 
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influence policy at the micro-level. Moreover, this chapter shows that in the context of 
distributive public policy, electoral considerations drive both presidential preferences and 
bureaucratic outcomes.  
 Often there exist competing views of political influence in policy making. These 
views disagree over the source of such influence (the president or Congress) as well as 
whether influence is direct (through decision making) or indirect (through efforts like the 
application of political pressure). This chapter shows that none of these explanations is 
false. Instead, they are a radically incomplete accounting of the realities and complexities 
of policy influence and political control. These views miss a tremendous amount of detail 
regarding how politics works in administrative process. This chapter offers a detailed 
look at this process, demonstrating how presidents effectively control even minor details 
of policy making within a burgeoning central government. Moreover, this analysis helps 
explain why scholars and observers of the executive branch often mischaracterize or 
underestimate the role of the election driven president in manipulating policy. The often 
opaque or hidden and always strategic approach of presidents and their surrogates ensures 
that this influence lacks transparency and that only (and particularly) the outcomes are for 
public consumption. 
 The federal grants process is a complex, diverse, multi-stage process that affords 
political actors in both the executive and legislative branches specific and unique 
opportunities to influence outcomes. Presidents rely substantially on political appointees 
and the Office of Management and Budget to affect policy in key ways. They tightly 
control information environments within federal agencies. While OMB functions as a 
bureaucratic buffer from external political influence, appointees foster a communication 
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environment that continuously keeps bureaucratic actors informed of administration 
priorities and preferences. Additionally, political appointees and OMB affect distributive 
outcomes in indirect ways such as strategic program design and criteria creation and in 
more direct ways by institutionalizing their role in policy decision making hierarchies.  
 In the end, this chapter provides insight into the black box of the bureaucracy. It 
identifies the key mechanisms in the policy process that facilitate political influence and 
control. Additionally, it illustrates how such political control can have distributional 
implications that can easily conform to political elites’ electoral interests. In so doing, a 
picture of an electorally-driven, micro-policy-oriented, highly political president becomes 
clearer, and as a result, the character, motivation, and overall scope of presidential power 
is reconceptualized. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
 
 Presidents are election driven individuals who use the formal and informal tools 
of their office to advance those interests. They engage in a basic, strategic and widely 
used behavior among elected officials: porkbarrel politics. Presidents wield extensive 
spending authority and direct federal dollars to swing states in advance of elections, as 
Swing states represent a critical constituency where presidential elections are won or lost. 
Discretionary spending power serves incumbent presidents as a campaign tool to further 
their reelection effort and the efforts of their same-party successor. 
 Presidents have the motive, means, and opportunity to engage in porkbarrel 
politics. However, political scientists often view such behaviors as beneath or beyond the 
president and as an exclusive political tool of legislative actors. Because of Congress’ 
role as chief appropriator and Members’ manageable constituencies, the literature focuses 
on their desire and ability to target funds in strategic ways. In a similar way, presidents 
capitalize on delegated spending power to motivate a broad bureaucracy to be responsive 
to his electoral interests. White House officials, the Office of Management and Budget, 
and political appointees serve as an army of responsive surrogates using leadership 
positions to ensure policy outcomes reflect presidential preferences. These political actors 
use a host of tools and mechanisms to assist the president’s penchant for pork. These 
include direct efforts such as distributive intervention, budgetary oversight, and personnel 
politicization as well as informal means such as the manipulation of funding criteria, 
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strategic design of grant programs, and the application of political pressure. What results 
is a complex system of political tools that empower presidents to behave in electorally 
strategic ways. 
 This project illustrates the comprehensive and successful efforts presidents mount 
in order to achieve electorally-strategic policy responsiveness from their administrations. 
This work rests on two claims that challenge standard research on the presidency. First, 
presidents are primarily election-driven individuals. This view challenges arguments that 
such motives are ancillary or non-existent. Second, presidents are able to influence and 
determine policy even at the micro-level in a more effective way than Congress. This 
perspective insists upon a re-examination of theories of presidential behavior and 
demonstrates the significant distributional consequences when presidential electoral 
interests drive policy administration. 
 
What We Know: The Effects of Electorally Strategic Policymaking 
 
And if the president ends up with total discretion over spending, we will 
see even more clearly where his priorities lie. 
 –Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) November 15, 2010 
 It is well understood among the Washington establishment that presidential 
spending authority is a critical power that allows the White House to generate policy that 
will deliver political and electoral benefits. In many ways, Congress delegates this 
authority out of necessity because it is resource constrained from implementing policy 
and in so doing, offers the president a critical political and electoral tool. This dissertation 
provides answers to several basic questions about presidential policy making in this 
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arena. First, do presidential electoral interests motivate public policy outcomes? Second, 
what tools do presidents have to induce responsiveness from a burgeoning bureaucracy? 
Third, what are the policy implications of an electorally strategic administration of 
policy? 
 Discretionary grants provide an ideal context for testing theories of presidential 
policymaking and electoral behavior. This area of spending totals approximately $100 
billion dollars each year, and the executive branch wields broad discretion regarding the 
design of programs, recipient eligibility, allocation criteria, and eventually distribution. I 
capitalize on this area of federal spending to show that presidential electoral preferences 
substantially influence both where and when these funds are distributed.  
 Electoral strategy for presidents centers on swing states. Every election cycle a 
cohort of states—some new, some seemingly perpetual—composes this critical 
constituency. Because of demographic and political forces within these states, their 
electoral outcomes are uncertain. It is in these states that presidential candidates wage the 
fiercest campaign wars, spending millions (now hundreds of millions) of dollars on 
advertising, rallies, campaign visits, get out the vote efforts, and staff organization. 
Incumbent presidents have an additional tool of campaign resources to target to swing 
states: federal grants. Citizens and organizations within swing states receive hundreds of 
millions of additional grant dollars every year, simply because of their states’ electoral 
competitiveness. As a presidential election draws near, this swing state-focused spending 
increases dramatically, delivering additional funds to these key constituencies. 
 One concern in studying the presidential porkbarrel involves evaluating how one 
individual’s preferences influence a plethora of policy outcomes even at the micro- or 
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individual-level. Because of concerns over agency drift and monitoring, how do 
presidents command broad electoral responsiveness? In the context of the presidential 
porkbarrel, the chief executive has several tools at his disposal. In fact, straightforward, 
well-publicized, easily interpreted presidential electoral preferences assist this endeavor 
by reducing the chance of agency loss due to incomplete information. In some complex 
areas of policy, difficulties can exist in conveying preferences and goals from the White 
House throughout the broad bureaucracy. However, for distributive policy, 
communicating preferences about key states is simple. 
 Although preferences are straightforward, which tools allow presidents to have an 
impact on such a broad set of policy decisions? Such an answer is far more complex 
because of presidents’ range of options in the context of federal spending. First, 
presidents can use political appointees in a wide variety of highly effective capacities. 
Appointees influence policy administration in a host of ways, and in terms of the political 
and electoral manipulation of fund distribution, numerous opportunities for influence 
exist. Appointees can position themselves to have direct decision making authority over 
distribution, essentially serving as gatekeepers for grant allocations. However, there are 
more subtle ways in which these hand-picked agency leaders can affect outcomes. They 
can foster an environment of intense political pressure where expectations regarding the 
behavior of civil servants are clear and controlling, and civil servants benefit from 
responsive behavior that avoids the negative consequences of that environment. 
Appointees can also affect internal administrative procedures and processes in ways that 
can facilitate political control and maximize presidential influence. In the context of 
federal grant programs, appointees and even the Office of Management and Budget (and 
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its appointees) can predetermine or at least powerfully influence outcomes by 
manipulating eligibility requirements, grant criteria, approval procedures, scoring or 
evaluation rubrics, and even through choosing who and by what process applications are 
evaluated. Each of these efforts can affect outcomes in various ways and are selected 
according to their effectiveness in a given context, policy area or agency.  
 Additionally, while the administration of policy in the executive branch involves 
thousands of decisions each day, it is clear from this project that presidents consider the 
distribution of federal funds to be particularly important—given its electoral efficacy. To 
maintain an impact in this area, presidents ensure that key personnel not only reflect and 
are willing to support his interest, but that those individuals serve in critical decision 
making roles in the policy process. Specifically, presidents make sure that political 
appointees have characteristics that are likely to generate responsiveness. Appointees 
have more political experience and are ideologically aligned with the president. They act 
as surrogates of the president’s political and electoral interests and of information he 
finds critical to the administration of policy. Making sure that appointees “look the part” 
or have the traits presidents find important is a basic story of politicization that the 
literature has described effectively. However, this project shows that when politicizing 
personnel, presidents take a keen interest in officials with distributive authority. Because 
distributors can deliver key electoral benefits, presidents ensure these individuals embody 
qualities that make them amenable to playing electoral politics with policy. In a direct 
way, this suggests that personnel politicization is a form of “electorization” in the context 
of administration posts with spending authority. Presidents are electorally strategic and 
desire their surrogates to be, too.  
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 This project also illustrates that the election-driven interest in distributors extends 
beyond political appointees and into the civil service, as well. Distributors are likely to be 
recruited by high level agency officials and are subject to greater dissatisfaction with the 
actions of political actors in an administration. The result is a personnel system for 
federal fund distribution that is powerfully politicized to induce responsiveness to 
presidential electoral interests. 
 Presidents are broadly effective at using their spending authority and power over 
bureaucratic processes to engage in porkbarrel politics. However, this electorally-
strategic policy control is not uniform across the executive branch. Instead, specific 
institutional designs condition presidential control and policy responsiveness to electoral 
interests. This project offers broad support for the idea that designing federal agencies 
with commission structures—fixed and staggered terms, parity requirements, reduced 
regulatory review, etc.—serves as an effective means of buffering presidential control. 
Broadly, presidents are unable to induce policy responsiveness to his electoral interests 
from independent commissions.
129
 Congress structures commissions for the purpose of 
limiting presidential control over policy, and this project shows that the additional 
legislative benefit of such design is a constraint on the president’s ability to engage in 
porkbarrel politics. For Congress, however, this effort comes at a cost. Unlike in other 
agencies, commissions also fail to provide benefits to key legislative constituencies.  
 Commission structure is not the only way in which presidential power over pork 
can be limited, however. Whereas responsiveness to presidential electoral interests is 
ubiquitous in cabinet agencies, it is conditional in independent agencies. In these 
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processes at the National Science Foundation. This institution is widely regarded as evaluating proposals 
based on scientific quality, rather than political considerations. 
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moderately insulated institutions, presidents require higher levels of politicization in 
order to induce responsiveness. In independent agencies with a lower saturation of 
political appointees, presidents are less able to target funds to swing states. Despite these 
structural constraints on presidential power, the ability of presidents to engage in 
porkbarrel politics remains robust and profound. While independent commissions and 
some independent agencies can resist his spending preferences, the large majority of 
federal funds flow through and from agencies in which presidential influence is 
pervasive, ensuring that these limitations are only marginally limiting. 
 A unique contribution of this research is that it illustrates the power of the 
executive branch and specifically presidential preferences in an area widely believed to 
be the purview of Congress. Moreover, the behaviors discussed in this dissertation—
strategically manipulating the distribution of funds for electoral gain—is a behavior 
commonly associated with legislative actors. However, this project effectively 
demonstrates that presidents, facing the same electoral motivations, behave in a manner 
similar to Members of Congress. Despite these claims, this dissertation does not suggest 
that Congress is powerless to influence funds. While outlining the importance of 
presidential influence over federal grants, I have evaluated the influence of the legislative 
branch in the process. In some settings legislative power is severely limited. This reduced 
Congressional role is attributable to the area of spending under analysis. By focusing on 
discretionary spending power, I purposefully examine funding for which Congress has 
delegated powers—essentially choosing to have a reduced role in distributive decisions. 
At the same time, delegation does not strip Congress of power entirely. Congress—even 
in the context of distributive spending—can impose some constraints on the executive 
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branch and retain some level of legislative influence.
130
 Additionally, because this 
spending authority depends on an express transfer of power from the legislative branch to 
the executive, presidents will seek to keep Congress happy in order to preserve this 
possibly precarious discretionary relationship. For these reasons, Congress can continue 
to have an effect, and this project suggests that it does. Congressional appropriators fare 
well in the distribution of discretionary grants. A state’s representation on the Senate 
Appropriations Committee translates into additional benefits for those constituents.  
 The agency-level analysis in this project allows for an even more nuanced 
examination of the Congressional role and offers broad support for the idea that 
legislative benefits in federal grant allocations arise from strategic presidential 
intervention, rather than from Congressional efforts. I demonstrate that beyond simple 
membership on the Senate Appropriations Committee, legislative benefits are targeted to 
a subset of legislative officeholders: members of the relevant House and Senate 
Appropriations subcommittees that oversee those agencies. The executive branch enjoys 
and capitalizes upon discretionary spending authority for its own electoral benefit. 
However, the president realizes that Congress giveth and Congress taketh away. 
Presidents know their ability to engage in porkbarrel politics largely depends on 
delegation, and to preserve this power, they ensure that the Congressional actors most 
directly charged with determining discretion benefit from pork, as well. Moreover, none 
of the other measures of legislative interests—institutional, political, or electoral—
influence the distribution of grants. If Congress were more directly involved in the 
distribution of funds, it would certainly provide benefits to other key legislative 
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constituencies. The results of this project support the notion that presidential strategy, 
centered on the strategic use of pork and the preservation of the authority to do the same, 
drives them to direct funds to key legislative interests.  
 Presidents capitalize on their spending authority to use large portions of the 
federal largesse as a campaign war chest. They advance their electoral interests and 
influence policy outcomes through personnel, process, and placation. Presidents are able 
to select political appointees and even civil servants based on criteria that make them 
more likely to be responsive to their political and electoral goals. The White House 
positions these actors in key decision making roles, particularly if they have distributive 
authority. There is a conscious awareness within an administration that distributors can 
provide important electoral benefits, and staffing these positions becomes a careful 
practice. In addition, presidents and their surrogates also influence administrative 
processes to induce responsiveness. They empower political actors to design programs 
and program details in strategic ways that foster path dependency toward electoral 
benefits. Political actors also create a highly politicized administrative environment, 
particularly around distributors, that ensures that information flowing into and out of 
agencies is tightly controlled, monitored, and will facilitate presidential electoral goals. 
Last, in order to preserve this spending authority presidents seek to placate Congressional 
appropriators who deliver discretionary power to the executive branch. Although 
presidents enjoy the ability to manipulate the delivery of federal funds, this power is not 
organic or formal, but delegated. To ensure that this critical electoral tool remains in the 
presidential quiver, agencies target funds to these key legislative constituencies, 
satisfying the political appetites at each end of Pennsylvania Avenue. 
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What We Think: A Re-examination of Presidential Behavior 
 
Presidential Motives and Incentives 
 Sidney Blumenthal was right. In 1992, he explained that presidents face the 
Permanent Campaign. As quickly as presidents finish their inaugural address, step inside 
from the West Front of the Capitol Building, and submit their first nominations to the US 
Senate, they begin running for reelection. Presidents face the permanent campaign and 
distinguish themselves as consummate campaigners. They devote extensive staff, time, 
planning, strategy and resources to reelection and the election of their same-party 
successor. However, many scholars view the president as differently focused. Whereas 
there exists little debate about the legislative obsession with electoral goals, presidents 
are seen as unique, national actors who behave in fundamentally different ways than 
Members of Congress. Rather than president-as-politician, the literature often describes 
the “national” president with a unique vantage point in the American political system and 
policy making arena.  
 This narrow and misguided view of the unique, “national” president emerges from 
four assumptions about presidential behavior that fail to withstand theoretical (and as is 
demonstrated in this project, empirical) scrutiny. Scholars argue first that presidents as 
the only nationally elected official face a national constituency. Second, the 22
nd
 
Amendment to the Constitution, instituting presidential term limits, ensures that the 
electoral interest dissipates in a president’s second term. Third, even in one’s first term, 
the electoral motive takes a backseat to interests like legacy, broad-based policy 
initiatives, and institutional power. Fourth, presidents are resource constrained from 
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engaging micro-level policy because of their unitary nature atop a burgeoning branch of 
government.  
 This project shows that the reality of presidential politics is much different than 
this standard view. The nearly unobstructed focus on swing states ensures that 
presidential constituencies are substantially smaller than national and the institutional 
design of the Electoral College requires presidents to think differently about their 
constituency and the ways in which they can connect to it. Furthermore, presidents have 
legitimate, vested interests in seeing their party retain control of the White House even 
after term limits bar the sitting president from seeking reelection. Presidents work to 
maintain their party’s support nationally and prop up the standard bearer nominated to 
succeed him. The 22
nd
 Amendment does not nullify presidential electoral interests; it 
simply redirects them. Next, it is certain that presidents have a host of motives, but like 
any elected official, presidents first require electoral success as a necessary condition for 
pursuing any other goals. Legacy, institutional power, and policy influence require 
success at the ballot box, and as such, presidents must be primarily driven by electoral 
interests. Finally, the view of the resource-constrained president stands contrary to the 
expansive work on the institutional presidency. Presidents, though the singular elected 
official in the executive branch (save the vice president), operate as leader of a complex 
and expansive network of appointees who brandish a combination of political finesse and 
policy expertise. This army of responsive actors empowers presidents not simply to 
realize their preferences through broad-based policy, but to make certain their interests 
permeate policy formation and outcomes at all levels. 
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 This theoretical discussion and the subsequent empirical support demonstrate that 
scholars of the presidency must move away from the view of the president as a unique, 
national actor too busy or disinterested to engage in common political and electoral 
behaviors. Instead, the role of electoral interests is critical in evaluating presidential 
behavior. The electoral incentive is not a minor White House consideration, nor an 
interest that ebbs with reelection. Instead, like Members of Congress, presidents are 
politicians who use the powers of the office to manipulate policy to advance their goals in 
the electoral arena. Particularly in the context of a common electoral behavior—
porkbarrel politicking—presidents are uniquely positioned, substantially empowered, and 
fiscally endowed to direct enormous sums of federal money to key constituencies at 
critical times. Presidential behavior is election-centered and constituency-oriented and 
employs the profound resources of the executive branch to affect policy at all levels.   
 
The Effect of Electoral Institutions on Presidential Incentives 
 The institutional design of the Electoral College drives presidential incentives 
over policy making. The Electoral College requires that presidents be chosen not by a 
national plebisicite—an institutional structure that could induce a more universal-policy-
oriented chief executive. Instead, presidents face a series of 50 state-level elections. For 
many of these races, no level of campaigning will affect electoral outcomes. The 
president’s party identification will be the sole determining factor in whether he wins 
many states. However, for a subset of states, electoral competitiveness is intense, as 
outcomes are not only uncertain but malleable. 
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 The competitiveness of a small subset of states makes the presidential electoral 
constituency manageable in size. Rather than appealing to a constituency of 300 million 
Americans, presidents are able to focus their efforts and resources in swing states. It is 
this reduced constituency that empowers and facilitates presidential porkbarrel politics. 
Additionally, an evaluation of state electoral competitiveness is available immediately 
after a presidential election, and if needed, it can be updated as often as is necessary 
given advances in political polling. Preferences over how to expend resources or design 
policy to reward constituencies is easily conveyed to agents and makes inducing 
responsiveness within the bureaucracy easier through clearly and universally understood 
information. In this way, the competitiveness of swing states provides straightforward 
instructions to presidents and their surrogates on how to maximize the impact of policy 
and distributive decisions for electoral gain. 
 The Electoral College also provides insight into the nature of porkbarrel spending 
in presidential politics and engages a central debate in the study of distributive politics. 
Scholars of the topic often clash over the proper constituency that elected officials should 
target with government revenue. The conflict, often labeled the swing vs. core debate, 
centers on the effectiveness of targeting funds to marginal voters in an effort to change 
minds or base voters in an effort to stimulate turnout. In the legislative arena this debate 
continues to generate substantial theoretical and empirical scholarship. However, in the 
context of presidential politics, the design of the Electoral College provides an easy 
solution to an often complex theoretical issue. Clearly, funneling government revenue (or 
campaign time, energy, and resources) to core states will offer the president no marginal 
benefit. A Democratic president who purchases advertising time or targets federal grant 
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allocations to the Baltimore media market will win Maryland’s 10 electoral votes. 
However, a Democratic president is just as likely to win those 10 electoral votes without 
that resource expenditure. Essentially, targeting funds to core presidential constituencies 
has no payoff because regardless of whether a candidate wins a state by 1% or 70%, he 
receives the same electoral benefit: that state’s electoral votes. Instead, a president must 
(and does) focus energy, resources, and porkbarrel spending to swing states with the hope 
that those expenditures will move electoral votes from his opponent’s column to his own. 
 The result of this evaluation of presidential elections and the impact of the 
Electoral College system is support for the swing hypothesis at the interstate level. 
However, this perspective does not settle questions of effective presidential campaign 
resource targeting at the intrastate level. When a campaign targets funds to a swing state, 
where are those funds directed within that state? Some evidence suggests that those funds 
are (and should be) targeted to core constituencies. This project is silent on this point, as 
the unit of analysis (the state) cannot provide an effective empirical evaluation of such a 
question. Yet, from a theoretical perspective, the targeting of core voters within swing 
states has merit. In the aggregate, presidential elections strive not for turnout, but for the 
strategic combination of state-level successes to total 270 electoral votes. However, at the 
state-level, campaigns focus tremendous time turning out core constituencies in an effort 
to affect the final vote tally in that state. Democratic candidates rely on public employee 
unions, conservation groups, college organizations, and women’s rights advocacy groups 
to turn out their voters to support the party’s standard bearer. Republican candidates rely 
on church groups, family values organizations, chambers of commerce and groups 
focused on individual liberties and federalism to generate enthusiasm among their 
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members and sympathizers. Bringing higher numbers of partisans to the polls within 
swing states may be the key to winning not just the state but the day.  
 The Electoral College may institutionalize a unique and somewhat schizophrenic 
campaign focus for presidents. It may induce presidents to implement an interstate swing 
strategy and an intrastate core strategy in order to maximize effectiveness. This 
dissertation has provided substantial evidence that swing states benefit significantly when 
strategic presidents seek to advance their own electoral interests. However, more work 
should and must be done in order to evaluate more comprehensively presidential strategy. 
By examining in a systematic way presidential resource strategy, research can offer a 
complete view of presidential electoral behavior both across and within states. 
 
Federal Spending Power in Other Areas 
 The executive branch allocates approximately $100 billion dollars in discretionary 
federal grants annually, offering presidents substantial resources to target to key 
constituencies. The analysis of these grants provides an ideal setting for assessing 
questions of presidential power and electoral interests, political control, and the 
president’s role in public policy. However, the focus on federal grants in this project 
demonstrates one part of a broad area of presidential power: spending authority. 
Discretionary spending authority offers presidents substantial influence in the policy 
process and extends far beyond grants. Contracts and procurement, licenses, cooperative 
agreements, and government insurance provide presidents a host of other opportunities to 
affect distributive outcomes. The focus on a singular area of presidential spending power 
allows for a detailed, systematic and nuanced analysis of the people and processes that 
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define and determine policy outcomes. This project has offered such analysis for grants 
and provides insights that likely extend to the other areas of discretionary authority.  
 Other research can extend this analysis by applying the same or similar questions 
to other areas of spending. Such analysis will provide important information regarding 
presidential power. Similar findings that suggest that presidential electoral interests 
influence the distribution of funding sources such as cooperative agreements or contracts 
will illustrate the broad scope of presidential porkbarrel politics. If such behavior extends 
across discretionary spending areas it would demonstrate that the federal funds available 
to presidential campaigns are greater than what this project shows. Alternatively, if the 
electorally strategic allocation of federal funds is restricted to grant distribution, it will 
facilitate another important avenue of research into presidential policy power and 
administrative control. Such a finding would suggest that the ability to exploit 
discretionary authority for electoral gain is not uniform. Instead, some intervening 
factor(s) condition presidential power or incentives. Understanding how differences in 
personnel and processes across these spending areas affect outcomes will shed greater 
light on which bureaucratic structures and policy making procedures condition 
presidential spending power. This project provides evidence of such conditionality within 
one area of spending, but the analysis can be improved through an extension into other 
areas. 
 
What Can Be Done: The Policy Implications of Presidential Pork 
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The Positives and Negatives of Presidential Pork  
 One question that naturally arises from the study of political influence over public 
policy involves the normative implications of such behaviors. Presidents systematically 
manipulate the distribution of federal funds in order to advance their electoral interests. In 
so doing, they target large sums of federal grant dollars to swing states at the expense of 
other states—a behavior robust across political parties and over time. The result is a 
geographic bias in the allocation of government revenue which advantages certain 
Americans simply by virtue of the state in which they reside or the proximity to a 
presidential election. Is such political manipulation of public policy detrimental to the 
administration of government and citizens’ equitable access to relief?  
 To evaluate the normative effects of this funding schema, it is critical to put 
distributive influence into context. This project illustrates clearly the ways in which 
presidents divert funds to swing states at key times. However, presidents do not pull 
money from needy constituencies, citizens, and groups and redirect them toward groups 
with abundant resources. Such a scenario would not only be a failure of policy, but a 
failure of the moral intent of federal assistance. In reality, the president’s strategic efforts 
to influence fund allocations are aided by copious need and limited resources. Almost 
universally, citizen and group demand far outpaces the supply of funds in grant programs. 
As a result, even the most scientific, need-based, automatic, apolitical allocation of 
federal funds will result in some needy applicants being denied assistance. For example, 
for a Department of Energy grant program intended to assist low income families in 
making energy efficient improvements to their homes, widespread need exists. Families 
in Wisconsin may be just as needy as families in North Dakota for improvements that 
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allow homes to withstand the Upper-Midwest winters. Yet, not all need across or within 
these states will be met. There may only be enough funding to help 25% of those who can 
use such assistance. Appropriations determine the level of unmet need, not presidential or 
executive branch behavior. Instead, presidential politics determines the allocation of that 
unmet need. 
 The effects of political (or electoral) influence exist at the margins. Some amount 
of funds is allocated without absolute regard for need. In the Energy Department 
example, some families in Wisconsin with slightly less need may receive funds instead of 
certain North Dakotans with slightly more need. In this way, some of the unmet need is 
shifted from Wisconsin to North Dakota. However, what the system does not involve is a 
perverse means of distribution where wealthy Wisconsinites see subsidies while 
impoverished North Dakotans suffer. The marginal impact of presidential electoral 
interests ensures that outcomes generally reflect need while still preventing serious policy 
failure.  
 In an ideal setting, federal funds would be allocated strictly based on need and the 
likelihood of achieving program goals. If a federal program has 1,000 grants to give out, 
the 1,000 neediest individuals would receive funds, regardless of their residency in a 
swing state, representation in Congress, or gubernatorial partisanship. However, policy in 
the United States is developed, designed, approved, and implemented in a political 
system. It should come as no surprise that political values and interests affect outcomes. 
In fact, one means of policy accountability is through politicization. By empowering 
elected officials to participate in all stages of the policy process, it allows voters to blame 
or reward individuals for failure or success. The political nature of the system 
256 
 
institutionalizes a form of democratic values and accountability that could be lost in one 
devoid of politics and the influence of political actors. In this way, political influence, as 
described throughout this project, is a consequence of the design of the American system. 
Yet, that consequence of design should not be conflated with a mistake or an error.  
 Taken to its logical extreme, presidential electoral interest in the distribution of 
federal funds could result in profound policy failure. If all $100 billion dollars in annual 
discretionary federal grants were directed to Ohio, Florida, New Hampshire, 
Pennsylvania, Virginia, and a few other highly competitive states, many citizens would 
suffer as need went grossly unmet. However, under this scenario institutional 
mechanisms in the democratic process could respond to such behaviors. Congress could 
redesign federal spending programs to restrict presidential power; oversight 
investigations could be launched into every federal agency participating in such 
distribution, and even voters in states unlikely to be competitive could respond in 
presidential elections.
131
 What would result is a democratic response that penalizes such 
behaviors. Instead, presidents are generally protected from such forces through a more 
measured and marginal incorporation of electoral strategy in policy implementation.  
 That voters and other democratic institutions allow presidents to behave in this 
way suggests one of two processes is at play. First, presidents may behave in electorally 
strategic ways outside of the observations of voters and democratically elected officials. 
This scenario speaks to the measured nature of the presidential effort. If such behaviors 
led to profound misallocations of funds—particularly in system with such heavy 
                                                 
131
 While this project has capitalized on the premise that non-swing states’ electoral outcomes are foregone 
conclusions in the presidential arena, such a claim may not be the case in the face of a profound abuse of 
office for electoral gain—particularly among states who are victimized by it. However, beyond the 
presidential general election, voters could rise up during the primary process to penalize incumbent 
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oversight and reporting requirements and one in which data on federal fund distribution 
are public—these individuals and institutions would take note. The ability of presidents 
to behave in such ways without detection speaks not to the imperceptible nature of such 
behaviors, but rather the generally innocuous nature of this influence.  
 Second, the undetectable influence hypothesis could explain the president’s 
ability to affect federal fund allocations; however, it is unlikely. Media and other political 
elites are well aware that executive branch spending powers are used for political and 
electoral gain—even if the details of such behaviors are assumed rather than concretely 
known. Voters also expect politicians to use their power and authority for such gain. As a 
result, another idea may explain why presidents are effective at engaging in porkbarrel 
politics without a democratic response. Citizens and other elected officials may be 
comfortable with this presidential behavior and by failing to respond, tacitly approve of 
it. Under this explanation, the threat or risk of democratic response exists, as relevant 
actors are aware that presidents use federal funds as electoral tools. However, what keeps 
at bay a public demonstration against such actions is a tempered use of the presidential 
porkbarrel. So long as presidents affect grant allocations at the margins and need is 
generally being met (given resource constraints), this type of presidential behavior will be 
(and is) allowed to continue. 
 
Addressing Presidential Influence 
 If this presidential behavior is considered a normative ill in the system, how could 
policy changes reform the process? To affect presidential behavior—specifically the 
influence over federal fund distribution for electoral gain—either presidential powers or 
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incentives must be manipulated. Policies and/or institutional reforms can be enacted that 
induce different behaviors and ultimately influence the nature of distributive outcomes. 
However, in evaluating any of these systemic changes, it is vital to assess the likelihood 
of such change as well as their consequences. 
i. Limiting Discretion 
 The president’s ability to influence the distribution of federal funds depends 
centrally on discretionary spending authority. This power, delegated from Congress, 
allows the executive branch to make allocation decisions over large sums of federal 
dollars. One means of limiting presidential influence in this area is through the restriction 
of discretion. Restricting distributive discretion withdraws from the executive branch the 
authority to design programs, criteria, and evaluation procedures as well as the power to 
make allocation decisions. By reducing discretion, Congress retains power over these 
facets of the funding process. 
 The Congressional restriction of distributive discretion is an unlikely scenario, 
however, for two reasons. First, presidents are not passive recipients of policy discretion. 
As a key player in the legislative process, presidents use discretion as a bargaining chip 
with which they negotiate in exchange for his signature. Because of the executive’s role 
in the creation and approval of legislation, Congress cannot simply reduce discretion 
unilaterally. In the context of  spending power and its associated electoral benefits, 
presidents should be particularly territorial over such discretionary authority and resist 
any Congressional effort to retain that power.  
 Additionally, Congress may not want to retain the spending authority it typically 
delegates to the executive. Discretion is critical for Congress, serving as a time saving 
device and institutional response to the legislative branch’s limited capacity. Powers are 
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delegated to the executive because Congress lacks the time, staff, and expertise to codify 
funding procedures for all types of federal spending. Even Congressional time saving 
devices for federal spending, such as the creation of formula and block grant programs, 
require extensive, internal negotiation—a task that would become unwieldy in the 
aggregate. As a result, while the delegation of spending authority empowers presidents to 
use funds in electorally strategic ways, it also serves to benefit Congress.  
 Even if the president were to accept the restriction of discretion and Congress 
could effectively handle the dramatic increases in policy making and legislative resource 
burdens, such a change would be ineffective at removing politics from policy. Rather 
than depoliticizing federal fund distribution, the restriction of discretion would simply 
redirect that political influence. The president would no longer be able to target funds to 
swing states. However, the result would be Congress directing federal dollars to key 
legislative constituencies. The literature on distributive politics describes the manner in 
which legislative interests influence allocations and which characteristics will induce 
greater funding (i.e., seniority, partisanship, committee assignment, electoral 
vulnerability). In fact, research by Frances Lee and Bruce Oppenheimer demonstrates 
that when designing legislative formulas, states with the smallest populations receive the 
greatest benefit, as a low cost way of gaining Senators’ support. Under such a scenario, 
smaller populations receive disproportionate benefits because of (Congressional) political 
influence. In the context of presidential interests, larger portions of the American public 
live in targeted areas (swing states) and can benefit from such influence.
132
 As a result, 
restricting discretion, while institutionally unlikely, will also do little to strip politics from 
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federal fund allocations. It simply empowers a different branch, composed of a higher 
number of elected officials, to make distributive decisions. 
ii. Insulating away Influence 
 Another possible proposal to limit presidential electoral influence over the 
distribution of funds involves insulating bureaucratic institutions. The empirical evidence 
presented in this dissertation illustrates that insulated administrative design can 
effectively limit presidential power. Specifically, independent agencies with lower levels 
of politicization and independent commissions render presidents unable to extract 
distributive benefits in an effort to advance their electoral interests. New agencies can be 
designed with commission structures including fixed and staggered terms for 
commissioners and party balancing requirements (among other traits). Alternatively, new 
independent agencies can be crated with a restricted number of political appointees 
relative to staff size. Additionally, existing cabinet agencies can be redesigned in order to 
reflect those same characteristics. Such institutional reforms would give agencies the 
structural characteristics that this dissertation confirms will limit the influence of the 
president. 
 The legislative process ensures that insulating institutional reforms are 
significantly unlikely to occur. Presidents would resist such legislative efforts. Because 
the creation of new agencies and the re-design or reorganization of existing agencies 
require a presidential signature to take effect, the White House would be unlikely to 
support a dramatic curtailing of presidential power. Moreover, because such efforts 
would be aimed at limiting presidential spending authority and influence over distributive 
outcomes, presidents would be particularly resistant to restricting a power that supports a 
critical behavioral incentive: the electoral interest. As evidence of such resistance, recent 
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presidential behavior has entailed efforts aimed in the opposite direction: de-insulation. 
As mentioned previously, President George W. Bush sought greater administrative power 
during the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in 2003. In fact, part of this 
government reorganization involved transferring the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (an independent agency) to the cabinet. Additionally, President Bush sought to 
increase the number of political appointees in the new Department, rather than maintain 
or decrease that figure. In 2012, President Obama’s request for greater reorganization 
authority under the Consolidation Authority Act sought to transfer independent 
institutions including the Small Business Administration, the Export-Import Bank, the 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and US Trade and Development Agency into a 
new cabinet department. This effort seeks to remove the insulating structures of 
institutions and transfer them to the part of the executive branch in which presidents 
wield the most pervasive political and electoral influence. These recent presidential 
moves demonstrate how unlikely institutional reforms that increase insulation are to 
receive the president’s signature. 
 Although these reforms are incredibly unlikely to occur, they could be effective if 
they were implemented. The empirical evidence presented in this project suggests that 
independent commissions and less politicized independent agencies effectively buffer 
presidential influence. That is, in these institutions, presidents are generally unable to 
manipulate outcomes in order to advance their electoral interest. There is no systematic 
relationship between state electoral competitiveness and the receipt of federal grants. By 
expanding such institutional designs to a broader set of federal agencies, strategic 
presidential spending power would likely be limited.  
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 This project also shows that in more insulated federal agencies, Congressional 
influence is also restricted. The institutional, political, and electoral interests of Congress 
tend not to affect distributive outcomes in independent commissions and less politicized 
independent agencies. In fact, Congressional interests are more likely to be satisfied 
through the distribution of funds from cabinet agencies. Insulation thus creates a 
paradoxical institutional incentive for Congress. Congressional interests are advanced by 
empowering presidential control over federal fund distribution. Limiting insulation not 
only pays dividends for the election driven president, but substantially benefits legislators 
seeking greater federal funds. This incentive structure also decreases the likelihood that 
such reforms can be enacted. Surely presidents would resist efforts to insulate federal 
agencies, but the evidence presented in this dissertation suggests that Congress should 
also resist insulation.  
 Finally, insulating federal agencies from presidential influence would not 
necessarily mean that politics is wholly purged from policy making. This project tests the 
influence of presidential electoral interests (as well as a host of Congressional interests) 
in evaluating the role of politics in agency process. However, the research does not test 
the role of other political influences within independent agencies and commissions. Such 
influences such as interest group capture may play powerful roles within these 
independent institutions, and the expansion of such designs would simply expand the role 
of different forces across broader areas of policy.  
iii. Reforming the Electoral System 
 Another means of limiting presidents from targeting federal funds to swing states 
would require changing presidential incentives. This project shows that the institutional 
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design of the Electoral College induces presidents to target attention and resources to 
swing states. To stop or modify this behavior, one option is a reformation of the process 
by which presidents are selected. Various proposals exist to eliminate the Electoral 
College and replace it with a different system. Each of these will create different and 
varied incentives that will drive presidents in the quest for electoral success. Two of the 
most common proposals involve dramatic shifts in the way votes are counted. Under one, 
the Electoral College system is largely kept in place, but states apportion their votes in 
different proportional ways.
133
 Under another proposal, the presidential electoral system 
would be transformed to a national plebiscite by which the winner of the national popular 
vote is elected president.  
 The likelihood of these proposals coming to fruition is also low. The first would 
require either a constitutional amendment or broad legislative efforts at the state level. Of 
course, a constitutional amendment is an onerous process that is rarely used and is 
particularly burdensome for the purpose of reforming the political process. Additionally, 
states are unlikely to transform the manner in which their electoral votes are allocated, 
particularly if it negatively affects the party in power. For example, in the state of 
Massachusetts, Democrats frequently control a supermajority of both houses of the state 
legislature. In a related way, Massachusetts is a core Democratic state in presidential 
elections. The Democratic controlled state legislature is unlikely to reform their electoral 
vote allocation system in a way that will deliver some of those votes to a Republican 
presidential candidate. This state legislative unwillingness to reform the system similarly 
reduces the likelihood of such changes occurring through state legislation or a 
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constitutional amendment. The second type of reform—a national plebiscite—requires a 
constitutional amendment and faces the same institutional stumbling blocks for passage. 
Not only will several states be unwilling to support a constitutional amendment because it 
would empower the other party, Congress would be hesitant to report out such an 
amendment for the same reasons. Similarly, this project illustrates that swing states 
benefit from their electoral competitiveness in the distribution of funds. Rational 
legislative actors in these states would resist such reforms because it can mean a 
reduction in the level of grant funding. Beyond grant funding, such reforms would also 
entail less campaigning from presidential candidates and fewer campaign dollars flowing 
into those states. Perennial swing states should be particularly resistant to any proposal—
legislative or constitutional—that seeks to change or eliminate the Electoral College.  
 If an effort to reform the Electoral College could and did succeed, how would it 
change presidential preferences and what would be the effect on distributive policy 
outcomes? The precise effects of electoral reform would, of course, depend on the details 
of the new system. It is likely that swing states would become less of a target for 
presidential candidates. For example, if the system were transformed into a national 
plebiscite, states would no longer be the unit of focus for campaigns. Instead, campaigns 
would implement broad efforts at voter turnout—particularly among core voters. The 
focus of presidential campaigns would be to target areas which are ideologically aligned 
with the candidate’s party and his or her values. Presidential candidates may target areas 
that display more partisan homogeneity or those with higher population densities so 
messaging efforts can reach more people more efficiently. There are likely strategies to 
target key geographic constituencies that will increase the likelihood of electoral success 
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based on the institutional structure of presidential elections—however reformed. The 
result is not the removal of electoral politics from distributive policy making. Instead, 
such reforms are likely to redirect that political influence to a new set of recipients. 
Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and New Mexico will no longer be the targets of presidential 
campaigns. Instead, Republicans may target funds to Texas, Tennessee, and Louisiana, 
while Democrats target New York, New Jersey and California. Simply reforming the 
electoral system cannot ensure the removal of politics. Because electoral institutions 
influence the incentives of campaigns and candidates, presidential influence over the 
distribution of federal funds is likely an attribute of the American system that will remain 
robust through time and even in the face of institutional reforms intended to stop it. 
Presidents will remain powerful, and porkbarrel politics will continue to prevail. 
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APPENDIX D 
 
 
 
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER V 
 
This appendix serves to provide an overview and detail the methodological and 
implementation approaches to elite interviewing for this dissertation. It is divided into 
three sections: design, identification/sampling, and instrumentation. The identification 
and instrumentation sections will also provide the precise documents used in the conduct 
of each aspect of this method. As a note, while some information relevant to the 
techniques used in this project would be helpful to understand more clearly this approach, 
in some cases limited detail comes as a result of privacy restrictions implemented in 
response to the consummate expertise and unimpeachable knowledge of the Vanderbilt 
University Institutional Review Board.  
Design 
As detailed extensively in this chapter, I conducted interviews with federal agency 
employees (bureaucrats and appointees), state bureaucrats, and interest group lobbyists. 
Respondents were drawn from a series of issue areas; however, in several cases, 
interviewees across respondent types were connected by issue areas.  
In total between August 2010 and June 2011, I conducted 22 interviews, including 
nine federal agency employees, six state bureaucrats and seven interest group officials. 
Most federal agency employees worked in the central offices of agencies. However, three 
respondents (2 appointees and one careerist) worked in sub-national offices of federal 
agencies. All interest group officials (lobbyists and grant managers) worked in 
274 
 
Washington, DC, offices of their institutions’ national headquarters, with one exception. 
One interest group grant manager worked at a multi-state office of an interest group.  
Interviews at the state level included respondents from swing, core Democratic, 
and core Republican states. For all respondents, two individuals worked for their 
institution for less than one year. Seven respondents had served in their institution for 1-3 
years. Four respondents served their institution for 4-9 years. Ten respondents served 
their institution for 10+ years.  
Interviews typically lasted between 45 and 60 minutes. The shortest interview was 
30 minutes; the longest lasted just over two hours. Initially, I requested that respondents 
allow a tape recording of the interview. Very quickly, I found that most respondents were 
uncomfortable with the request, and they declined. Moreover, I found many respondents 
who declined the recording were initially more guarded in their responses. In these cases, 
as the interview proceeded the “recording-request effect” abated, and information became 
more accessible. After the fourth interview, I stopped requesting the opportunity to record 
and relied on handwritten notes. In all cases, I analyzed and clarified notes as soon as was 
possible after the interview.  
Nearly all interviews were conducted in person. Two exceptions were phone 
interviews. One respondent requested a phone interview because of serious scheduling 
conflicts. Another requested a phone interview because of weather-related issues. All 
other interviews were face-to-face. Each was conducted either in the office of the 
respondent or a nearby conference room with one exception. Because of scheduling 
conflicts, one interview began in a Starbucks restaurant and continued onto a subway 
train at the request of the respondent. Although this setting was less than ideal, I was 
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given the choice between a sub-optimally set interview or no interview. I chose the 
former. Each interview was also conducted one-on-one, with one exception. Two federal 
agency employees requested to be interviewed together. Both respondents were 
careerists, but one respondent was senior to the second. My interview request was to meet 
with the senior staffer, and given the topic (federal grants), she asked that another 
individual whose job centered on grants be present. 
All interviews were guided by a similar set of foundational questions and topics to 
be explored. The precise foundational instrumentation is provided in a later section. 
However, all interviews were open-ended and often explored other (related) topics based 
both on responses offered and the avenues that the respondent wished to explore. 
Respondents were guided back to relevant topics when the discussion became uselessly 
tangential, but generally, such tangents were uncommon. Instead, the direction 
respondents explored were sometimes unexpected revealing rich and important 
information.  
Identification/Sampling 
The identification of prospective respondents began first by using data on the 
universe of federal agencies and grant programs for this project. This list encompassed 
the institutions that allocated all federal discretionary grants between 1996 and 2008. 
During this period of time, not every agency allocated grants in every year. However, 
most agencies were consistent during this period. I did not disregard agencies that failed 
to allocated funds in every year, but all agencies identified for possible research sites 
were frequent or universal distributors. 
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I eventually narrowed a list to 12 agencies based on diversity in issue area and 
institutional location and construct. I included 10 cabinet institutions and two 
independent institutions; however, all federal agency respondents eventually hailed from 
cabinet institutions. Next, by utilizing each agency’s website and often their 
organizational chart, I was able to identify which individuals most closely dealt with 
federal discretionary grants.
134
 I contacted each prospective federal agency respondent 
through their government email address, using my own Vanderbilt University email 
address. The text of that email can be found in Figure 5.A1. 
Upon gathering responses and scheduling interviews, I next identified relevant 
interest groups that worked with federal grant issues in the agencies in which respondents 
hailed. Often, the relevant, issue-based, national interest groups were easily identifiable. 
However, in some cases, I did supporting research that used Congressional reports, 
published reports from agencies and media accounts of related stories to identify the 
relevant interest group sources. Similar to the manner in which, federal bureaucrats were 
contacted, I used staff directories available online to identify key prospective respondents 
in those organizations. I subsequently contacted each via email using language contained 
in Figure 5.A2.  
Next, I chose states that represented a diversity of backgrounds in terms of 
presidential electoral competitiveness. I utilized swing, Democratic core, and Republican 
core states.
135
 Once again, I identified state agencies that often served as issue-based 
institutional complements to the federal agencies in which interviews were to be 
                                                 
134
 In some instances, such resources were insufficient and I relied on the Federal Yellow Book. When both 
methods failed, I chose to email a career staffer most closely identifiable with federal fund distributions and 
requested the contact information of the proper individual.  
135
 Once again, per privacy restrictions required by the Vanderbilt Institutional Review Board, I am unable 
to identify which states were used. However, states were medium to small in size. 
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conducted. Using online staff directories, I was able to identify key prospective 
respondents at these state institutions who dealt most frequently with federal grant 
programs. I contacted these individuals and requested interviews via email, using 
language contained in Figure 5.A3. 
To be sure, the sampling technique in this project is purposefully non-random. 
However, the sampling did meet the goals of this project. First, within a respondent type, 
respondents dealt with different issue areas. However, across respondent types, 
respondents were frequently linked by similar policy areas in issue-based groups. Second, 
interviewees from each respondent type were sampled. Third, respondents at the state 
level were drawn from states with varied presidential electoral competitiveness.  
Instrumentation 
As mentioned previously, interviews were open-ended in nature and while they 
explored similar themes, institutional processes, and political dynamics, each played out 
very differently. I sought to explore pre-determined areas of inquiry. However, the path 
(and in some cases the ability) to explore such topics was difficult dependent on the 
respondent’s comfort and willingness to answer questions. Typically, respondents were 
quite open and forward in responses to my questions. In certain cases, it was clear when 
respondents were uncomfortable and guarded. When this occurred, the path forward 
included initial attempts at motivating answers and subsequently (when unsuccessful) 
veiling the question for use later in the interview.  
Although interviews were open-ended, the Vanderbilt University Institutional 
Review Board required and subsequently approved a set of sample questions for each 
respondent type that had to be offered and made available to each respondent. These 
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served more as a topical guide than a strict questionnaire format, as respondents often 
explored and offered insight into different, related, and important areas of inquiry. The 
sample questions are found in Figure 5.A4. 
In designing the sample interview instrument for this project, I found it was 
important to be sensitive to the institutional position of the respondent vis-à-vis the 
information being requested. For example, explicit questions about the influence of the 
White House, OMB, or political appointees may cause resistance among federal agency 
officials who may be unwilling to discuss such a topic. Similarly, for state bureaucrats 
and interest group officials, questions that probe how personal connections within the 
agency benefit their grant proposals may cause interview tension. As such, these topics 
were either delicately approached or were accessed using veiled questions. In this way, a 
federal bureaucrat may not be willing to explain that OMB can change grant allocations. 
However, that respondent may be more willing to respond to a series of questions asking 
about OMB contact, oversight, and role in decision making. Such techniques were used 
frequently during the interviews—a technique that was refined over time and with 
experience within and across interviews. They produced useful information from nearly 
every respondent, even though the means of accessing that information varied by 
respondent type and even by respondent.  
Finally, it is important to note, respondents were informed in a consent form 
(Figure 5.A5.) that they had the right to decline answering any questions. Such a decline 
to answer occurred twice over the course of all interviews and in each case reflected what 
was poor wording of a question in the context of that interview. In an effort to overcome 
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such issues, I explained to all respondents that because of a sensitivity to privacy,
136
 no 
information would be revealed in reporting results that could identify them. To clarify for 
respondents, I noted that if I were a journalist, the information would be considered for 
background or deep background and that I would simply identify their respondent type. 
Often this explanation satisfied respondents. However, on a few occasions, respondents 
requested portions of the interview be off the record. 
In the end, flexibility in instrumentation and a responsiveness to interviewees’ 
preferences or needs was the most straightforward means of accessing information. By 
relying on a foundation of topics and questions to motivate each interview as well as a 
keen awareness of topical boundaries and phrasing techniques, this portion of the project 
proved quite successful. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
136
 In reality, this came at the request of the Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board. 
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Figure 5.A1. Federal Agency Contact Letter. 
DATE 
 
Dear NAME: 
 
I am writing today to request an interview with you regarding my doctoral dissertation. I 
am writing about executive branch influence over the federal grants process and public 
policy outcomes. I am interested in how federal agencies allocate grant money. I want to 
ask you about this process in the context of your current position as a grant manager in 
the AGENCY NAME. Because of your role at AGENCY NAME, you will provide keen 
insight into the federal grants process. Political scientists know very little about the grant 
allocation mechanisms inside federal agencies and my research seeks to advance our 
understanding of this important operation of the United States government.  
 
I am currently completing my Ph.D. at Vanderbilt University in the Department of 
Political Science. This project is part of the final requirements of my degree. I have 
enclosed a short copy of my vita which tells you a little about myself.  
 
I am hoping to arrange a time to interview you in person. I will be in Washington, DC, 
from July 12
th
 to July 28
th
 and can meet with you at your place of employment at your 
convenience. I can also send you the questions in advance if you would prefer. . The 
interview will last approximately 30 minutes. During the interview you are, of course, 
free to decline to answer any questions or request that certain responses be off the record. 
In short, I am happy to make whatever arrangements that are necessary in order to get 
you to agree to the interview. 
 
If you are willing to do the interview, or would like additional information before making 
a decision please feel free to email me directly (john.hudak@vanderbilt.edu)  or call 203-
231-0287 and we can discuss arranging an interview. 
 
Thank you in advance. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
John Hudak 
 
 
John Hudak 
Ph.D. Candidate 
Department of Political Science 
Vanderbilt University 
john.hudak@vanderbilt.edu  
cell: 203.231.0287 
office: 615.322.6222 
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Figure 5.A2. Interest Group Contact Letter 
DATE 
 
Dear NAME: 
 
I am writing today to request an interview with you regarding my doctoral dissertation. I 
am writing about executive branch influence over the federal grants process and public 
policy outcomes. I am interested in how federal agencies allocate grant money. I want to 
ask you about this process in the context of your current position with the firm FIRM 
NAME. Because of your role at FIRM NAME, you will see and participate in the federal 
grants process in a unique and important way. Political scientists know very little about 
the forces and influences driving grant allocations inside federal agencies and my 
research seeks to advance our understanding of this important operation of the United 
States government.  
 
I am currently completing my Ph.D. at Vanderbilt University in the Department of 
Political Science. This project is part of the final requirements of my degree. I have 
enclosed a short copy of my vita which tells you a little about myself.  
 
I am hoping to arrange a time to interview you in person. I will be in Washington, DC, 
from July 12
th
 to July 28
th
 and can meet with you at your place of employment at your 
convenience. I can also send you the questions in advance if you would prefer. The 
interview will last approximately 30 minutes. During the interview you are, of course, 
free to decline to answer any questions or request that certain responses be off the record. 
In short, I am happy to make whatever arrangements that are necessary in order to get 
you to agree to the interview. 
 
If you are willing to do the interview, or would like additional information before making 
a decision please feel free to email me directly (john.hudak@vanderbilt.edu)  or call 203-
231-0287 and we can discuss arranging an interview. 
 
Thank you in advance. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
John Hudak 
 
 
John Hudak 
Ph.D. Candidate 
Department of Political Science 
Vanderbilt University 
john.hudak@vanderbilt.edu  
cell: 203.231.0287 
office: 615.322.6222 
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Figure 5.A3. State Agency Contact Letter 
DATE 
 
Dear NAME: 
 
I am writing today to request an interview with you regarding my doctoral dissertation. I 
am writing about executive branch influence over the federal grants process and public 
policy outcomes. I am interested in how federal agencies allocate grant money to the 
states. I want to ask you about this process in the context of your current position as a 
grant manager in the STATE AGENCY NAME. Because of your role at STATE 
AGENCY NAME, you will provide keen insight into the federal grants process as a 
recipient agency. Political scientists know very little about the grant allocation 
mechanisms inside federal agencies and my research seeks to advance our understanding 
of this important operation of the United States government.  
 
I am currently completing my Ph.D. at Vanderbilt University in the Department of 
Political Science. This project is part of the final requirements of my degree. I have 
enclosed a short copy of my vita which tells you a little about myself.  
 
I am hoping to arrange a time to interview you in person. I will be in (LOCATION), from 
DATE to DATE and can meet with you at your place of employment at your 
convenience. I can also send you the questions in advance if you would prefer. The 
interview will last about 30 minutes. During the interview you are, of course, free to 
decline to answer any questions or request that certain responses be off the record. In 
short, I am happy to make whatever arrangements that are necessary in order to get you 
to agree to the interview. 
 
If you are willing to do the interview or would like additional information before making 
a decision, please feel free to email me directly (john.hudak@vanderbilt.edu) or call 203-
231-0287 and we can discuss arranging an interview.  
 
Thank you in advance. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
John Hudak 
 
 
John Hudak 
Ph.D. Candidate 
Department of Political Science 
Vanderbilt University 
john.hudak@vanderbilt.edu  
cell: 203.231.0287 
office: 615.322.6222 
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Figure 5.A4. Sample Interview Questions for Release 
Principal Investigator: John J. Hudak      Version Date: 
04/14/2010  
Study Title: Presidential Influence over Federal Grants  
Institution/Hospital: Vanderbilt University  
 
Proposed Survey Questions for each respondent type:  
Federal Grant Managers:  
1) Please describe the processes by which grant applications move through your 
agency.  
2) Please describe your role in the grant application process.  
3) Do there exist procedures that “fast track” applications?  
4) Describe the grants process in terms of the structure of your agency.  
5) After your role, which actors process applications next?  
6) Who has final approval over grant allocations?  
7) How often are you recommendations accepted?  
8) How much contact do you have with  a. applicants?  
b. senior agency staff?  
c. agency and department heads?  
d. the Office of Management and 
Budget?  
e. White House staff?  
f. Congressional Member/Committee 
staff?  
 
Interest Group Lobbyists:  
1) Please describe your role in the federal grants process.  
2) Please describe the ways in which you aid clients seeking support from the 
government.  
3) Who are the individuals most responsible for the success/failure of grant 
applications?  
4) What other means do clients use to enhance their success before federal 
agencies?  
5) Do political appointees in agencies work closely in the federal grants process?  
6) Who has final approval over federal grants?  
7) Does the White House have contact with the relevant actors in the federal grant 
process?  
8) Do political appointees have such contact?  
9) Does the Office of Management and Budget have such contact?  
10) Does Congress have such contact?  
 
Local Officials:  
1) Please describe your role in the federal grants process?  
2) Are there any specific individuals or offices in federal agencies that your deal 
with directly?  
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Figure 5.A4 continued 
 
3) Are there any procedures to use or individuals to talk to that can fast track an 
application?  
4) What is your office’s success rate at applying for federal grants?  
5) During your tenure in this office have formal or informal application 
procedures changed                dramatically across presidential administrations?  
6) Has your success in the grants process changed dramatically across presidential 
administrations or over time?  
7) When your applications are being considered do you contact any federal 
agency officials on a regular basis?  
8) Do you contact any other local officials on a regular basis?  
9) Do you contact any officials in a Congressman or Senator’s office on a regular 
basis?  
10) Do state agencies rely on the help from any interest groups in advancing their 
success in terms of the federal grants process?  
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Figure 5.A5. Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board Informed Consent 
Document for Research  
 
Principal Investigator: John Hudak  
Revision Date: 05/18/2010  
Study Title: Presidential Influence over Federal Grants  
Institution/Hospital: Vanderbilt University 
 
 This informed consent document applies to adults.  
(Example: adults, child 12-17 years, parent, legal representative, healthy volunteer, etc.)  
Name of participant: ______________________________________ Age: ___________  
 
The following information is provided to inform you about the research project and 
your participation in it. Please read this form carefully and feel free to ask any 
questions you may have about this study and the information given below. You will 
be given an opportunity to ask questions, and your questions will be answered. Also, 
you will be given a copy of this consent form.  
Your participation in this research study is voluntary. You are also free to withdraw from 
this study at any time. In the event new information becomes available that may affect the 
risks or benefits associated with this research study or your willingness to participate in 
it, you will be notified so that you can make an informed decision whether or not to 
continue your participation in this study.  
 
1. Purpose of the study:  
 
The purpose of the study is to gain information regarding the bureaucratic processes that 
govern federal grants in the United States. The interviews are being conducted as part of 
the fulfillment of requirements for a Ph.D. in political science at Vanderbilt University.  
You are being asked to participate in a research study because of your integral role in this 
process.  
 
2. Procedures to be followed and approximate duration of the study:  
 
This study will be conducted from June to September 2010. For each participant, 
the study involves a single interview conducted in person with a researcher from 
Vanderbilt University. The interview will take approximately 30 minutes. With the 
consent of the participant, interviews will be audio recorded. However, if a 
participant prefers the interview not be digitally recording, the research will simply 
take hand written or typed notes. The interview will include questions about the 
actual processes at work in federal grant administration as well as inter- and intra-
agency contact with executive branch and legislative staff.  
In case the interviewer requires additional clarification, you may be contacted 
further via email or telephone.  
 
3. Expected costs:  
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There are no costs to participation in this study.  
 
4. Description of the discomforts, inconveniences, and/or risks that can be 
reasonably expected as a result of participation in this study:  
 
Any inconvenience or discomfort from the interview will simply be the half hour 
taken out of your day to participate as well as any discomfort you have in answering 
questions, any of which you may decline to answer  
 
5. Good effects that might result from this study:  
 
a) The benefits to science and humankind that might result from this study. This 
study will offer a clearer description of the federal grants process at each stage. It 
provides a deeper understanding of this process that helps inform the general public and 
the academic community in a way that facilitates the process itself.  
b) The benefits you might get from being in this study. This study offers no direct 
benefit to you.  
 
6. Alternative treatments available:  
 
N/A (individuals who choose not to participate will not be included in the study).  
 
7. Compensation for participation:  
 
There is no compensation for participation.  
 
8. Circumstances under which the Principal Investigator may withdraw you from 
study participation:  
 
N/A  
 
9. What happens if you choose to withdraw from study participation:  
 
If you choose to withdraw from the study, your responses in the interview will not 
be used in the project.  
To withdraw, you can simply contact the principal investigator, John Hudak at 
XXX.XXX.XXXX or email him at john.hudak@vanderbilt.edu and request 
withdrawal from the project.  
 
10. Contact Information. If you should have any questions about this research study or 
possibly injury, please feel free to contact John Hudak at XXX.XXX.XXXX or my 
Faculty Advisor, NAME at XXX.XXX.XXXX.  
 
For additional information about giving consent or your rights as a participant in this 
study, please feel free to contact the Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board 
Office at (615) 322-2918 or toll free at (866) 224- 8273.  
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13. Confidentiality:  
 
All efforts, within reason, will be made to keep your personal information in your 
research record confidential but total confidentiality cannot be guaranteed. All responses 
from the interview will be kept without personally identifying information attached. A 
numerical code will be used so that the researcher knows which participant is associated 
with that interview, but that code will not be shared beyond the researcher. Any 
responses that are used in projects and reports will be deidentified and will not include 
any information that can be used to trace the response to an individual.Additionally, 
upon completion of the project all digital audio recordings will be deleted from all data 
storage systems.  
 
14. Privacy:  
 
Your information may be shared with Vanderbilt or the government, such as the 
Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board, Federal Government Office for Human 
Research Protections, if you or someone else is in danger or if we are required to do so by 
law.  
 
STATEMENT BY PERSON AGREEING TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY  
I have read this informed consent document and the material contained in it has 
been explained to me verbally. All my questions have been answered, and I freely 
and voluntarily choose to participate.  
 
I consent to this interview being audio recorded using a digital audio recording device.  
____________________ _______________________________________________  
Date Signature of participant  
I DO NOT consent to this interview being audio recorded using a digital audio recording 
device.  
____________________ _______________________________________________  
Date Signature of participant  
Consent obtained by:  
Date Signature  
Printed Name and Title  
 
Date of IRB Approval: 05-21-2010  
Date of IRB Expiration: 05-20-2011 
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